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Is Buddhism’s attitude towards accepted forms of knowledge sceptical? Are 
Pyrrhonian scepticism and classical Buddhist scholasticism related in their 
respective applications and expressions of doubt? In what way and to what 
degree is Critical Buddhism an offshoot of modern scepticism? Questions such 
as these as well as related issues are explored in the present collection, which 
brings together examinations of systematic doubt in the traditions of Buddhism 
from a variety of perspectives. What results from the perceptive observations 
and profound analytical insights of the seven essays is a rich and multi-faceted 
picture of two families of philosophical systems—scepticism and Buddhism—
that seem both akin and at odds, both related and distant at the same time.






4  Zimmermann | Döll 
 
 
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek  
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche  












ISBN 978-3-89733-558-5 (E-Book) 
ISBN 978-3-89733-518-9 (printed version) 
© 2020 projekt verlag, Bochum/Freiburg  
www.projektverlag.de 
Cover original design by Benjamin Guzinski; Julia Wrage, Hamburg 











Some Sceptical Doubts about “Buddhist Scepticism” 21 
Mark Siderits 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt? A Note on Dharmakīrti and Scepticism 37 
Vincent Eltschinger 
Nāgārjuna’s Scepticism about Philosophy 55 
Ethan Mills 
Yavanayāna: Buddhist Soteriology in the Aristocles Passage 83 
Georgios T. Halkias 
The Evident and the Non-Evident: Buddhism through the Lens of 
Pyrrhonism 109 
Adrian Kuzminski 
Scripture and Scepticism in Vasubandhu’s Exegetical Method 131 
Oren Hanner 
Sceptical Buddhism as Provenance and Project 161 





 Foreword 7 
 
Foreword 
About Hamburg Buddhist Studies 
Ever since the birth of Buddhist Studies in Germany more than 100 years 
ago, Buddhism has enjoyed a prominent place in the study of Asian religions. 
The University of Hamburg continues this tradition by focusing research ca-
pacities on the religious dimensions of South, Central, and East Asia and 
making Buddhism a core subject for students of the Asia Africa Institute. The 
Numata Center for Buddhist Studies is proud to have found a home at one of 
Europe’s pioneering academic institutions. With its Hamburg Buddhist Stud-
ies book series it honors the University’s long-standing commitment to re-
search in the field of Buddhist Studies and aims to share its results with both 
the academic community and the wider public. 
Today, Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline makes use of a broad 
spectrum of approaches and methods. The field covers contemporary issues 
as much as it delves into the historical aspects of Buddhism. Similarly, the 
questions shaping the field of Buddhist Studies have broadened. Understand-
ing present-day Buddhist phenomena—and how such phenomena are rooted 
in and informed by a distant past—is not at all an idle scholarly exercise. 
Rather, it has become clear that fostering the understanding of one of the 
world’s major religious traditions is a crucial obligation for modern multi-
cultural societies in a globalized world. 
Accordingly, Hamburg Buddhist Studies addresses Buddhism as one of 
the great humanistic traditions of philosophical thought, religious praxis, and 
social life. Its discussions will undoubtedly be of interest to scholars of reli-
gious studies and specialists of Buddhism, but also aim at confronting Bud-
dhism’s rich heritage with questions the answers to which might not easily 
be deduced by the exclusive use of historical and philological research meth-
ods. Such issues require the penetrating insight of scholars who approach 
Buddhism from a broad range of disciplines, building upon and yet going 
beyond the solid study of texts and historical evidence. 
We are convinced that Hamburg Buddhist Studies will contribute to open-
ing up the field to those who may have no training in the classical source 
languages of the Buddhist traditions but approach the topic against the back-
ground of their own disciplinary interests. With this book series, we would 
like to also encourage a wider audience to take an interest in the academic 
study of the Buddhist traditions. 
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About this Volume 
Based on the papers presented and discussed during a conference convened 
by the editor at Hamburg University in 2017 and jointly supported by the 
Maimonides Centre for Advanced Studies and the Numata Center for Bud-
dhist Studies, this collection brings together examinations of types of sys-
tematic doubt in the traditions of Buddhism from a variety of perspectives. 
Outlooks from comparative philosophy are naturally present, and the ques-
tion “May Buddhism’s attitude towards accepted knowledge accurately be 
described sceptical?” is addressed both affirmatively and pessimistically. 
Possible interdependencies between Pyrrhonism and classical Buddhist scho-
lasticism as well as the sceptical nature of New and Critical Buddhism are 
explored. What results from the perceptive observations and profound ana-
lytical insights of the seven essays collected here is a rich and multi-faceted 
picture of two philosophical systems that seem both akin and at odds, both 
related and distant at the same time.  
 
Michael Zimmermann and Steffen Döll 
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Philosophical curiosity, as some have argued, begins when we first call into 
question things that we ordinarily take to be self-evident. It is when doubts 
regarding the nature of reality, ourselves, or our beliefs arise that we start to 
ponder philosophical questions, specifically questions about the limits of our 
knowledge. The articles collected in the present volume seek to improve our 
understanding of the role that sceptical questions of this sort have played in 
the formation and development of Buddhist thought. While in everyday par-
lance scepticism is oftentimes equated with sheer doubt, the focus of this col-
lection is its philosophical sense and usages. John Greco (2008: 4–5) recog-
nizes three historical implementations of philosophical scepticism in West-
ern philosophy: scepticism as a way of life, scepticism as a practical problem, 
and scepticism as a theoretical problem. In the Greek and Hellenistic worlds, 
scepticism was prescribed as a way of life leading to well-being (eudai-
monia). A sceptical life was, therefore, considered to be ethically superior to 
a dogmatic one. Pyrrhonism, for instance, aimed at a tranquil state of mind 
(ataraxia) through the suspension of judgement on all matters. Early modern 
philosophy, on the other hand, considered scepticism to be a practical prob-
lem. Philosophers have attempted to overcome it using a variety of strategies 
in order to arrive at certain knowledge. Thus, René Descartes, in a well-
known array of sceptical arguments, sought to surmount various kinds of 
epistemological obstacles to certain knowledge. Nowadays, contemporary 
philosophy treats scepticism as a theoretical problem. Present-day thinkers 
are interested in what counts as a good argument or reason for thinking that 
scepticism may be valid. Each of these implementations may find parallels 
in Buddhist philosophy, and the studies presented here make various use of 
them in order to examine the issue at the heart of the volume. 
Manifestations of scepticism in Buddhist philosophy can be investigated 
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives. Thus, in addition to taking the 
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different senses of scepticism into account, the questions guiding the contri-
butions focus on the historical and philosophical dimensions of scepticism in 
Buddhist thought, as well as on a comparative inquiry into their meaning in 
light of other philosophical traditions. Some of the papers seek to examine 
whether and in what ways Buddhist works and thinkers display sceptical at-
titudes. This dimension of inquiry refers to instances in which Buddhist 
sources question different forms of knowledge or prescribe the suspension of 
judgement towards beliefs. Another question that has been considered cen-
tres on the history of Buddhist thought. Granting that there are expressions 
of scepticism in Buddhist philosophy, what are their origins? Can we identify 
historical influences on Buddhist sceptical thought, or, vice versa, influences 
that Buddhist sceptical arguments had on contemporaneous and later philo-
sophical developments? Finally, a third line of investigation that has been 
pursued in this volume is comparative in nature. How do sceptical arguments 
and strategies employed in Buddhist philosophy differ from or resemble their 
counterparts in non-Buddhist traditions? Although this question is broad 
enough to subsume systems from any geographical area and tradition, the 
discussion that evolves in the following chapters centres solely on compari-
sons with Western philosophy. The mirror images come from the Greek and 
Hellenistic landscape, as well as from modern Western theories about 
knowledge and doubt. 
One question that may arise very early in view of these lines of inquiry 
concerns the rationale for examining Buddhist philosophy through the prism 
of scepticism and its manifestations. In what ways could relying on ideas 
developed by sceptical philosophical systems contribute to our understand-
ing of Buddhist thought? One plane on which having recourse to scepticism 
as understood in Western philosophy is useful is that of the history of philos-
ophy. The employment of a single term may lead us to insights into the intel-
lectual relationships and exchanges between the Indian philosophical envi-
ronment and that of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. This principle has 
guided a number of past studies which explore the historical connections be-
tween Buddhist and ancient Western philosophy. In this volume, Adrian 
Kuzminski refines his historical narrative of how Indian sources actively 
shaped Pyrrho’s sceptical thought, while Georgios Halkias examines indica-
tions of historical relations of this kind in Aristocles’s History of Philosophy. 
The use of a uniform terminology is also instrumental in revealing theo-
retical commonalities and differences between Buddhism and other systems 
of thought. Vincent Eltschinger, for example, points to the stark contrast be-
tween the New Academy’s and Dharmakīrti’s approaches to knowledge, 
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while noting that they nevertheless tackle practical matters in a similar way, 
and my paper suggests that different ethical evaluations of a doubtful mental 
state, as Vasubandhu’s treatment of this issue shows, may result in different 
degrees of commitment to a sceptical endeavour. But before that, turning our 
gaze to the family of sceptical thought systems known from Western philos-
ophy allows us to consider the preliminary question of whether Buddhism 
exhibits sceptical inclinations at all. This is the route taken by Mark Siderits, 
who largely answers the question in the negative, and Ethan Mills, who does 
choose to characterize Nāgārjuna as a sceptical thinker. And finally, relying 
on Western notions of scepticism proves particularly useful when studying 
modern trends in Buddhism which explicitly connect Buddhist doctrines to 
sceptical or critical principles. This is the use that James Mark Shields makes 
of the term in his contribution. Naturally, in this collection, the historical, 
philosophical, and comparative perspectives complement each other and are 
oftentimes inseparable. 
The volume opens with Mark Siderits’s assertion that Buddhist philoso-
phy cannot usefully be seen as employing any sceptical strategies. Siderits 
looks at Buddhist arguments through the lens of both Pyrrhonian scepticism 
and radical scepticism. By examining the ways in which Buddhist thinkers—
from Abhidharma authors to Nāgārjuna (c. 200 CE) and Vasubandhu (fourth 
to fifth centuries CE)—have treated issues that have become the object of 
sceptical doubt in Western philosophy—the nature of the self, the existence 
of a mind-independent world, and metaphysical certainty—this chapter 
shows that in most of these cases, Buddhism is better understood as arguing 
for a determinate view. In like manner, the formal parallels between Madh-
yamaka philosophy and ancient forms of scepticism, which have often served 
to defend a sceptical reading of Buddhism in modern scholarship, do not 
overcome the many differences that a comparison of these philosophical cur-
rents reveals. Lastly, when Buddhist arguments may nevertheless be inter-
preted as sceptical, such as in Vasubandhu’s defence of the representation 
only (vijñaptimātra) position, these arguments inevitably lead to logical dif-
ficulties. 
In the second chapter, Vincent Eltschinger turns to the epistemological 
strand of Buddhism and examines the strategies that its members employed 
when dealing with instances of doubt. Comparing Dharmakīrti (around 600 
CE), a prominent logician and thinker of that tradition, to equivalent Hellen-
istic schools of thought, Eltschinger opines that Dharmakīrti’s attitude to-
wards knowledge should be seen as closer to the epistemological optimism 
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of the Stoics rather than the pessimistic view of Academic scepticism. Essen-
tially, both the Stoics and Dharmakīrti believed that knowledge of reality is, 
in principle, possible. Like the thinkers of the New Academy, however, 
Dharmakīrti faced difficulties related to practical uncertainty, such as esti-
mating the possibility of a successful life and spiritual practice when the re-
sults of action cannot be fully foreseen. In order to deal with such circum-
stances, Dharmakīrti and the Academics both had recourse to forms of prob-
abilism, which provide a weaker substitute for objective knowledge and cer-
tainty. 
The Buddhist philosopher who has most often been identified with scep-
ticism is Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school. 
In the third chapter, Ethan Mills defends his two-phase reading of Nāgārjuna 
as a sceptic about philosophy. According to this reading, Nāgārjuna displays 
two seemingly incompatible tendencies: first, he argues in favour of a posi-
tive view—namely, the theory of emptiness (śūnyatā)—and against the idea 
of essence (svabhāva); second, he encourages the negative abandonment of 
all views. These tendencies can be reconciled if Nāgārjuna’s philosophical 
procedure is to be taken as a gradual move towards scepticism about all forms 
of philosophy and their content. Nāgārjuna first argues for the thesis of emp-
tiness as a philosophical stance and consequently demonstrates that the idea 
of emptiness undermines all philosophical views, including the theory of 
emptiness itself. Mills shows that this interpretation is supported by several 
Buddhist thinkers, including Candrakīrti (c. 570–650 CE), Kumārajīva (c. 
343–413 CE), and mKhas-grub Dge-legs-dpal-bzang-po (1385–1438 CE). 
Indeed, comparisons between Madhyamaka philosophy and Pyrrhonism 
have been drawn by a number of modern studies. In chapter 4, Georgios 
Halkias opens with a short survey of these works and the principal milestones 
in the discourse regarding the affinities between the two philosophical sys-
tems. From this point, the chapter argues for a historical link between Madh-
yamaka philosophy and Pyrrho’s scepticism by presenting a Buddhist read-
ing of the Aristocles Passage. This passage, which provides a summary of 
Pyrrho’s ideas, is attributed to his student Timon (c. 320–230 BCE) and pre-
served in Aristocles’s (first to second centuries CE) History of Philosophy; 
since Pyrrho himself did not leave any philosophical writings and evidence 
of his life and philosophy is found in only a limited number of other sources, 
the Aristocles Passage is considered to be the most essential source for Pyr-
rho’s teachings. Seen through a Buddhist lens, the passage displays corre-
spondences between the two systems of thought in various dimensions, from 
the goal of employing their ideas to the fruits obtained thereby. According to 
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Halkias, these similarities point to the existence of intellectual ideas common 
to both the Buddhist and Sceptic traditions throughout recorded and unre-
corded history. 
Adrian Kuzminski’s inquiry in the fifth chapter of this volume is guided 
by a similar rationale: revealing crucial analogies between Pyrrho’s ideas and 
early Buddhist thought, he proposes that it is very likely that Pyrrho obtained 
some of the fundamental principles of his philosophy from Indian Buddhism 
during his stay in the subcontinent, reconciling them with his Greek mindset. 
In particular, Pyrrho’s sceptical approach to knowledge, as preserved in Sex-
tus Empiricus’s classification of facts (pragmata) into evident and non-evi-
dent, exhibits an epistemological approach that is comparable to that of the 
Buddha. Although some argue that it is more reasonable to believe that Pyr-
rho drew this perspective from his immediate surroundings—from the 
Democriteans, Cyrenaics, or Megarians—the chapter goes on to show that 
Pyrrho’s thinking integrated various elements, the specific combination of 
which would have been unobtainable in Greece, but could have been found 
in India. The result is a Pyrrhonian phenomenological atomism akin to that 
of the Abhidharma dharma theory. 
While it is arguably classical scepticism and Madhyamaka philosophy 
that have attracted the most scholarly attention, sceptical threads can also be 
found outside Madhyamaka thought. Similarly, Buddhism may be examined 
in light of a variety of sceptical ideas formed in later periods. As I show in 
chapter 6, Vasubandhu, the author of many Yogācāra and non-Mahāyāna 
works, sought to accommodate instances of religious scepticism—expres-
sions of doubt that challenge or dispute the credibility of scriptural 
knowledge claims—in both his theory of exegesis and his commentarial 
work. This form of scepticism is reminiscent of certain critical attitudes to 
religion expressed by early modern thinkers. Vasubandhu himself is far from 
being a sceptic: unlike the Pyrrhonists and in keeping with the Buddhist tra-
dition, doubt for him is an unwelcome state of mind; an attitude that produces 
confusion and is associated with ignorance rather than instilling peace of 
mind. At the same time, rationally justified objections to Buddhist teachings 
ought to be considered and resolved. In either case, Vasubandhu demon-
strates that scepticism should be directed at human understanding instead of 
at Buddhist scriptures, thereby transforming religious scepticism into episte-
mological scepticism. Similarly, the desired end of entertaining sceptical 
doubt or objections is not the suspension of judgement, but the achievement 
of certainty.  
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Finally, in the concluding contribution to the volume, James Mark Shields 
explores modern projects which bring Buddhist thought into dialogue with 
classical and early modern forms of scepticism, as well as modern and con-
temporary forms of progressive and radical philosophy. Belonging to this 
circle of reformers are Stephen Batchelor, whose idea of a secular Buddhism 
defines a middle way between dogmatic faith and unreflective atheism that 
is suited to 21st-century Buddhist practitioners; the Japanese scholarly move-
ment of Critical Buddhism, which sought to reintroduce a critical element 
into contemporary Asian Buddhism that they considered to be an essential 
aspect of early Buddhism; and the radical Japanese New Buddhist move-
ments of the mid to late Meiji period (1868–1912), which unanimously be-
lieved that Buddhism needed to re-establish itself as a “this-worldly,” en-
gaged religion. In his study, Shields evaluates the degree to which these ef-
forts have succeeded in integrating scepticism and criticism in their vision of 
Buddhism, while maintaining the vital Buddhist praxis of responding to the 
suffering of the world. 
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Some Sceptical Doubts about “Buddhist Scepticism” 
Mark Siderits 
For my own part, I am sceptical that there is much in Indian Buddhist philos-
ophy that may usefully be seen as scepticism. Moreover, I think that on those 
occasions where they do employ strategies borrowed from the sceptical 
toolkit, Buddhist philosophers run into difficulties. I shall be examining pos-
sible roles for scepticism in Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, and my conclusions 
will be mostly negative. But I know that some will disagree. I see my role 
here to be one of laying out some broad themes in the topic; I shall be pro-
vocative in some of my remarks, but I shall do this mostly as an attempt to 
stimulate discussion. 
Ordinarily, “I am sceptical about x” can mean any number of things de-
pending on context. In a society where belief in ghosts is common, “I am 
sceptical about ghosts” can be used to assert that ghosts do not exist. The 
sceptic about anthropogenic global warming typically believes that we 
simply do not know whether global warming is caused by human activity. 
Philosophical uses of scepticism display the same ambiguity between the on-
tological and the epistemological. The professed moral sceptic may be a po-
lite moral anti-realist. But strictly speaking, the philosophical sceptic should 
confine their claim to the epistemic realm and leave ontological questions to 
metaphysicians. Those are the rules I shall abide by here: by “sceptic,” I shall 
mean someone who withholds judgement about matters in a certain domain. 
But there is a further distinction to be drawn. A sceptic might hold that we 
cannot have knowledge of matters in that domain, or they might instead with-
hold judgement as to whether or not we can have knowledge of matters in 
that domain. In Hellenistic thought, the first kind of sceptic was called an 
Academic, while the second was called a Pyrrhonian. The form of scepticism 
that has loomed large in modern philosophy from Descartes on, a form often 
called “radical scepticism,” is of the first kind. I shall be using the term “rad-
22  Siderits 
ical scepticism” for the first sort of scepticism and “Pyrrhonian” for the sec-
ond, even though the latter may in fact be more thoroughgoingly disruptive 
than the former. 
There are a number of claims about which Buddhists may be described as 
being sceptical, such as the claim that there is an Īśvara. They are not, though, 
sceptical about the existence of a self: they say that we can know that there 
is no such thing. But neither is any Indian Buddhist sceptical about another 
matter that many would say is beyond the capacities of human knowledge: 
that there is karma and rebirth. This should, I think, give us pause when con-
sidering whether any Buddhists endorse the sort of scepticism practised by 
Pyrrhonians. Surely Sextus Empiricus would see belief in the karma–rebirth 
ideology as an obstacle to tranquillity. I shall return to this question later. 
For now, I want to say some things about radical scepticism and the uses 
to which it may be put. The radical sceptic typically denies that we have 
knowledge about matters in a strictly limited domain, a situation which is 
then contrasted with what holds elsewhere in the epistemic landscape. Thus, 
one might be a radical sceptic with respect to the existence of an external 
world, or of other minds; one might deny that one can ever have knowledge 
with respect to future states of affairs, or to normative claims; and so on. The 
radical sceptic generally arrives at this result by employing evidence about 
matters that we supposedly do know, so that the result is not epistemic anni-
hilation. Thus, Descartes says that his method of doubt would, if unchecked 
by the cogito, still leave in place at least one item of knowledge: that nothing 
is known. (This is why a Pyrrhonian calls the radical sceptic a “dogmatist.”) 
But once the radical sceptic’s work is done (say, with respect to our 
knowledge of the external world), the metaphysician may enter. And it is 
common to suppose that once we have been shown that there is reason to 
doubt whether we are in epistemically significant contact with the physical 
objects that we ordinarily believe populate our world, it is but a short step to 
subjective idealism. But how exactly is that step taken? It would seem that if 
I do not know that there is an external world, I equally do not know that there 
is not. Let us look briefly at how Berkeley, that stock Western idealist, man-
ages the transition from “for all I know there is no external world” to “there 
is no external world.” 
The crucial link is to be found in the epistemological internalism that mo-
tivates Descartes’ method of doubt: the thesis that in order to know that p, 
one must know that one knows that p (the KK thesis). This thesis is called 
“internalist” because it makes knowledge conditional on justification being 
internal to the cognizing subject in some sense. If we accept the analysis of 
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knowledge as justified true belief, then the KK thesis claims that in order for 
one to be justified in believing that p, one must have direct access to the con-
ditions that constitute one’s being justified in believing that p. And a repre-
sentationalist account of perception—the view that what one is directly aware 
of in sense perception is not a physical object but a mental representation—
makes it the case that all one’s directly accessible evidence for the existence 
of an external world consists of states of the subject. This does not itself rule 
out the possibility that these states result from interaction with an external 
world. Radical scepticism can, once again, only bring us to the result that for 
all we know, there may be no external world. But epistemological internalism 
has another consequence that has been crucial to the argument for idealism. 
This is the semantic internalist claim that since we must know what we mean 
by the words we use in articulating knowledge claims, and knowing the 
meaning of a word involves knowing what entity it refers to, the meaningful-
ness of any claim about external objects must depend on our having direct 
access to things external to the mind. Since this is ruled out by a representa-
tionalist account of perception, it follows that all talk of an external world is 
devoid of meaning. Realism about the external world turns out not to be false 
but, rather, meaningless.  
This was Berkeley’s master argument for subjective idealism. It proceeds 
in two stages. First, radical scepticism yields the disjunction: the intentional 
object of sensory experience is either an external object or an inner mental 
state, and we cannot say which. Semantic internalism is then deployed in or-
der to show that the first disjunct is meaningless.1 But now, when we consider 
Vasubandhu’s argument for vijñaptimātra, we see something quite different. 
Like Berkeley (and Dignāga), he first uses representationalism to set up the 
disjunction. But his rejection of the external-world realist disjunct does not 
rely on semantic internalism. Instead, he gives two straightforwardly meta-
physical arguments: one aimed at problems that arise in trying to explain how 
the atoms that are the ultimate reals of the external-world realist ontology 
could bring about sense perceptions; the other appealing to the principle of 
lightness (parsimony) to show that the karmic seeds hypothesis yields a better 
explanation of the genesis of sense perceptions.2 Yogācārins are not semantic 
internalists. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 See Berkeley (1713/1998, 1.179ff). 
2 Kellner and Taber (2014) claim that in Viṃśikā, Vasubandhu supports idealism with an argu-
ment from ignorance: since external objects cannot be established by any epistemic instrument, 
they do not exist. While Kellner and Taber seem to distance themselves from an internalist 
reading, their analysis of Vasubandhu’s strategy comes uncomfortably close. However, my 
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The alternative to semantic internalism is, naturally enough, semantic ex-
ternalism. This is the view that meanings “ain’t in the head”; that the meaning 
of a term is established through causal connections with states of affairs that 
are distinct from the inner states of individual language-users. The key result 
of this anti-individualist stance is that a speaker may meaningfully use a term 
without themselves knowing the referent. In the case of terms used to express 
sense experience, the referent will be whatever regularly causes the sensory 
states that speakers are trained to use as criteria of application. Hilary Putnam 
(1975) used Twin Earth thought experiments to motivate this view of mean-
ing. He later, in the first chapter of his 1981 Reason, Truth and History, de-
ployed it in his famous (or, in some quarters, infamous) BIV argument that 
is meant to serve as a reductio on radical sceptical hypotheses. 
“BIV” stands for “brains in a vat,” which is what we are invited to suppose 
we might all be. This is another way, in addition to the “I might be dreaming” 
scenario, of fleshing out the sceptical hypothesis that the world that is pre-
sented to us through our sense perception is radically different from how we 
take it to be. Imagine, then, that we might be bodiless brains in a vat of nu-
trients, being fed sensory input through brain implants connected to a super-
computer. The programming run by this computer is so sophisticatedly in-
teractive as to be undetectable. Since it is undetectable, when we have the 
experience as of seeing and touching a pot, the cause of this experience might 
be a feature of the program (if we are BIVs), or it might be a pot (if we are 
human beings walking around in the open air). The BIV sceptic will claim 
that we cannot know which it is. But now the semantic externalist intervenes. 
Either we are flesh-and-blood humans, or else we are BIVs. Consider the 
sentence “there is a pot.” The meaning of the word “pot” is whatever reliably 
causes the sensory stimulation that we have learned to express using “pot” 
utterances. It follows that the meaning will differ depending on whether we 
are flesh-and-blood humans or BIVs. If the former, then the reference will 
be pots; if the latter, then it will be some feature of the computer’s program-
ming. The same will hold for all other terms used to express the content of 
our sensory experience. Because of this systematic difference in reference 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
chief difficulty with their reading is that it strikes me as uncharitably weak. Why, after all, can 
the realist not retort that perception establishes the existence of external objects? I take 
Vasubandhu to be arguing in Viṃśikā that the karmic seeds hypothesis that vijñaptimātra theo-
rists use to explain sensory experience posits fewer unobservable entities than does the hypoth-
esis that sensory experience is caused by interaction with external objects (entities that the rep-
resentationalist agrees are not directly observable). And the theory that posits the least number 
of unobservable entities in explaining the phenomena wins. 
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across most terms in our language, we are actually looking at two distinct 
languages. Let us call the first language “English” and the second “Vat-Eng-
lish.” Given the sceptical hypothesis that for all we know, we might be BIVs, 
we cannot know which language we are speaking. But if we are speaking 
English, and we are therefore not BIVs, the sentence “I am a BIV” will be 
false. And likewise, if we are BIVs and are speaking Vat-English, then the 
sentence “I am a BIV” will express something false, for the feature of the 
program that figures in speaker self-reference is not the feature that would 
normally be expressed in Vat-English by “brain in a vat.” The upshot is that 
if the sceptical hypothesis were true, it would be false: whichever language 
we happened to be speaking, it would be false to say “I am a brain in a vat.” 
The sceptical hypothesis is shown by semantic externalism to be self-refut-
ing. 
Now change the sceptical hypothesis to the claim that for all I know, I 
might be a causal series of ālaya consciousnesses. In that case, the word 
ghaṭa would refer to the development of a certain sort of vāsanā. Given the 
shift in reference for this and most other terms, we must then distinguish 
between Sanskrit and Ālaya-Sanskrit. And once again, the result will be that 
the sceptical hypothesis is self-refuting. While Yogācāra does not employ 
anything like Berkeley’s scepticism-fuelled argument, Vasubandhu’s buoy-
ancy argument does rely on the hypothesis that we cannot tell from the con-
tent of our sensory experience alone whether it originates from interaction 
with an external world or from the ripening of karmic seeds. As such, it is 
vulnerable to the charge that it relies on a questionable account of meaning. 
(The other argument is, as Graham Priest has said, valid by the terms of fifth-
century mathematics, but not by those of 21st-century mathematics.)  
One might wonder whether a Buddhist would wish to embrace semantic 
externalism. But the thought that meanings are established through conven-
tion, something that is widely shared among Buddhist schools, suggests an 
implicit endorsement of the externalist’s anti-individualist stance. Conven-
tions are forged by groups of people in interaction with their environment. It 
is not up to the individual to change the convention by fiat. As Putnam said, 
meanings ain’t in the head: they exist in the interactions between groups of 
people and conditions in the world. 
Reflection on this result will take us in the direction of Madhyamaka, 
which is where I think we should go if we want to examine the case for read-
ing Pyrrhonian scepticism into any part of the Buddhist tradition. The exter-
nalist refutation of radical sceptical hypotheses suggests that using the scep-
tic’s disjunction—that for all we know, things might be as we ordinarily 
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think, or they might be completely different way—for revisionary metaphys-
ical purposes is a mistake. That may in turn suggest that metaphysics is gen-
erally a hopeless enterprise: that trying to work out how things are anyway is 
a fool’s errand. This conclusion is certainly one way of understanding what 
Madhyamaka is up to. But before we get to Madhyamaka, we need to go back 
in time to early Buddhism and look at the treatment of the avyākṛta or inde-
terminate questions in the Nikāyas, for this treatment is sometimes cited as 
evidence of sceptical tendencies in the very inception of the Buddhist tradi-
tion (and thus as evidence supporting a sceptical reading of Madhyamaka). 
The avyākṛta are questions that the Buddha refused to answer. Since sages 
were expected to have knowledge about all soteric matters, and the questions 
that the Buddha chose not to answer were on topics deemed to be related to 
liberation, this refusal was considered noteworthy. One interpretation of his 
silence is that since answering these questions is not in fact relevant to attain-
ing liberation, not answering them is consistent with the limited omniscience 
(viz. what might be called Dharmic omniscience) expected of a sage. And 
while this interpretation is compatible with the possibility of the Buddha 
simply not knowing the answers to these questions, some take it further and 
see a certain sort of principled scepticism in his stance. The idea here is that 
such questions are to be rejected on the grounds that answering them would 
require engaging in the epistemologically dubious enterprise of “speculative 
metaphysics.” The Buddha is here seen as a proto-positivist, someone who 
rejects all attempts to extend knowledge beyond what is subject to empirical 
confirmation. 
While it is clear that the Buddha does reject some of the avyākṛta on 
straightforwardly pragmatic grounds,3 I am not sure that the Buddha’s si-
lence is best seen as stemming from scepticism regarding their domain. There 
is, I think, an account of his rejection of all alternative answers to the ques-
tions that better accords with later treatments of the issue. Take the questions 
about the post-mortem status of the enlightened person.4 The Buddha’s re-
sponse is an early instance of a negative catuṣkoṭi: it is not to be said that 
after death the enlightened person exists, does not exist, both exists and does 
not exist, or neither exists nor is non-existent (i.e., attains some inexpressible 
state). One wonders how all four options can be rejected, but later exegetes 
uniformly explain this as having been made possible by the use of the com-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 For example, M 63 (Cūḷamāluṅkya Sutta). 
4 M 72 (Aggivacchagotta Sutta). 
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mitmentless prasajya pratiṣedha negation. That in turn tells us that the ques-
tion involves a false presupposition: in this case, the assumption that there is 
such a thing as a person. Given that persons are mereological sums, and thus 
are no more than conceptual constructions, it is strictly speaking false that 
there are persons, and so it is false that there are liberated persons. Statements 
with false presuppositions lack truth-conditions, and so lack meaning. Their 
shared presupposition being false, all four possible answers to the question 
turn out to be meaningless. The Buddha’s rejection of all four is tantamount 
to the injunction “Don’t say gobbledygook.” 
This is the first use of what I call a presupposition failure filter, which 
filters those seemingly meaningful utterances that actually lack semantic sig-
nificance due to presupposition failure out of the discourse. It is put to great 
use in Abhidharma articulations of what I call Buddhist Reductionism. There, 
it serves as a kind of semantic insulation between the two truths, preventing 
contradictions from arising in the domain of the ultimate truth by confining 
statements using what are called mere convenient designators to the realm of 
conventional truth. The mesh of this filter grows ever finer as we move from 
the earliest Abhidharma texts to the much later work of Dignāga and Dhar-
makīrti (where all discourse is screened out). But it is in Madhyamaka that 
the presupposition failure filter does its most radical work. It was agreed by 
all that the test of an entity’s being ultimately real is whether it bears its na-
ture intrinsically—whether it may bear that nature in the unaccompanied 
state. Mādhyamikas develop a battery of arguments meant to reduce to ab-
surdity various views about what sorts of things might have intrinsic natures 
and how they might function. If these arguments were to succeed, they would 
show that there are no ultimately real entities or ultimate truths. And this is 
so not because the ultimate nature of reality is inexpressible (the Yogācāra 
view), but rather because the very idea of the ultimate nature of reality is 
incoherent. Madhyamaka is a particular sort of non-dualism, namely, seman-
tic non-dualism: there are not two kinds of truth, there is just one, the con-
ventional. 
Madhyamaka is often taken for a kind of scepticism, specifically Pyrrho-
nian scepticism (or perhaps that of Jayarāśi’s Lokāyata).5 It is not hard to see 
why. Mādhyamikas seek to banish the search for the ultimate truth by show-
ing that there is nothing that such statements could be about. Pyrrhonians 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Dreyfus and Garfield (2011) for a relatively cautious and nuanced formulation of the 
claim that Madhyamaka is like Pyrrhonism, but also for references to some less cautious ver-
sions. 
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likewise try to bring about an end to inquiry into matters that are not imme-
diately evident from our experience. Mādhyamikas are routinely accused of 
moral nihilism, as are Pyrrhonians. Madhyamaka is confronted with the 
charge of being self-refuting: in purporting to show that there can be no reli-
able means of belief formation, it is said to render itself unable to support its 
own claim that all things are empty or devoid of intrinsic natures. Pyrrhonism 
likewise faces a self-refutation objection. Nāgārjuna claims that he has no 
thesis, and so does Sextus. Both systems struggle to devise a method that will 
allow them to achieve their aim of quieting certain sorts of conceptual activ-
ity without committing to substantive claims about the nature of the world or 
our knowledge. And so on. 
I am not persuaded by all these parallels. But before saying why, I should 
mention one additional point that I think does carry some weight. One inter-
esting feature of Sextus’ work is the wide variety of topics he addresses. He 
seems to have something to say against every learned view of his day. This 
prolixity is a function of the task he set himself: to help his reader attain a 
state of tranquillity by revealing the absence of conclusive reasons in support 
of the views held by learned inquirers. And this must be accomplished with-
out suggesting that there is some general recipe for demonstrating the lack of 
decisive reasons, for to do so would be to lapse into dogmatism, to exempt 
his own methods from the Pyrrhonian stricture against holding beliefs. All 
he can do is respond to the views of others, setting out countervailing reasons 
that might serve as effective antidotes to the particular belief in question. But 
this appears to have been Nāgārjuna’s strategy as well. Each of the 27 chap-
ters of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) takes up a different topic, and one 
has the sense that the work could have been indefinitely extended. This is, I 
think, because there can be no master argument for the conclusion that all 
things lack an intrinsic nature. A master argument would require there to be 
some feature common to all ultimate reals whereby they could be shown to 
lack intrinsic natures, which would defeat the purpose of showing that all 
things lack an intrinsic nature; namely, to show that there can be no such 
thing as how the world is anyway. Thus, Mādhyamikas must confine them-
selves to pointing out absurdities that follow from the views of their realist 
opponents.6 Since such opponents and their realist views are many, there may 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 By “realist,” I here mean something much broader than the external-world realism of a phys-
icalist. The target of Madhyamaka critiques is what is nowadays called metaphysical realism, 
the view that there is such a thing as how the world is anyway, that is, independently of how we 
happen to conceive of it. The subjective idealism of Yogācāra is just as much a realism in this 
sense as Cārvāka is. 
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be no end to the task. What the Mādhyamika must count on is that sooner or 
later, their interlocutor will get the point and desist from propounding new 
metaphysical theories. 
The prolixities of the two systems do, then, provide some support for call-
ing Madhyamaka a kind of scepticism. But I do not think that this is enough 
to overcome the differences. Take, for instance, their respective aims. For 
Sextus, the aim is the tranquillity that comes from no longer forming beliefs 
through reasoned inquiry. One learns, for instance, to avoid forming a belief 
about questions such as whether tattooing is good or bad. Instead, one con-
ducts one’s life by acting in accordance with how things appear to one prior 
to inquiry. Jayarāśi describes the state resulting from this suspension of 
judgement as one in which “all worldly activities are engaged in with the 
delight of non-analysis (avicāritaramaṇīya)” (Franco, 1987, p. 44). Perhaps 
this state is one of delight, but Mādhyamikas are Buddhists, and this is not 
what Buddhist practice aims at. The Buddhist goal is the cessation of exis-
tential suffering; it is to be attained by extirpating all forms of an “I”-sense. 
It is difficult to see how the Pyrrhonian practice of acquiescing in how things 
appear to the uninquisitive could lead to such extirpation. Most people have 
the intuition that they are persisting agents and subjects of awareness. This 
intuition is what Buddhists have in mind when they speak of moha or delu-
sion. How could merely acquiescing in delusion lead to liberation? 
Kuzminski (2008) has recently argued for the view that Madhyamaka 
may usefully be thought of as like Pyrrhonism in important ways. Aware that 
the acceptance of the doctrine of karma and rebirth is just the sort of belief 
in a “non-evident” matter that Pyrrhonians would condemn as dogmatic, he 
asserts (pp. 60–61) that Mādhyamikas do not take the doctrine at all seri-
ously. This is difficult to reconcile with the thrust of MMK 26, which con-
cerns precisely how karmic causation generates future births. Perhaps 
Kuzminski might turn to his claim that for Madhyamaka, nirvāṇa is not dis-
tinct from saṃsāra for support (p. 84), since he equates saṃsāra with the 
Pyrrhonian notion of the “evident”—that is, how things appear to ordinary 
people—and rebirth is not “evident” in this sense. But for Buddhists, saṃsāra 
is first and foremost a matter of beginningless rebirth, hardly something that 
ordinary people find themselves compelled to accept given their sensory ex-
perience. Moreover, the view that Madhyamaka equates nirvāṇa and 
saṃsāra is based on a misreading of MMK 25.19. All Nāgārjuna actually says 
there is that nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are alike in both being empty; that is, not 
ultimately real. To say this is not to say that nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are not 
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conventionally distinct; indeed, Buddhist practice would be pointless other-
wise. In support of this claim that the goal of Madhyamaka, nirvāṇa, is Pyr-
rhonian tranquillity, he quotes Candrakīrti to the effect that “the absence of 
anxiety [i.e., tranquillity] is the distinguishing characteristic of morality” 
(MAV 6.205b). However, the passage he quotes, *śīlaṃ cādāhalakṣaṇaṃ, ac-
tually means that the precepts of the Path are by nature devoid of passion, the 
point being that since the passions reinforce the “I”-sense, the path to the 
cessation of suffering involves practices (such as the cultivation of universal 
compassion) that work to counter the passions. Given Kuzminski’s descrip-
tion of the Pyrrhonian attitude towards the acquisition of knowledge (p. 39), 
a much better candidate for an Indian parallel to Pyrrhonism would be 
Jayarāśi’s Lokāyata. This school is, however, the target of sustained Madh-
yamaka attack (as at MAV 6.99–102). 
Here is one final reason to be sceptical about the attempt to assimilate 
Madhyamaka into the Pyrrhonian brand. One matter about which the Pyrrho-
nian must be indifferent is the question of whether or not there is anything 
behind the appearances in which one acquiesces. When it directly appears to 
the Pyrrhonian sage that they are hungry, they simply eat. They do not engage 
in inquiry as to whether it is best that one eats, or how one would best go 
about eating. Their sceptical practice has trained them not to engage in such 
inquiry by showing that for any question about the matter, there are good 
reasons supporting each of the different possible answers. However, this still 
leaves open the possibility that there are determinate answers to such ques-
tions—answers that may be beyond the scope of human knowledge, but de-
terminate answers for all that. Metaphysical realism, the view that there is 
such a thing as how the world is anyway, is not ruled out for the Pyrrhonian. 
It is, however, for the Mādhyamika. This is precisely the point of the doctrine 
of emptiness. Indeed, it is the point of the doctrine of the emptiness of emp-
tiness. As Nāgārjuna makes clear in MMK 13.8cd, the mistake of taking emp-
tiness to be a feature of ultimate reality lies in supposing that there could be 
such a thing as ultimate reality. The Madhyamaka middle path between real-
ism and nihilism lies in letting the presupposition-failure filter screen out all 
thought of there being a way that things exist independently of our concepts, 
which reflect interests and cognitive limitations. 
I said above that there can be no master argument for the claim that all 
things are empty. However, some think that the appeal to dependent origina-
tion can be used to fashion such an argument. For my own part, I am sceptical 
that such an argument could succeed. As usually formulated, it depends on 
mistaking the bhāva of svabhāva for “existence” instead of “nature.” When 
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Ābhidharmikas say that only things with svabhāva can be ultimately real, 
what they mean is not that only things that are not dependent on other things 
for their coming into existence can be ultimately real. (Such entities would 
be eternal, and most if not all dharmas are thought to be momentary.) What 
they mean is that only things that can be the way they are without reliance on 
other simultaneously existing things can be ultimately real. The nature of an 
ultimately real entity must be something that that entity could have in the 
unaccompanied or “lonely” state. Moreover, to say that an entity originates 
in dependence on cause and conditions is not to say that its nature is extrinsic 
or “borrowed” from some other simultaneously existing entity. So I don’t 
think that such an argument could be made to work. But if I am wrong about 
this, that would yield an additional reason to deny that Madhyamaka is Pyr-
rhonian. Sextus would surely see the deployment of such an argument as ev-
idence of “dogmatism.” 
In Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV), Nāgārjuna develops a strategy that may be 
used to argue against the possibility of establishing the number and nature of 
the pramāṇas; that is, against the very possibility of epistemology. The basic 
idea is that any attempt to show that a particular cognition resulted from the 
exercise of a pramāṇa or epistemic instrument will incur one of three faults: 
question-begging, infinite regress, or mutual dependence. (The five “modes” 
or prayogas that Sextus uses for the same purpose include these three.) If, for 
instance, I claimed that my seeing a pot was veridical on the grounds that it 
results from perception, and in response to the question of how I know per-
ception to be a pramāṇa I were to simply assert that it is, I would be guilty 
of question-begging. Now, at one time, I took the use of this strategy to 
amount to an argument against the possibility of there being pramāṇas. But 
in that case, Sextus could accuse Nāgārjuna of dogmatism. Sextus is himself 
careful to deploy his version of the strategy in carefully delimited contexts 
so as to make it clear that the opponent’s own views are being used against 
them. So perhaps the more charitable reading of the discussion in VV is that 
Nāgārjuna is merely replying to an objection and not developing an argument 
for a substantive thesis. In either case, Nāgārjuna, like Vasubandhu, is mak-
ing use of a sceptical stance. Are there difficulties in that?  
The opponent here is a metaphysical realist who also thinks that the phil-
osophical enterprise begins with the establishment of the pramāṇas.7 Vācas-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 There is some uncertainty as to who Nāgārjuna’s opponent might have been. At one time, I 
accepted what was then the consensus view that it was a Naiyāyika. But even in 1979, the dates 
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pati replies, on Nyāya’s behalf, that while the regress that results from seek-
ing to validate a cognition by validating the instrument of that cognition can 
in principle continue indefinitely, in practice it stops after at most two or 
three iterations. While this may at first seem to completely miss the point of 
the argument, on reflection, it turns out to carry some weight. 
The first thing to notice here is that Nāgārjuna’s strategy might illicitly 
presuppose epistemological internalism. This presupposition would be illicit 
because those who are in the business of seeking to determine the number 
and nature of the pramāṇas are externalists: for them, a given cognition 
counts as an instance of pramā or knowledge just in case it is the product of 
a reliable cause. One need not know that it was so produced in order for it to 
count as pramā; it simply has to be the case that its cause possessed the rele-
vant epistemic virtues. Likewise, one need not know all the evidence that 
would show a given epistemic procedure to be of the right sort in order to 
know that that procedure is a pramāṇa; all that is required is that the cogni-
tion whereby one apprehended the procedure as a pramāṇa was produced in 
the right way. One can look into the pedigree of the cognition; one can look 
into the pedigree of the procedure that produced the cognition; one can even 
take the further step of checking up on the procedure one uses to make sure 
the original procedure is indeed reliable. But one need not do any of these 
things provided that the cognition is in fact veridical and that it was in fact 
produced by means of a truth-conducive procedure.  
To this, it will be objected that cognizers will not employ an epistemic 
procedure unless they have some reason to believe that it is trustworthy or 
truth-conducive. A mere lucky guess does not count as knowledge, and mere 
lucky guesses are the best we could hope for if we did not seek to discover 
which are the procedures that cause true beliefs. The question then returns: 
What epistemic procedures are we to employ in seeking to determine the 
number and nature of the pramāṇas? To this, however, a champion of 
pramāṇa epistemology would respond that we should not expect to com-
pletely eliminate the role of luck in our epistemic achievements. A theory of 
the pramāṇas is developed over time, through the method of reflective equi-
librium. The point of the method is precisely to lessen the role of luck in our 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
seemed wrong. Some scholars now think that the opponent is an Ābhidharmika of some sort. 
Be that as it may, there is considerable discussion of Nāgārjuna’s attack on pramāṇavāda in the 
commentaries on Nyāya Sūtra, and for good reason, given that his arguments threaten to under-
mine the Nyāya enterprise. The important point for present purposes is not whom Nāgārjuna 
had in mind, but whether his critique succeeds in refuting the metaphysical realist’s project. 
What Naiyāyikas say in response to that critique is relevant to this question. 
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epistemic achievements. As a universal fallibilist, the causal-theroretic epis-
temologist concedes that we may never know that we have actually arrived 
at the ideal solution to the challenges we face in our quest for accurate infor-
mation about the world. However, this is not to say that an ideal solution does 
not exist. And, more importantly, it is not to say that we are irrational if we 
continue to seek an ideal solution. What would be irrational would be to heed 
these sceptical doubts about the epistemological enterprise. 
It is at this point that we should come back to the question of what Nāgār-
juna is doing in his critique of pramāṇa epistemology in VV. Is he merely 
replying to an objection from a metaphysical realist, someone who is a realist 
about the pramāṇas, or does he intend his argument to have wider conse-
quences? We know that later Mādhyamikas found room for a theory of the 
pramāṇas at the conventional level. So, in their eyes at least, one can do epis-
temology while acknowledging that all things—including pramāṇas—are 
empty. The question is whether the critique in VV is meant to extend to eve-
ryone who denies that all things are empty. Buddhist Reductionists like 
Vasubandhu, Buddhaghosa, and Dharmakīrti also tried their hand at devel-
oping a theory of the pramāṇas, but as Reductionists, they must hold that 
there are entities with intrinsic natures. Are they tarred with the same brush 
that Nāgārjuna might use against a realism like Nyāya’s? 
Navya-Naiyāyikas were aware of the problem of epistemic luck and tried 
to develop ways of eliminating all reference to luck in their theory of the 
pramāṇas. The 12th-century Advaitin Śrīharṣa argued that their attempts ac-
tually established that “pramāṇa” is a cluster concept, that prāmāṇya is not a 
jāti or natural kind, but instead a mere upādhi.8 If this is correct, does it help 
support the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness against the metaphysical re-
alism of the Abhidharma enterprise? Here again, I think the answer must be 
no. One can, I think, acknowledge that “pramāṇa” does not pick out a natural 
kind and still hold that the world we seek to know through the exercise of 
pramāṇas comes pre-sorted into determinate kinds of individual entities. If 
Śrīharṣa is right, then pramāṇa is a human conceptual construction. But for 
the Buddhist Reductionist, the same is true of human. The fact that a theory 
of pramāṇas must take into account the interests and cognitive limitations of 
humans is perfectly explicable on the basis of the facts about those dharmas 
to which the existence of humans is reducible. Thus, the result is a standoff 
between the metaphysical realism of Buddhist Reductionism and the global 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 See Granoff (2018). 
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anti-realism of Madhyamaka. The Mādhyamika can support their anti-real-
ism using pramāṇas that are merely conventionally real. But they cannot turn 
around and deny the coherence of the Buddhist Reductionist employment of 
pramāṇas understood to have the same ontological status. Once again, strat-
egies based on sceptical premises take Buddhist philosophers only so far. 
I think it is safe to say that most philosophers reject scepticism, in all its 
varieties. It has, though, become something of a cliché that scepticism plays 
an important role in the development of philosophy. Sceptical challenges mo-
tivate realist philosophers to forge new conceptual tools for defending what 
the sceptic calls into question. Scepticism also triggers new agendas in on-
tology, such as reductionisms and eliminativisms in various domains. The 
chief focus of the papers collected here is the role that scepticism has played 
in the development of Buddhist philosophy. But perhaps we should think of 
Buddhist philosophy as something that continues to develop today. If this 
makes sense, then we should also be considering what sorts of new sceptical 
challenges it confronts, and how it might respond. This is what living philo-
sophical traditions do. 
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Beyond Reasonable Doubt? A Note on Dharmakīrti  
and Scepticism* 
Vincent Eltschinger 
Madhyamaka, to which several papers of the present volume are dedicated, 
is arguably the Indian tradition that is most relevant to a discussion of the 
theoretical and practical connections between Buddhism and scepticism: 
Nāgārjuna offers a striking counterpart to Pyrrho’s (365–275 BCE?) tetra-
lemma;1 he refuses to endorse any philosophical position or to commit him-
self to any metaphysical framework, almost exclusively resorts to reductio 
ad absurdum,2 and severely criticizes traditional Buddhist dogmatics and ri-
val epistemologies; and his attack on key notions such as causality, produc-
tion, motion, and sensation provides a striking parallel to Aenesidemus’s 
(first century BCE) critique in his Pyrrhonian Discourses.3 There is little 
doubt that Candrakīrti (c. 600 CE) and Mādhyamikas of the so-called 
*Prāsaṅgika trend would have recognized themselves in scepticism under-
stood as “an attempt to base its rejection of all doctrines on a methodical 
critique of all sources of knowledge allegedly available” (Brunschwig, 1997, 
p. 460). The present paper does not address Madhyamaka, however, but an-
other major component of Indian Buddhist philosophy, the so-called episte-
mological tradition and its most prominent personality, Dharmakīrti (c. 600 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
* Most sincere thanks are due to my excellent friend John Taber for his invaluable comments 
on this paper. 
1 For a commentary on Timon’s (315–225 BCE?)/Aristocles’s (first century CE) well-known 
summary of Pyrrho’s philosophy, see Brunschwig (1997, pp. 466–473), and, in the present vol-
ume, the essay by Georgios Halkias. 
2 The sceptic philosopher Arcesilaus (see below) is reported to have adopted an “essentially 
refutative didactic method.” According to Cicero’s De Finibus (2.2), those who wanted to listen 
to him were prohibited from asking questions and requested to expound their own views, which 
he subsequently dismissed. See Brunschwig (1997, p. 568). 
3 Chapter 2 as summarized by Photius in his Myriobiblion; see Brunschwig (1997, pp. 581–
582). 
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CE). In spite of later attempts to interpret him as a Mādhyamika,4 and irre-
spective of the abundant use later Mādhyamikas made of his epistemological 
principles (some major “epistemologists” were actually Mādhyamikas), 
Dharmakīrti has hardly anything to do with Madhyamaka, a tradition towards 
which he was, if not entirely hostile, at least (ironically?) indifferent.5 Given 
the obvious (though sometimes perhaps superficial) similarities between 
Madhyamaka and scepticism, it is thus not entirely surprising that Dhar-
makīrti’s thought has only a little to offer in this connection. At least as far 
as his epistemology is concerned, the great Buddhist logician can even be 
said to stand much closer to ancient scepticism’s obsessional target, Stoicism, 
with which he shares several basic assumptions and attitudes regarding 
knowledge and its possibility. Without pushing the comparison too far, Stoi-
cism and scepticism can be said to have the same kind of relationship as the 
Buddhist epistemologists and the Madhyamaka, with the first of each pair 
adopting a decidedly “dogmatic” and optimistic attitude towards knowledge, 
truth, and certainty. 
Contrasting Epistemologies 
To characterize it very briefly, Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is a practice-ori-
ented epistemological system acknowledging two (and only two) reliable 
sources of knowledge (pramāṇa): perception (pratyakṣa, bare sensation) and 
inference (anumāna). Perception grasps bare uninterpreted particulars (sva-
lakṣaṇa), which are the only things that can be said to exist according to 
Dharmakīrti’s strictly nominalistic account of reality (which states that uni-
versals are nothing more than useful intellectual constructs referring to 
shared functional differences). Perception is non-erroneous (abhrānta) and 
free from conceptual construction (kalpanāpoḍha) and thus provides an un-
biased, unmediated, and positive access to (and image of) reality. Contrary 
to other types of awarenesses (conceptual, mnesic, etc.), it displays a vivid 
(spaṣṭa, sphuṭa) image of its object. All cognitive events ultimately go back 
to perceptual awarenesses, and hence to the causality of real entities, includ-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 See Steinkellner (1990) and Franco and Notake (2014, pp. 38–42). 
5 See PV 3.4 in Franco and Notake (2014, pp. 38–42). As noted by the translators, interpreting 
Dharmakīrti’s opponent as a Mādhyamika is only found in the earliest commentators (Deven-
drabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, seventh century CE). 
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ing the conceptual traces subsisting in the mind in the form of latent tenden-
cies imprinted by earlier experiences. Inasmuch as it “awakens” or actualizes 
one of these conceptual traces, perception triggers a judgement or ascertain-
ment (niścaya) in which raw perceptual data are interpreted in the form “this 
is X.” However, due to ignorance (a kind of counter-science possessed by all 
ordinary humans), causes of error, and obstacles to the identification process, 
ascertainment can fail to occur, thus leaving room for errors and false super-
impositions. The role of inference is to eliminate these errors and, as it were, 
to (re)establish the truth. This is why inference allows the wise to penetrate 
the true nature of reality (tattvāvatāra) and thus has a decisive role to play in 
the salvational process. Although concrete particulars are inexpressible, re-
ality can be adequately described in its most general features: momentari-
ness, selflessness, painfulness, and so on. According to Dharmakīrti, then, 
reality can be known and adequately described, and all of our reliable cogni-
tions are causally related to it in a direct/positive or in an indirect/negative 
manner. Needless to say, most if not all of these points are challenged by the 
Mādhyamikas. 
The “sceptic”6 philosophies of Arcesilaus (316–241 BCE) and Carneades 
(214–129 BCE), both of whom were scholarchs of the New (or Middle) 
Academy, developed in reaction to Stoicism and its optimistic account of hu-
man knowledge (which they regarded as arrogant and breaking with the tra-
ditional humility of Greek epistemologies7), notably at the level of the so-
called cognitive impression (katalêptikê phantasia).8 This epistemological 
optimism was based on the identity between logos as human reason and logos 
as the underlying principle of the universe, an identity which warranted the 
world’s basic rationality and intelligibility, and on the fact that epistêmê and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, only the Pyrrhonian philosophers labelled themselves “sceptics,” but they 
themselves recognized striking similarities between Pyrrhonian and Academic topics and ap-
proaches (see, e.g., Sextus Empiricus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.232). These representatives 
of the Academy clearly saw themselves as Platonists, a claim that becomes less surprising if 
one thinks of Plato’s first dialogues and their aporetic method. As Brunschwig (1997, p. 569) 
further argues, the form of Plato’s dialogues (in which Plato himself does not appear as a char-
acter) was abandoned after his death, so that “avec le recul, les dialogues de Platon pouvaient 
fort bien apparaître […] comme des œuvres dont il était à peu près impossible d’extraire les 
vues personnelles de Platon.” 
7 See Cicero’s important testimony (Academica 1.43–46) in Brunschwig (1997, pp. 565–566). 
8 For interesting accounts of this controversy, see Lévy (2008, pp. 25–38) and Brunschwig 
(1997, pp. 566–568). On the Stoic representation/impression, see, for example, Muller (2006, 
pp. 146–167), Ildefonse (2004, pp. 75–109), and Long and Sedley (2001a, 174–236). 
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truth were regarded as being ultimately grounded in reality. A key Stoic con-
cept in this connection was sunkatathesis, a word with marked political over-
tones pointing to the mind’s capacity to judge or to assent to a certain im-
pression or representation (phantasia) left by an object of the senses and 
hence to distinguish a true proposition from a false one. As allegedly re-
flected in the word’s etymology, this phantasia was believed to project light 
(phôs) onto a certain aspect of reality and to be so irresistible as to lead the 
knowing subject to give his assent to it as though it were dragging him/her 
by the hair, according to Chrysippus (279–206 BCE). Once it has been legit-
imated by this active approval in the form “this is X,” the once-passive rep-
resentation becomes “cognitive,” truly manifests the object’s intrinsic char-
acter, and serves as a criterion of truth. In addition, this representation pos-
sesses a vividness that our representations of unreal objects in dreams, hallu-
cinations, and so on, do not have, and according to Zeno (334–262 BCE?), it 
entails three basic elements: it “arises from that which is; is stamped and 
impressed in accordance with that very thing; and of such a kind as could not 
arise from what is not” (Sextus Empiricus in Long & Sedley, 1987, vol. 1, 
§40E; translated in Baltzly, 2018). There is much in Stoic epistemology, 
logic, and physics that can be compared with Dharmakīrti’s system, even 
though, as is most often the case in such comparative ventures, not much 
would withstand a closer and contextual analysis. 
In order to justify the key concern of his philosophy, the universal sus-
pension of judgement/assent (epochê peri pantôn), the Sceptic Arcesilaus 
fiercely attacked the Stoics’ cataleptic impression, arguing that “no impres-
sion arising from something true is such that an impression arising from 
something false could not also be just like it” (Cicero in Long & Sedley, 
1987, vol. 1, §40D; translated in Baltzly, 2018). In other words, the only le-
gitimate consequence to be drawn from the unknowability of things 
(akatalêpsia) was that one should refrain from any assent. Arcesilaus’s argu-
ments are not well documented, but there are some reasons to believe that he 
was referring to cases of sensory errors, oniric or hallucinatory illusions, and 
so on. In any event, his point was apparently not that the Stoics misrepre-
sented what legitimate assent or the criterion of truth was or should be, but 
rather that there was nothing in human experience to meet the necessary con-
ditions. In parallel to his attack on representations, he claimed that every 
statement could be opposed with a contrary statement of equal force (isothe-
neia). Arcesilaus apparently laid emphasis on the pessimistic tendencies 
which the New Academy thought could be identified in some passages of 
Phaedo (for example, 66B): those in which Plato made the body responsible 
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for the soul’s incapacity to achieve knowledge, or where he emphasized the 
intrinsic weakness of the sensory faculties and human understanding. More 
generally, Arcesilaus regarded the world as being shrouded in a profound 
obscurity where nothing could be discerned or understood. In sharp contra-
distinction to this, the Stoics and Dharmakīrti made frequent use of photic 
metaphors when analysing cognition and representation. 
Life and Action 
One of the main objections that the Stoics levelled against scepticism was 
that the universal suspension of judgement made action impossible insofar as 
action requires an impression, the soul’s assent, and an impulsion (hormê). 
According to Plutarch (46–120 CE), Arcesilaus (at least dialectically) admit-
ted that sensory impressions could not be avoided, but denied that assent was 
a necessary element in the causal chain leading to action, arguing that having 
an opinion or hurriedly assenting to an impression could only result in falsity 
and error and thus had to be dispensed with (Against Colotes, 1122A–F, in 
Long & Sedley, 1987, vol. 1, §69A). Arcesilaus contended that the impres-
sion left by appropriate objects had a natural capacity to trigger an impulsion 
towards them by weighing upon or bending the soul’s central commanding 
faculty (hêgemonikon). But on which basis is one to decide about the proper 
course of action in the absence of any certainty? If Sextus Empiricus (160–
210 CE?) is correct, then Arcesilaus appointed reasonability as the criterion 
of right action: (s)he who suspends her/his judgement on everything still can 
make what is reasonable, or what can be given a reasonable justification (eu-
logon),9 the guiding principle of her/his actions (choosing, avoiding, etc.). As 
Carlos Lévy puts it,  
being fully conscious of the fallibility of one’s representations and judgements 
does not prevent one, according to him [sc. Arcesilaus], from acting in the best 
possible way by resorting to a type of rationality capable of accounting for all 
of one’s choices. (Lévy, 2008, p. 38; translation mine)  
One of Arcesilaus’s successors at the head of the Academy, Carneades, pro-
posed a more sophisticated alternative to the Stoics’ assent in order to make 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 This notion also has a Stoic background; see Long and Sedley (1987, vol. 1, §59B) and Lévy 
(2008, p. 38). 
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decisions in life and practice possible.10 He appointed as a (purely subjective) 
criterion what he termed “convincing impressions”; namely, impressions that 
“strongly appear to be true” (but can turn out to be false) and their increas-
ingly refined developments in the form of impressions that are “shaken by 
nothing” and “analysed in detail.” Carneades’s criterion remained entirely 
fallible, and hence allegedly true to the spirit of scepticism, in that it was not 
able to distinguish what is apparently true and is genuinely true from what is 
apparently true and is actually false. This doctrine has often been regarded 
as “probabilistic,” even if this designation owes more to Cicero’s Latin ren-
dering (probabile) of the Greek word pithanon (“convincing”) than to the 
doctrine itself.11 Whatever the case may be, Carneades’s project consisted, 
according to Carlos Lévy again, in “defining a purely relative cognition that 
made action possible without ever turning the bases of this action into dog-
mas” (Lévy, 2008, p. 44).  
Dharmakīrti was by no means a Sceptic, as we have seen, but like all of 
his Hellenistic homologues, including the Sceptics, he had to account for the 
very possibility of successful life and practice. The problem he was facing, 
of course, differed both in terms and in scope from the one facing the Scep-
tics, for unlike them, he admitted the possibility of a true knowledge of em-
pirical reality. His problem was quite clearly circumscribed: whereas action 
in general is by definition connected with future  (and hence situationally 
imperceptible) results, religious practice understood as a kind of interaction 
with the invisible (by means of rites, formulas, etc.) is connected with 
transempirical (and hence intrinsically imperceptible) states of affairs. In 
other words, people engaging in action are not in a position to ascertain 
whether their endeavours will be successful and what types of consequences 
the said endeavours will have. Their decisions can thus be expected to rely 
on an epistemologically weaker criterion than the one(s) used in order to cog-
nize empirical reality. When coping with this problem, Dharmakīrti was led 
to conclusions that are to some extent analogous to the New Academy’s in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 See Long and Sedley (2001b, 42–46), Brunschwig (1997, pp. 570–573), and Lévy (2008, pp. 
42–44). 
11 Note Lévy (2008, pp. 43–44): “Carnéade construisit ce que l’on a appelé improprement le 
‘probabilisme.’ Il ne s’agissait pas, en effet, pour lui, de déterminer les conditions dans 
lesquelles un événement avait le plus de chances de se produire, mais de structurer le monde 
des représentations sans pour autant reconnaître l’existence d’un critère qui permettrait de dis-
tinguer infailliblement les phantasiai vraies de celles qui ne l’étaient pas.” Philo of Larissa 
(154–84 BCE) transferred Carneades’s practical criteria of plausibility to the field of theoretical 
research (see Brunschwig, 1997, pp. 572–574). 
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that they mobilize reasonable justification and a form of “probabilism” rather 
than objective knowledge and certainty. 
Let us first consider everyday activities such as farming.12 Since all the 
undertakings of so-called rational or judicious (prekṣāvat) persons imply a 
goal, these persons are justified in attempting to determine the results that 
they can reasonably expect from the use of a certain means. Repeated prac-
tice and observation has taught farmers that seeds of a given kind are capable 
of yielding the result they expect from them; that is, a good crop. Though 
their work (ploughing, sowing, etc.) and its expedients (seeds, etc.) generally 
brings about the desired result, agriculturists are not unaware of the fact that 
the ultimate occurrence of this result might well be impeded by unfortunate 
events such as drought or storms. In other words, they can at best infer their 
work’s fitness for bringing about the expected results, or equivalently, the 
possibility that these results may occur, because to infer the actual occurrence 
of the results themselves would be to suppose that they can ascertain the ab-
sence of any impediment. 
Agriculturists, then, act with uncertainty or doubt (saṃśaya) regarding the 
future and hence imperceptible results of their endeavours. In other words, 
they find themselves in a situation in which they do not perceive things or 
states of affairs that are inaccessible with respect to space, time, and/or mode 
of being (svabhāva, dravya), which Dharmakīrti refers to as adṛśyānupalab-
dhi, the “non-perception of something imperceptible.” Since this does not 
allow for any certainty regarding the existence or non-existence of a given 
state of affairs, Dharmakīrti explicitly describes this kind of non-perception 
as a dubious cognition, which should compel our farmers not to cognize, de-
scribe, or treat this state of affairs as existent (sajjñānaśabdavyavahāra) and 
hence entice them to inactivity or abstaining from action (apravṛtti, 
pravṛttiniṣedha). However, one observes that they do not refrain from action; 
that is, they engage in action in spite of this uncertainty. Now, what can be 
said about that rationality of these persons, if uncertainty as to the existence 
of the desired result does not prevent them from engaging in action? Can they 
be described as rational at all? Here, Śākyabuddhi (660–720 CE?), one of 
Dharmakīrti’s early commentators, provides us with an important statement:  
If one is acting out of doubt, how is it correct to say that people who do so are 
“rational”?—What is the contradiction here? It is the [person] who would act 
out of certainty [alone] that is irrational. There are indeed two causes that com-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 See Eltschinger (2007). 
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pel one to act: doubt about an object(/profit) and certainty about an ob-
ject(/profit). Inactivity also has two causes: doubt about [something possibly] 
unprofitable and certainty about [something] unprofitable. A person who acts 
out of the first two causes and a person who does not act out of the second two 
is what the world means by a rational person. If acting without certainty is so 
unusual, then it would be contradictory for farmers, etc., to work in the fields 
and so on, for they have no means of valid cognition that can ascertain that 
their future wheat and such will grow. (PVṬ ñe D72b2–5/P87b4–88a1, trans-
lated in Dunne, 2004, p. 291 n. 126, partly modified) 
Śākyabuddhi’s opponent contends that rationality entails acting out of cer-
tainty alone. Śākyabuddhi quite strikingly replies that it is just the opposite; 
that is, that one who only acts out of certainty is behaving in an irrational 
way, thus clearly implying that rational persons also act out of uncertainty, 
just as farmers do. 
Now, what about the religious practice of judicious persons? To put it in 
a nutshell, Dharmakīrti acknowledges three types of objects: perceptible ob-
jects (pratyakṣa, such as a table), imperceptible hic and nunc objects 
(parokṣa, such as a fire on a hill), and intrinsically or radically imperceptible 
objects (atyantaparokṣa, such as the details of the law of karmic retribution). 
Whereas the first type of objects can be grasped by perception, the second 
falls within the jurisdiction of inference (i.e., from perceiving smoke, I can 
infer the existence of a fire on the hill). As for the third type of objects, they 
can be apprehended neither by perception nor by inference. It should be em-
phasized, however, that it is by no means the case that in Dharmakīrti’s eyes, 
the transempirical realm cannot be known at all, for it can be apprehended 
by various types of personalities, from omniscient buddhas to much lower 
types of mystics and spirituals, thanks to their extraordinary perceptual, “pro-
phetic” abilities.13 Rather, Dharmakīrti’s claim is that ordinary human cog-
nition, which is limited to sense perception and inference, and hence to the 
empirical realm, has no access to supersensuous states of affairs. Given that 
a significant part of religious practice pertains to the latter, these gnoseolog-
ical limitations put human beings with religious expectations in a fairly dif-
ficult situation. Those who wish to improve their condition (e.g., by obtaining 
a better existential status after death) or to reach salvation therefore have no 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 By “prophetic,” I do not mean, at least primarily, the ability of these persons to predict future 
events (though some of them are credited with such powers), but their “visionary” capacity to 
perceive ordinarily imperceptible states of affairs. Their paradigmatic ancestors in ancient India 
are the Vedic “seers” (ṛṣi), who are credited with a direct encounter with the otherwise invisible 
dharma. 
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other possibility than to rely on religious revelation, because the supersensi-
ble realm is the jurisdiction of scriptures (āgama) or the “prophets” alone.14 
This is what Dharmakīrti says in an important statement:  
The person [who wishes to engage in religious practice] cannot live without 
resorting to scriptural authority. [This for two reasons: first,] because [it is 
only in scripture that (s)he] learns the great benefits and evils [that are to be 
expected from] engaging in and refraining from certain [actions] whose results 
[remain entirely] imperceptible [to her/him; and second,] because [this person] 
does not see [anything] contradictory to the existence of these [desirable or 
undesirable results]. (PVSV 108.2–5)  
There is thus no other reason to resort to scripture than the inability of ordi-
nary human beings to perceive supernatural things. Therefore, Dharmakīrti 
says,  
it is [only] the ignorant person who looks at scripture as a means of valid cog-
nition in order to put into practice its teachings, because [those] who have 
thoroughly understood the truth do not [need to] resort to the instruction [of 
others any longer]. (PVSV 175.27–28, translated in Eltschinger, Krasser, & 
Taber, 2012, 75)  
However, this outlines what could be described as a religious anthropology 
from an epistemological point of view, but it does not solve the problem, all 
the more so since ancient India’s marked religious pluralism presupposed 
numerous and often mutually contradictory scriptures. For which scripture 
should one opt, then? And how can we evaluate its reliability? For, bearing 
as they do on invisible things, scriptural statements are ipso facto unverifiable 
and unfalsifiable for ordinary human beings, and since they have no invaria-
ble connection with any meaning, they cannot be expected to express their 
invisible object in a “natural” and unbiased way. What to choose, then, and 
on what basis? 
Dharmakīrti credits Dignāga (480–540 CE?), the “founding father” of 
Buddhist epistemology, with an original approach to the problem:  
If [a person] is [necessarily] to act [on a scriptural basis], it is better that (s)he 
act in this way [i.e., after evaluating scripture, and] this is the reason why 
[Dignāga recommends that scriptural] authority [be decided] through [critical] 
examination. (PVSV 108.5–6)  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 This is either because their words and phrases have an authorless, natural relationship with 
their supersensible meanings (which is the position of the Mīmāṃsā school) or because their 
authors (generally referred to as āptas or “credible persons/persons of authority”) have a su-
pernatural access to the invisible (which is the position of most other schools, including Bud-
dhism). 
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To explain, although religious scriptures deal with supersensible states of af-
fairs, they generally also contain numerous statements that bear on empirical 
reality and are therefore in principle verifiable or falsifiable. Assessing the 
truth or falsity of these statements is the core of Dharmakīrti’s method of 
critical evaluation: a scripture can be said to be reliable as regards the super-
sensible realm if (1) whatever it says about empirical facts is true and (2) it 
does not entail internal contradictions. A given scripture’s reliability in 
transempirical matters is thus inferred from its reliability in the empirical 
ones. This is the method outlined in PVSV 108.20–109.3, which Dharmakīrti 
adapts from Vasubandhu’s (350–430?) Vyākhyāyukti (VY)15 and ascribes to 
Dignāga:  
[A treatise’s] not being invalidated by perception consists [first] in the fact that 
the things it holds to be perceptible are indeed such [i.e., perceptible], as [the 
five skandhas, i.e., colours] such as blue, [affective sensations such as] pleas-
ure and pain, [ideation consisting in one’s] grasping the characteristics [of 
things, conditioning factors] such as desire, and cognitions [which are all per-
ceived by sensory perception and self-awareness. Second, a treatise’s not be-
ing invalidated by perception consists] in the fact that the [things] it does not 
hold to be such [i.e., perceptible] are [indeed] imperceptible, as [pseudo-con-
stituents] such as pleasure, which [the Sāṅkhya erroneously takes to] combine 
in the form of sounds, etc., and [categories] such as substances, motions, uni-
versals, and connections [which the Vaiśeṣika erroneously takes to be percep-
tible]. Similarly, [a treatise’s not being invalidated by inference] consists 
[first] in the fact that the [things] it holds to be the objects of an inference that 
does not depend on scripture are really such [i.e., inferable], as the four nobles’ 
truths, [and second] in the fact that the [things it holds to be] non-inferable are 
really such [i.e., noninferable], like the self, [God,] etc. [And this type of in-
validation is] also [relevant] concerning an inference that depends on scripture 
[which consists in identifying internal contradictions within a treatise]. For 
example, once it is admitted that demerit has the nature of [defilements] such 
as desire and the [corporeal and verbal acts] that originate from them, one does 
not prescribe [things] such as ablutions and fire oblation in order to remove it 
[i.e., demerit, because they cannot annihilate its cause]. 
Dharmakīrti presents this method as being of universal application, but it is 
quite clear that in actual practice, he limited its use to the critical evaluation 
of non-Buddhist scriptures and made it a tool of interreligious polemics and 
apologetics. PV 1.332–334 provides a memorable application of its princi-
ples to the Veda:  
[The Veda] says that a permanent soul is the agent [of action], [indeed] that 
there are permanent entities, [and] that supersensible [things] are sensible. [It 
declares] a wrong cause, a wrong duration as well as a [wrong] cessation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 See VY 169.14 ff. 
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entities, or [puts forward yet] other [things] whose possibility is excluded by 
the two means of valid cognition or contradicted by inference based on scrip-
ture. He who would pretend that [such a treatise] is veracious without having 
set aside [its] contradictions and without exhibiting the purpose of the treatise, 
would surpass an unchaste woman in audacity. (PV 1.332–334, translated in 
Eltschinger, Krasser, & Taber, 2012, p. 65) 
Here is Dharmakīrti’s autocommentary thereon:  
The Veda declares that a soul, which neither loses its former nature nor as-
sumes a new one, [i.e., which is permanent] is successively the agent of [good 
and bad] deeds and the experiencer of the fruits of [those] deeds. [It is suppos-
edly the experiencer] due to being the inherence cause [of pleasant and un-
pleasant sensations,] and [the agent] due to assuming the supervision [of bod-
ily actions], etc. And this has repeatedly been shown to be incorrect. And [the 
Veda also states] the permanence of certain entities, [which] is incorrect, be-
cause a non-momentary [entity] violates the criterion of something real. 
[Moreover, the Veda says that things which are] indeed strictly imperceptible, 
such as universals, are perceptible, and [declares] a wrong origination, dura-
tion, and cessation of entities: [Indeed, it proclaims that something] which in-
itially is not an agent [and which, being permanent,] cannot receive [any] new 
property, can generate [an effect] through dependence on [something] else; 
[that something] whose nature is no [longer] to be brought about since it has 
[already] been completed [by its own causes can] last by virtue of a substratum 
[upon which it depends]; and [that entities] perish due to a cause, etc. [The 
Veda states] yet other [things] which are contrary to what is established by 
perception and inference and are negated by inference based on scripture, such 
as the capacity of the Agnihotra and [ablutions] to purify one of sin, etc. [He 
who,] failing to set aside the contradictions of the pramāṇas in the entire body 
of the treatise [and] failing to exhibit [that it has] the properties of a [sound] 
treatise, viz., [its] expressing [internal] consistency, appropriate means, and a 
human purpose, [and even] wishing to prove, just by [resorting to] the [occa-
sional] truthful indication of something trivial, that the Veda which says these 
things is equally faultless when it comes to [those] profundities which can 
scarcely be penetrated by great insight—he surpasses the unchaste woman in 
audacity. (PVSV 174.14–28, translated in Eltschinger, Krasser, & Taber, 2012, 
pp. 65–71)  
Dharmakīrti devised a second method, which he presented as an alternative, 
but which is the one he operated with while evaluating the reliability of the 
four Buddhist truths in the second chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika (PV 2.146 
ff.). This method, which goes back to Āryadeva (third century CE?) and 
Dharmapāla (530–561 CE?),16 is presented as follows in PV 1.217 and PVSV 
115.15–19 thereon:  
Or [scripture] is inference with regard to the other [domain] due to its being 
not belying with regard to the principal points [i.e., the Four Noble Truths], 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
16 See Tillemans (1986) and Tillemans (1990, 1:29–32). 
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because the nature of what is to be abandoned and what is to be realized to-
gether with their means is well established [by it]. Reliability consists in the 
fact that what is to be obtained and what is to be avoided [together with] their 
means, which has been taught by that [credible person], corresponds to reality 
(avaiparītya); like the Four Noble Truths in the way it will be explained [in 
the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter]. Because that very [thing that has been taught], 
which serves the human goal, [and hence] is suitable to be practised, is relia-
ble, the assumption that this is so also in the case of the other, transcendent 
realm may not lead to oneʼs deception. [And this is for two reasons:] (1) be-
cause there is no counter-evidence (anuparodha), and (2) because it is point-
less for a speaker to make false statements without a purpose. 
This second method is less systematic and significantly more economical, for 
instead of checking each and every point of the treatise under consideration, 
one focuses on the central doctrinal points: the Four Noble Truths, emptiness, 
etc. Nevertheless, the overall strategy remains that of an inferential transfer-
ence of authority from one type of statement to another. 
However, far from simply adopting it from Dignāga, Dharmakīrti prob-
lematized this strategy by questioning its formal and epistemic aspects and 
concluding quite unambiguously that the inference at stake was formally 
flawed:  
Thus, this scripture has been explained in both ways to be inference for want 
of [any other] possibility (agatyā), [having in mind:] ‘Given that one has to 
proceed on account of scripture it is still better to proceed in such a way.’ 
However, inference in such a way indeed is not without problems (na […] 
anapāyam), for words are not invariably concomitant with [their] objects. 
(PVSV 109.19–22, translated in Krasser, 2012, p. 101) 
Claiming that such an inference is unsatisfactory is tantamount to saying that 
scripture is not a full-fledged means of valid cognition, a consequence that 
Dharmakīrti actually draws in the fourth chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika 
when referring to some of the passages just considered: “Now, it had already 
been refuted earlier that scriptures were pramāṇas” (PV 4.101ab, translated 
in Dharmakīrti, 2000, p. 141). In these and other passages, Dharmakīrti thus 
relativizes the epistemic status of scripture qua inference and at least provi-
sionally17 denies it any reliability in supersensible matters—a rather surpris-
ing and provocative position for someone who was likely a Buddhist monk 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
17 “Provisionally” because the proof-strategy at work in the second chapter of the Pramāṇavārt-
tika aims to demonstrate that the core of the Buddha’s teachings, the Four Noble Truths, is 
reliable, hence that the compassionate Buddha who taught them is/has become (like) a means 
of valid cognition. On the structure of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika, see 
Franco (1997, 15–43); on Dharmakīrti’s conception of the Buddha as pramāṇabhūta in this 
demonstration, see Krasser (2001). 
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in a Buddhist institution of learning. One of Dharmakīrti’s clearest state-
ments concerning the deceptive character of such an inference is the follow-
ing:  
Objection: Isn’t it the case that such a thing as the arrangement of the world, 
even though it is not an object [accessible] to reason,18 is known [by you Bud-
dhists] from the statement of a person which must be assumed [to be true, on 
the basis of his reliability in regard to other things]? [Answer:] No, because 
[we have] no confidence [in such a person]. It is indeed not the case that, since 
[a person has been observed] not to err with respect to a certain [matter], eve-
rything [that person says] is like that [i.e., true, and this for two reasons: first], 
because one observes that [people who are known to be reliable in regard to a 
certain thing do in fact] err [in regard to other things]; and [second,] because 
a concomitance between the [verbal] activity of this [allegedly superior per-
son] and reliability is not established. Beyond that, the [aforementioned] defi-
nition of scripture has been accepted for lack of [any other] recourse. There is 
[indeed] no ascertainment [of supersensible things] from [scripture thus de-
fined, and] this is the reason why [we have] also stated [above] that scripture 
is not a means of valid cognition. (PVSV 167.23–168.3, translated in 
Eltschinger, Krasser, & Taber, 2012, pp. 42–44) 
Dharmakīrti remains true to his position even when he is asked about the 
reliability of the Buddha’s (rather than Vasubandhu’s) statements about 
things that are beyond the grasp of reason, such as cosmology: it is not be-
cause this eminent person is seen not to speak falsely about certain empirical 
things that he can be ascertained to always speak the truth. In other words, 
no invariable correlation can be established between his statements and reli-
ability (in the form “whatever this person says is true”), because one cannot 
rule out the possibility that some of his statements, notably those that pertain 
to the supersensible, are unreliable. This fallacious type of inference is gen-
erally referred to as being “with a remainder” (śeṣavat): it is an inference in 
which the absence of logical reason (being this person’s statement) from the 
counter-instances (unreliable statements) of the property to be proven (being 
reliable) is doubtful (sandigdha). 
Dharmakīrti makes this explicit in the framework of his controversy 
against a Brahmanical opponent (Naiyāyika or “vetero-Mīmāṃsaka”) who 
wishes to prove the authority of the Veda by resorting to the following strat-
egy: “[Those] Vedic sentences for which there is no cognition [on the part of 
Buddhists as being true] are [in fact] true, because they are part of the [same] 
Veda, just like the sentence ‘Fire is the remedy for cold,’ etc.” (PVSV 173.17–
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 That is, the operation of the two means of valid cognition, perception and inference. 
50  Eltschinger 
19, translated in Eltschinger, Krasser, & Taber, 2012, p. 62). Even if the op-
ponent infers the reliability of the entire Veda (including those of its state-
ments that relate to the supersensible) on the rather weak basis of a single 
trivial statement, his strategy is structurally similar to the one ascribed to 
Dignāga. According to Dharmakīrti, 
the [argument] of this [adversary] is [an inference of the type known as] 
śeṣavat, like [the inference that something has a certain] taste [as other fruits] 
from having the same color and like [the inference that something is] cooked 
[from being] in one [and the same] pot. This type of [inference] has been re-
jected by the Logician19 because it deviates [from the property-to-be-proved]. 
(PVSV 173.19 and PV 1.331, translated in Eltschinger, Krasser, & Taber, 
2012, p. 62)20  
Now, of course, the opponent is well aware of the structural similarity be-
tween the two approaches and criticizes Dharmakīrti for adopting the very 
same strategy. In his reply, Dharmakīrti has to concede that Dignāga’s 
method also amounts to a śeṣavat inference and thus does not dispel doubt, 
but he recommends that all scriptural statements be checked, not just one, as 
his Brahmanical opponent claims. This, he says, is the only way in which one 
can hope to maximize the chances of being successful and avoiding decep-
tion:  
And [true,] we have stated this definition of scripture [too]. However, this [is 
justified only] if, for every object capable of being examined, there is correct-
ness of positive and negative assertions by appropriate means of valid cogni-
tion. [And] even if there is no necessary relation between words and [their] 
meanings [which would ensure the validity of scripture], it is better that a [per-
son] act in [a state of] doubt [when it comes to matters relating to worldly 
prosperity and salvation]; for [scripture] may occasionally be reliable in this 
case. (PVSV 173.26–174.1, translated in Eltschinger, Krasser, & Taber, 2012, 
pp. 63–64)  
Dharmakīrti fully admits that the criterion to which he resorts for deciding 
on a certain scripture, an inferential transfer of authority, is formally flawed 
and thus epistemologically unsatisfactory. However, he says, it is the least 
unsatisfactory or best possible strategy in that it significantly increases the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
19 Dignāga. 
20 Note also PVSV 173.22–25: “This kind of inference was declared to be not [really] a proof 
by the master [Dignāga] himself in pointing out the deviating character of the Naiyāyikas’ 
śeṣavat-inference, like the [so-called] proof that fruit [one has not tasted] has the same taste [as 
fruit one has tasted] because it has the same color, and the [so-called] proof that rice grains one 
has not observed are cooked, like those which one has observed, because they are in one [and 
the same] vessel” (translated in Eltschinger, Krasser, & Taber, 2012, p. 63). 
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probability that the treatise under consideration is reliable and allows a suc-
cessful interaction with the transempirical realm. In other words, it is reason-
able for judicious persons to use this criterion when it comes to making de-
cisions about things that are beyond the scope of reason and empirical 
knowledge; that is, in situations that are essentially characterized by doubt 
and uncertainty. Dharmakīrti is not a sceptic, not even a “local” sceptic, but 
his way of dealing with the unknowability of the supersensible is similar to 
that of the Sceptics in that it appeals, albeit on a much narrower scale, to 
reasonability and rational justification. 
References 
Abbreviations and Primary Sources 
D = sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka. Takasaki, Jikido, Zuiho Yamaguchi, and Noriaki 
Hakamaya (eds. 1977–1981). sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ’gyur preserved at 
the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo: University of Tokyo. 
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makīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary, edited by Raniero Gnoli. 
Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 
23).  
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Nāgārjuna’s Scepticism about Philosophy 
Ethan Mills 
The pacification of all cognitive grasping and  
the pacification of conceptual proliferation are peace.  
Nowhere, to no one has any dharma at all been  
taught by the Buddha. 
– Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 25.24 
 
Nāgārjuna (c. 200 CE) is usually regarded as the founder of the Madhyamaka 
school of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, and he has likely been one of the 
most variably interpreted philosophers in history. In the hands of interpreters 
in India, Tibet, East Asia, and the West, Nāgārjuna has been read as a nihilist, 
a mystic, an anti-realist, a transcendental metaphysician, a deconstructionist, 
an irrationalist, an empiricist, a philosophical deflationist, a philosopher of 
openness, and a sceptic.1  
The root of much of these interpretive disputes is the fact that Nāgārjuna’s 
texts appear to contain two mutually incompatible tendencies. Let us call 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 See Wood (1994) for a contemporary defense of a nihilist interpretation (which was influential 
in classical India); Burton (2002) for a reading that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy entails nihilism 
despite his non-nihilist intentions; Arnold (2005) for a transcendental interpretation of Nāgār-
juna’s commentator Candrakīrti; Magliola (1984) for an appropriately playful Derridian decon-
structive reading; Huntington (2007) for an irrationalist reading with a postmodern flavour; and 
Kalupahana (1986) for an empiricist reading in which Nāgārjuna debunks the metaphysical 
excesses of philosophers following the death of the Buddha. Mystical readings see the negative 
arguments as preparation for ineffable mystical insight (see Abe, 1983, Murti, 1955, and Taber, 
1998), while anti-realist readings take Nāgārjuna’s point to be that “we cannot give content to 
the metaphysical realist’s notion of a mind-independent reality with a nature (whether express-
ible or inexpressible) that can be mirrored in cognition” (Siderits, 2000, p. 24; see also Siderits, 
2007, and Westerhoff, 2010). Versions of sceptical readings that differ from my own can be 
found in Garfield (2002), Matilal (1986), and Kuzminski (2008). A recent interpretation of 
Nāgārjuna as a philosophical deflationist can be found in Gandolfo (2016); an interpretation 
that makes much of metaphors of openness is McGagney (1997). For a general introduction to 
Madhyamaka, see Williams (1989), chapter 3, and for a detailed history of Madhyamaka in 
India, see Ruegg (1981). 
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these positive and negative tendencies. On one hand, Nāgārjuna seems to be 
presenting positive philosophical arguments in favour of the thesis that all 
things are empty of essence, the thesis of universal emptiness. Consider, for 
instance, this frequently discussed verse from the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(hereafter MMK): “That which is dependent origination, and that which is 
designated based on having grasped something, that we call emptiness and 
the middle path itself” (MMK 24.18).2 On the other hand, there are negative 
passages in which Nāgārjuna seems to encourage readers to eschew any the-
sis whatsoever, perhaps even a thesis of universal emptiness. For example, 
the MMK ends with this famous yet puzzling verse: “I bow to him, Gautama, 
who, by means of compassion, taught the true dharma for the purpose of 
abandoning all views” (MMK 27.30).3 How can Nāgārjuna simultaneously 
argue in favour of a positive view that all things are empty while also encour-
aging the negative abandonment of all views? Does one of these tendencies 
take priority over the other? Does Nāgārjuna contradict himself, and if so, 
does he do so intentionally? Does Nāgārjuna mean just what he says, or 
should some of his statements be taken non-literally? What is the point of his 
philosophical procedure? 
My goal is to offer a sceptical interpretation that offers coherent answers 
to these questions. My thesis is that Nāgārjuna is best seen as a sceptic about 
philosophy. Rather than seeking to put forward a philosophical view about 
the nature of reality or knowledge, Nāgārjuna uses arguments for emptiness 
to purge Madhyamaka Buddhists of any view, thesis, or theory whatsoever, 
even views about emptiness itself. 
Elsewhere, I have defended this interpretation against others, especially 
mystical and anti-realist interpretations.4 Here, I shall instead argue in favour 
of my sceptical interpretation by illustrating its hermeneutic virtues, particu-
larly how it makes sense of the fact that Nāgārjuna employs two seemingly 
incompatible tendencies. I will make a case study of Nāgārjuna’s discussion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe / 
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā // (MMK 24.18). This single verse has spawned 
a cottage industry among Nāgārjuna scholars. A good place to start is Berger (2010). Transla-
tions from Sanskrit are my own unless otherwise noted. 
3 sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat / 
  anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam // (MMK 27.30) 
4 See Mills (2013, 2016, 2018b). 
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of causation in chapter 1 of the MMK. Lastly, I will turn to historical issues: 
first, Nāgārjuna develops the quietist strands of Early Buddhism while incor-
porating elements of analysis-insight strands, and second, there are historical 
precedents for sceptical interpretations of Nāgārjuna in India, Tibet, and 
China. Inquiry into Nāgārjuna’s historical and religious context shows that 
for him, Buddhism and scepticism are not merely compatible in the way that 
Sextus Empiricus claims Pyrrhonism is compatible with religious practice. 
Buddhist practice of at least one type actually constitutes a type of scepticism, 
a point that can contribute to larger conversations about scepticism and reli-
gious practice. 
Scepticism about Philosophy 
As I use it, “scepticism about philosophy” constitutes a diverse cross-cultural 
club of philosophers who use philosophical methods against philosophy it-
self, which distinguishes them from sceptics whose objects are domains such 
as knowledge of the external world, other minds, induction, and so on. Scep-
ticism about philosophy is most fully exemplified in Western philosophy by 
Sextus Empiricus, in China by Zhuangzi, and perhaps in Abrahamic tradi-
tions by al-Ghazali, Maimonides, and Montaigne. The Indian tradition con-
tains hints of such scepticism in the Ṛg Veda, Upaniṣads, and Early Bud-
dhism, but scepticism about philosophy reached its peak in the “three pillars” 
of Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and Śrīharṣa.1 While this rather motley cross-cultural 
crew of sceptics operates within different intellectual contexts and often en-
gages in scepticism for different reasons, I think there is enough similarity in 
their sceptical attitude about philosophy to warrant gathering them together 
into a loosely affiliated philosophical coalition. 
Since I am claiming that Nāgārjuna is sceptical about philosophy, it is 
natural to wonder what, exactly, I am claiming he is sceptical about. The 
difficulty in answering this question comes from the fact that sceptics about 
philosophy tend to define “philosophy” dialectically based on their oppo-
nents’ views. Sceptics about philosophy neither need nor desire to put for-
ward a theory about what philosophy really is.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 I am borrowing the “three pillars” metaphor from Eli Franco: “From almost complete oblivion 
he [Jayarāśi] slowly emerges as one of the three pillars on which Indian scepticism rests, the 
other two being the much more famous Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa” (Franco, 1994, p. 13). 
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As an example of this parasitic method of defining the target of scepticism 
about philosophy, consider Sextus Empiricus. Sextus tells us that he relies on 
the Stoics’ idea that philosophy consists of three parts: 
The Stoics and some others say that there are three parts of philosophy—logic, 
physics, ethics—and they begin their exposition with logic […]. We follow 
them without holding an opinion on the matter. (Outlines of Scepticism [PH] 
2.2) 
Sextus says that Pyrrhonists do not have their own opinions about what phi-
losophy is for the simple reason that Pyrrhonism is not about putting forward 
and defending positions on philosophical matters such as the true nature of 
philosophy; rather, Pyrrhonism is an ability to reach equipollence between 
opposing views, which leads to the suspension of judgement and a feeling of 
tranquillity (PH 1.4).2  
Similarly, Nāgārjuna is working purely dialectically with metaphysical 
and epistemological definitions from opponents such as Ābhidharmikas and 
Naiyāyikas, because his ultimate goal is not the elucidation of another philo-
sophical doctrine, but rather the “pacification of conceptual proliferation” 
(prapañcopaśama). Thus, the target of Nāgārjuna’s scepticism is defined by 
his opponents. 
Nāgārjuna’s Two Phases 
According to my interpretation, Nāgārjuna has two general phases in his phil-
osophical procedure, corresponding to the positive and negative kinds of 
statements I identified earlier. The first phase is that of offering arguments 
for emptiness and against essence (svabhāva). The second phase is that of 
demonstrating that this idea of emptiness has the peculiar property of under-
mining not only all other philosophical views, but even itself, thus leaving a 
thorough Mādhyamika without any views, theses, or positions whatsoever. 
This second phase is the purging of philosophical impulses, the end of phi-
losophy itself. In other words, Nāgārjuna is a sceptic about philosophy. 
Nāgārjuna’s texts are not a steady march from phase one to phase two. 
His texts are complex and move freely between these phases. Still, a general 
tendency to move towards the second phase can be detected in the MMK from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 There may be evidence of direct historical interaction between Pyrrhonism and Madhyamaka, 
but I will not consider such evidence here (see Beckwith, 2015, and McEvilley, 2002). 
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the fact that the verses most amenable to phase two are found in the dedica-
tion (mangalaṃ), at the end of several chapters, and especially at the end of 
the text.3 
This interpretation opens Nāgārjuna up to the objection that it is self-re-
futing or at least logically inconsistent to claim that one is making no claim. 
This is a time-honoured objection that goes as far back as the Nyāya Sūtra 
(probably roughly contemporaneous with Nāgārjuna himself). 4  Is such a 
claim self-refuting? How can one have a claim and a non-claim at the same 
time without violating the Law of Non-Contradiction? Here, an analogy with 
Pyrrhonism can help. According to Harald Thorsrud, the charge of incon-
sistency is a category mistake: “Just as it is neither consistent nor inconsistent 
to ride a bicycle, the practice of scepticism, in so far as it is something the 
sceptic does, can be neither consistent nor inconsistent” (Thorsrud, 2009, p. 
146). Likewise, Nāgārjuna’s texts are part of a philosophical practice with a 
therapeutic rather than theoretical goal. While phase one looks like a philo-
sophical language game of giving reasons for positions, in phase two, Nāgār-
juna is simply playing a different game. 
The most obvious advantage of my interpretation is that it can account for 
the presence of both positive and negative kinds of statements. It sometimes 
seems as if Nāgārjuna is offering straightforward arguments for emptiness 
because he is giving straightforward arguments for emptiness, and it some-
times seems as if Nāgārjuna is rejecting all philosophical views because he 
is rejecting all philosophical views. Granted, my interpretation places a 
greater emphasis on phase two, but this phase is reached through arguments 
for emptiness. In other words, phase one is the medicine one must take in 
order to reach phase two, as suggested by MMK 13.8: “The antidote to all 
views is proclaimed by the conquerors to be emptiness. Those who have a 
view of emptiness the conquerors called incurable.” To insist on taking emp-
tiness as a view is to remain in phase one. In his commentary on this verse, 
Candrakīrti quotes a sūtra in which emptiness is compared to a medicine that 
must purge itself from the body once it has cured the intended illness 
(Prasannapadā [PP], pp. 208–209). MMK 13.8 and its commentary should 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 The end of chapter verses are 5.8, 13.8, 25.24, and 27.30. Other verses suggestive of phase 
two are 18.5, 21.17, and 24.7. 
4 See Nyāya Sūtra 2.1.12–13, in which a Madhyamaka-style argument against pramāṇas is con-
sidered and rejected as self-contradictory. For a thorough study of this section of the Nyāya 
Sūtra and its relation to the Vigrahavyāvartanī, see Oetke (1991). The charge of self-refutation 
is also is the first objection Khedrupjey makes against his sceptical opponent (mKhas-grub dge-
legs-dpal-bzang-po, 1992, p. 258). 
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be taken to mean that even though one might vigorously argue for emptiness 
in phase one, in phase two, emptiness, like a purgative drug, should remove 
itself along with all other philosophical views.5 
Most philosophers are accustomed to residency in something like phase 
one. We put forward arguments, refute other arguments, and so forth. But 
what is it like to inhabit phase two? This phase is described beautifully by 
MMK 25.24: “The pacification of all cognitive grasping and the pacification 
of conceptual proliferation are peace. Nowhere, to no one has any dharma at 
all been taught by the Buddha.”6 Candrakīrti’s commentary explains that 
that which is the pacification, or cessation, of all bases of conceptual prolifer-
ation, that is nirvāṇa. […] Also, pacification of conceptual proliferation, be-
cause there is non-activity of words, is peace, because of the non-functioning 
of thought. (PP, p. 236)7 
This pacification of grasping and “conceptual proliferation” (prapañca) is 
about as extreme an end to philosophical speculation as I can imagine; it is 
hard to imagine that any philosophical theory could be an option for a person 
in this state. It may seem odd to claim that the pacification of conceptual 
proliferation constitutes nirvāṇa, but notice that Candrakīrti says that it is 
only when all bases of conceptual proliferation have ceased that nirvāṇa is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 Anti-realist interpreters may object by pointing to Candrakīrti’s other famous metaphor in this 
section: that of the person who says “Give to me, then, that same ware called ‘nothing’” (PP, 
p. 208). In anti-realist terms, this means that emptiness is not an object or being. However, 
regarding anti-realism as a theory about what does not exist could be construed as a subtle form 
of grasping at being; namely, grasping at the being of a theory that tells us that certain things 
do not really exist. The problem is not with the content of anti-realism in that it inclines towards 
a nihilistic theory; rather, in phase two, the problem is that anti-realism is a theory at all. 
6 Erich Frauwallner has translated 25.24 as “All perception ceases, the diversity is appeased, 
and peace prevails. Nowhere has the Buddha proclaimed any doctrine to anyone” (Frauwallner, 
1958/2010, p. 211). This relies on translating prapañca as “diversity,” which is, I think, the 
sense of the word in some Brahmanical contexts (such Gauḍapāda’s Āgama Śāstra), but it ig-
nores the Buddhist context in which prapañca has a more psychological sense of “conceptual 
proliferation.” Also, Frauwallner sees 25.24 as “one of the germs of the later doctrine that sees 
in the phenomenal world a creation of cognition” (Frauwallner, 1958/2010, p. 186). I do not 
think that this works, however, since prapañca does not have the idealist sense that the mind in 
some sense actually creates reality, but simply the psychological sense that the mind grasps at 
concepts. 
7  sarveśām prapañcānāṃ nimittānāṃ ya upaśamo ’pravṛttis tān nirvāṇam. […] vācām 
apravṛtter vā prapañcopaśamaś cittasyāpravṛtteḥ śivaḥ (PP, p. 236). 
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reached. In the meantime, lessening one’s attachments to views, concepts, 
and thoughts is a good thing for a Buddhist to do.8  
The notion of the “pacification of conceptual proliferation” 
(prapañcopaśama) is vital to my interpretation. Prapañca comes from the 
root √pac or √pañc and has the primary meanings of “expansion, develop-
ment, manifestation.” In philosophy, it is said to mean “the expansion of the 
universe, the visible world.” In other contexts, it could even mean “deceit, 
trick, fraud, error” (Monier-Williams, 1995, p. 681). In Nāgārjuna’s context, 
however, we need to take into account the specific Buddhist history of this 
word: prapañca comes from the Pāli papañca, which is “very hard to define.” 
It has been rendered into Tibetan as a word that means “spreading out, en-
largement” and “activity” and into Chinese as a word meaning “frivolous 
talk” or “falsehood. […] The freedom from prapañca is always praised” and 
the word is “closely associated with vikalpa, and the contexts suggest vain 
fancy, false imagining” (Edgerton, 2004, pp. 380–381). In discussing the 
Nikāyas, Steven Collins points out that “papañcā are said to have ideas (or 
perception) as their cause; the ‘root of imaginings and estimations’ is said to 
be the idea ‘I am the thinker’ […] an idea described as an ‘internal craving’” 
(Collins, 1982, p. 141). For Madhyamaka, this idea came to be closely asso-
ciated with language. According to Paul Williams, “‘prapañca’ in the Madh-
yamaka seems to indicate firstly the utterance itself, secondly the process of 
reasoning and entertaining involved in any articulation, and thirdly further 
utterances which result from this process” (Williams, 1980, p. 32). 
The pacification (upaśama)9 of prapañca is the goal of phase two. How-
ever radical phase two might be, it seems unlikely that a person in this phase 
would be worried about philosophical theories, which rely a great deal on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 It may also be that Candrakīrti’s enthusiasm has inclined him to read more into the verse than 
is necessary. Perhaps Nāgārjuna did not mean that one should stop thinking altogether, but 
simply that one will find peace when one stops grasping at cognitions and concepts. Also, it 
may be that nirvāṇa is not as otherworldly as it is often taken to be. As the contemporary Thai 
monk Buddhadāsa, who often strives to make Buddhism a more practical, down-to-Earth mat-
ter, puts it, “in Dhamma language, nibbāna is the complete and utter extinction of dukkha right 
here and now” (Buddhadāsa, 1988, p. 26). 
9 I prefer “pacification” for upaśama in this context instead of “cessation,” because the root 
√śam means not only “cessation,” but also “to become tired […] be quiet or calm or satisfied 
or contented” (Monier-Williams, 1995, p. 1053). Also, the Sanskrit etymology resonates nicely 
with the Latin root of “pacification,” which is pax (peace). More importantly, √śam is the root 
for śamatha (tranquility), which is the Sanskrit name for one of the forms of meditation recog-
nized by Buddhists, the other being vipaśyanā (insight). This latter connotation may have been 
obvious to Nāgārjuna’s Buddhist readers. 
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prapañca: the expansion of concepts and language. Prapañca also has a neg-
ative affective dimension involving unnecessary and harmful attachments to 
concepts and utterances. In this sense, the Buddha did not teach any dharma, 
because he did not mean to put forward a theory; he meant to cure us of the 
disease of wanting to put forward theories. In phase one, a person might be 
convinced that all beings really are empty; in phase two, one ceases to even 
ask the question of whether beings are empty, much less to grasp at one an-
swer. Interpretations that depict Nāgārjuna as implying or making claims that 
there either is or is not some ultimate reality entirely miss the point. The point 
is to stop longing for either non-conceptual or conceptual access to ultimate 
reality or even for conceptual construction of theories that claim that there 
are no absolutes. The point is to stop trying to give a general theory of any-
thing, even a theory of universal emptiness. The point is to stop philosophiz-
ing. Thus, when Nāgārjuna denies having a view (dṛṣṭi) or thesis (pratijñā), 
he does not intend us to qualify these statements. He has no views. Full stop. 
What is the link between these two phases? The clue comes in the penul-
timate verse of the MMK: “And thus, due to the emptiness of all beings, in 
regard to what, for whom, of what things at all, will views, concerning eter-
nality and so forth, be possible?” (MMK 27.29).10 This expresses the empti-
ness of emptiness. The idea is that if emptiness is accepted as a philosophical 
theory in phase one, then there ceases to be anything for a philosophical the-
ory about emptiness to be about, a need for a person to have such a theory, 
or any basis for such a theory.11 
One might object that the “and so forth” (ādayaḥ) after “eternality” 
(śāśvata) is meant only to add “nihilism” (ucchedavāda) to the list of views 
that emptiness makes impossible; perhaps a view of the middle way is safe. 
However, this route is blocked by the last verse: “I bow to him, Gautama, 
who, by means of compassion, taught the true dharma for the purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 atha vā sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāc chāśvatādayaḥ / 
kva kasya katamāḥ saṃbhaviṣyanti dṛṣṭayaḥ // (MMK 27.29) 
11 I also think that the thesis of universal emptiness is self-undermining, because it simultane-
ously must be universal and cannot be universal on account of its emptiness (see Mills, 2016). 
I also agree with Garfield and Priest (2002) that it is contradictory to assert that the essence of 
all things is that they lack essence, although rather than committing Nāgārjuna to some variety 
of paraconsistent logical theory, I see this as the means by which the view of emptiness cancels 
itself out. After using emptiness to demonstrate the internal incoherence of other theories, 
Nāgārjuna hopes that readers will see that emptiness itself is internally incoherent and ought to 
be relinquished along with all other theories as the final target of prasaṅgic unravelling. 
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abandoning all views” (MMK 27.30).12 Here, dharma should be taken in the 
sense of teaching a sceptical technique rather than in the sense of a philo-
sophical view or truth-claim as in 25.24.  
There is, of course, a long-standing debate about whether “all views” (sar-
vadṛṣṭi) here means all views whatsoever, or all false views, as is commonly 
interpreted by many Indian, Tibetan, and Western commentators.13 I think 
we should take Nāgārjuna at his word.14 While I cannot resolve this centu-
ries-long dispute here, I will say that a strength of my interpretation is that 
we can take Nāgārjuna seriously in both phases; we need not ignore or down-
play the significance of either. By taking Nāgārjuna as a sceptic about phi-
losophy, we can see a certain unity in his philosophy while taking both posi-
tive and negative statements seriously. 
The Cause of Scepticism: The Critique of Causation 
Let me turn to one specific area: the critique of theories of causation. My 
interpretation can make sense of why Nāgārjuna offered such deep criticisms 
of this area of central philosophical concern. His intention is not to offer some 
alternative to other philosophers’ theories about causation, but rather to up-
root the impulse to engage in any such theorization at all. 
I will concentrate on the first chapter of the MMK. This chapter begins 
with one of the most famous verses of the text: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 sarvadṛṣṭiprahānāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat / 
  anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamaṃ // (MMK 27.30) 
13 Proponents of the “false views” translation note that dṛṣṭi often has a negative connotation of 
“a wrong view” (Monier-Williams, 1995, p. 492). While it is possible that Nāgārjuna meant 
“wrong views,” it is also possible that he meant views in general. The same Sanskrit word is 
used for the element of the Eightfold Path known as “right view” (samyag-dṛṣṭi), which has a 
positive connotation in most contexts. In any case, an appeal to the text cannot solve this debate. 
My point is that if we want to take “dṛṣṭi” as meaning all views, it is possible to do so in a way 
that makes sense of the text. In favour of my translation, however, I would point out that a 
major reason in support of the “false views” translation—that the text cannot make sense oth-
erwise—is simply not the case. 
14 In this, I agree with Garfield in his agreement with Ngog and the Nying-ma school (Garfield, 
2002, pp. 46–68). Later, I will discuss Patsab as well as the opponent of Khedrupjey in the 
Great Digest as others who take MMK 27.30 at face value. Fuller (2005) is a thorough study of 
diṭṭhi (the Pāli equivalent of dṛṣṭi) in early Buddhism. 
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Not from itself, nor even from another, nor from both, nor even from no cause, 
are any arisen beings found anywhere at all. (MMK 1.1)15 
The first thing to notice is that this is an example of a catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma 
in which four options are given; in this catuṣkoṭi, all four options are denied. 
There is extensive contemporary scholarship on the logical issues of the te-
tralemma,16 but these issues are beyond my concerns here.17 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / 
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana // (MMK 1.1) 
16 Some contemporary sources that discuss logical aspects of the catuṣkoṭi are Chakravarti 
(1980), Galloway (1989), Garfield and Priest (2002), Robinson (1957), Ruegg (1977), and 
Westerhoff (2006, 2009, chapter 4). Ruegg (1977, pp. 39–52) gives a summary of work on the 
issue from the 1930s until the early 1970s. 
17 The logical issues arise when one understands a negative catuṣkoṭi as follows: 
~P 
~~P 
~ (P & ~P) 
~~(P v ~P) 
(In MMK 1.1, “P” would be “the cause arises from itself.”) If this is interpreted according to 
straightforward propositional logic, it would seem that denying both option one and option two 
at the same time violates the Law of Non-Contradiction, since “~~P” is (by the rule of Double 
Negation Elimination) equivalent to “P” and then you would have “~P & P.” There are also 
positive versions of the catuṣkoṭi (e.g., MMK 18.8) in which option four is “~(P v ~P),” which 
violates the Law of Excluded Middle. A third major issue is that the third and fourth options 
are not logically distinct: applying De Morgan’s Theorem to option four of the positive ca-
tuṣkoṭi (“~[P v ~P]”) turns it into “~P & ~~P,” which (via Double Negation Elimination) is 
logically equivalent to the third option (“[P & ~P]”). Chakravarti (1980), Ruegg (1977), and 
Westerhoff (2006) bring in the prasajya-paryudāsa distinction. They take the negations of each 
option of the negative catuṣkoṭi as prasajya negations that do not accept the opponents’ presup-
positions (such as the existence of svabhāva). Westerhoff also points out that Nāgārjuna means 
to use a prasajya negation of both a proposition and its paryudāsa negation, which means that 
there is no violation of the Principles of Non-Contradiction or Excluded Middle any more than 
there is in saying “the number seven is neither green nor not green” or “unicorns are neither 
brown nor not brown.” Westerhoff and Chakravarti also bring in the idea of “illocutionary ne-
gation” in which the negation has a performative aspect of refusing to engage in a practice such 
as promising or asserting (Chakravarti, 1980, p. 305; Westerhoff, 2006, p. 379). Westerhoff 
sees this as a “more general notion” than prasajya negation, since it also includes cases such as 
recognition of a lack of evidence to either assert or deny a statement; he then interprets the 
fourth option of the catuṣkoṭi to mean that Nāgārjuna does not assert either P or ~P, which 
makes it logically distinct from the third option (Westerhoff, 2006, pp. 379–380). I am more 
sympathetic to Chakravarti, who sees all four negations as illocutionary negations. This may 
make options three and four logically equivalent at the end of the day, but only if illocutionary 
negations are within the purview of Double Negation Elimination, which they may not be. In 
any case, Nāgārjuna’s point seems to be more that his opponents might think they are separate 
options. Westerhoff raises the concern that illocutionary negations make it seem that Nāgārjuna 
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The second option is clearly the view held by the Abhidharma schools.18 
According to Abhidharma, there are four pratyayas, or “conditions.” This 
includes aspects of what Aristotle would call an “efficient cause,” but also 
other factors that are conditions for something taking place. Nāgārjuna lists 
them as follows:  
There are thus only four kinds of conditions (pratyayas): material cause (hetu), 
object of a cognition (ālambana), immediately preceding cause (anantara), 
and dominant cause (ādhipateya). There is no fifth kind of condition. (MMK 
1.2)19 
The pratyayas can be explained through examples. The material cause (hetu) 
of a sprout is a seed. The sprout would in turn be a cause of, say, a mango 
tree, which is a material cause of a mango. An object of a cognition (ālam-
bana) would be the taste that one might cognize when biting into a piece of 
mango. An immediately preceding cause (anantara) is the state of affairs 
right before an event, such as a piece of mango reaching one’s tongue. A 
dominant cause (ādhipateya) is what gets the whole process going and gives 
it its purpose, such as one’s decision to eat a mango in order to enjoy its 
tastiness.20 Nāgārjuna argues against each of these pratyayas. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
is ultimately uncommitted to the truth or falsity of statements concerning the existence of 
svabhāva and answers that “we want to assert a negative proposition when speaking about the 
proposition concerned” (Westerhoff, 2006, p. 381). I am not so sure; while Nāgārjuna makes 
assertions in phase one, such assertions are ultimately a means towards ceasing to make any 
assertions in phase two. I would suggest that even statements about universal emptiness are not, 
at the end of the day, straightforward assertions of negative propositions, although that is how 
they appear; I see Nāgārjuna’s statements in phase one as provisional statements that are ulti-
mately taken back in phase two. 
Garfield and Priest (2002) claim that some of Nāgārjuna’s statements should be interpreted as 
embracing true contradictions and that Nāgārjuna is therefore hinting at a type of non-classical, 
paraconsistent logic called dialetheism. Irrationalist interpretations such as Huntington (2007) 
take Nāgārjuna to be purposefully denying logical principles. Concerning Garfield and Priest, 
we simply do not need anything as exotic as dialetheism to make sense of the catuṣkoṭi; a bit of 
care with the type of negation involved will do. I am not denying dialetheic logic, just that we 
need it to interpret Nāgārjuna’s catuṣkoṭis. 
18 The Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas also held a version of this view. 
19 catvāraḥ pratyayā hetuś cālambanam [hetur ārambaṇam] anantaraṃ / 
tathaivādhipateyaṃ ca pratyayo nāsti pañcamaḥ // (MMK 1.2) 
20 For more details on the pratyayas and their Abhidharma pedigree, see Garfield (1995, pp. 
108–109), Siderits (2007, p. 194), and Siderits and Katsura (2006, p. 135). 
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There is disagreement among both classical and contemporary commen-
tators concerning the details of Nāgārjuna’s argument,21 but here is how I 
characterize it: 
Option One: Suppose an arisen being were to arise from itself (in In-
dian philosophy, this view, which was held by the Sāṃkya school, is 
called satkāryavāda, the view that the effect is pre-existent in the 
cause).22 However, this cannot work, because the essence (svabhāva) 
of the effect is not found in its conditions (pratyaya) (verse 1.3ab). For 
instance, the light and heat of fire is not found in firewood, nor is the 
consistency of yoghurt found in fresh milk. 
Option Two: Suppose an arisen being were to arise from something 
else (this view is called asatkāryavāda, the view that the effect is not 
present in the cause, which was the view of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Ab-
hidharma Buddhists). There are several arguments against this option: 
 First, “if its own essence (svabhāva) is not found, then the es-
sence of the other (parabhāva) is not found” (verse 1.3cd).23 That 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
21 Siderits notes at least one difference in Buddhapālita’s and Candrakīrti’s interpretations of 
MMK 1.3cd in that Candrakīrti sees it as linked to verse 4 (Siderits, 2004, p. 404). Some differ-
ing contemporary summaries of the argument can be found in Garfield (1995, pp. 103–123), 
Hayes (1994, pp. 308–310), Siderits (2004, pp. 401–408), Taber (1998, pp. 213–222), and 
Westerhoff (2009, pp. 99–113). One major difference is that Garfield, unlike most other com-
mentators, claims that Nāgārjuna draws a distinction between cause (hetu) and condition 
(pratyaya) and seeks to demonstrate the incoherence of causes, which have essences, while 
showing that conditions, which are empty, are philosophically acceptable as part of “Nāgār-
juna’s conventionalist regularism” (Garfield, 2002, p. 72; see also Garfield, 1995, pp. 103–
105). Siderits points out that the claim that Nāgārjuna makes such a distinction “leads to a 
strained reading of MMK 1.4–1.5, as well as to the acute problem that he must then make MMK 
1.11–1.13 objections” (Siderits, 2004, p. 415 n. 18). I agree with Siderits here and would also 
point out that hetus are listed as one kind of pratyaya and that Nāgārjuna argues against each of 
the four pratyayas in MMK 1.7–10. I see no evidence in the text of chapter 1 for the distinction 
between hetus and pratyayas. As Garfield admits, however, one of his reasons for drawing this 
distinction is to reconcile chapter 1 with the seemingly constructive view implied by the dis-
cussion of emptiness, dependent origination, and the two truths in MMK 24 (Garfield, 2002, p. 
41). 
22 Westerhoff points out that there are actually two versions of option one: the first is that “cause 
and effect are the very same object” and the second, which was the Sāṃkhya theory, is that “the 
effect is contained in, and forms a part of, the cause” (Westerhoff, 2009, pp. 100, 103). 
23 avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate (MMK 1.3cd). Garfield glosses this argument as 
follows: “The view is in fact internally contradictory. Given that things have no intrinsic nature, 
they are not essentially different. Given that they lack difference, they are interdependent. But 
given that interdependence, there cannot be the otherness needed to build otherness-essence out 
of dependence” (Garfield, 1995, p. 112). Siderits (2004, p. 416 n. 20) argues that this reading 
of the argument leaves it open to Hayes’s charge that it commits the fallacy of equivocation on 
the words svabhāva and parabhāva such that they can mean either identity and difference or 
causal independence and causal dependence (Hayes, 1994, pp. 312–315). To avoid attributing 
this fallacy to Nāgārjuna, Siderits follows Candrakīrti in seeing verse 3cd as a set up for the 
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is, once you rule out the first option that the essence of the effect 
is found in the conditions (which means that the cause and effect 
have the same essence), it is not clear how the two separate es-
sences required by the second option—the essence of the cause 
and that of the effect—are to be related. In the absence of any 
way to identify that this effect is an effect of that cause and vice 
versa, Nāgārjuna concludes that the “essence of the other” 
(parabhāva), meaning the essence of the cause given the essence 
of the effect and vice versa, is not found.  
 Second, Nāgārjuna considers a possible answer to the problem 
raised in the previous argument: perhaps the two essences are 
related by a causal power (kriyā). “A causal power (kriyā) has 
no condition (pratyaya), nor does it occur without conditions” 
(1.4ab).24 That is, the idea of a causal power is contradictory, for 
if you assert a causal power to explain the relation between cause 
and effect, you need another relation to explain the relation be-
tween the causal power and the cause itself, and so forth, and so 
an infinite regress ensues. Thus, there cannot be any such rela-
tion relating cause to effect, but there has to be such a relation if 
option two is to work.25 The same problem arises if you try to 
say that the conditions possess a causal power (1.4cd). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
introduction of the idea of kriyā (activity, causal power) in verse 4 (Siderits, 2004, p. 404; 2007, 
p. 194). Siderits then glosses the argument of 3cd as follows: “Since the intrinsic nature of the 
effect is not in the conditions, it will not do to say that the effect arises from something with a 
distinct nature (that the cause is parabhāva to the effect)” (Siderits, 2004, p. 404). Siderits’s 
linking of 3cd to verse 4 gives Nāgārjuna a way to avoid equivocating on identity and inde-
pendence, since it shows how the two senses of svabhāva and parabhāva are in fact related: 
these terms consistently refer to the identity of the causes and effects (however, I do not think 
that Siderits is correct that the argument needs to show that causation is conceptually con-
structed to accomplish this). Rather than relying on an equivocal conceptual link between 
svabhāva and parabhāva, Siderits construes the argument as raising the issue of how the cause 
and effect are to be related if they are separate. If the first option (the effect arises from itself) 
were correct, it would be easy to see how causes cause their particular effects, since the cause 
and effect have the same essence; however, the second option cannot answer this question un-
less you bring in some sort of causal connection or causal power (kriyā). Of course, verse 4 
argues against the concept of kriyā as well. For an alternative attempt to avoid Hayesian falla-
cies, see Taber (1998). 
24 kriyā na pratyayavatī nāpratyayavatī kriyā (MMK 1.4ab). 
25 My reading of this argument, especially the idea that it involves an infinite regress, is inspired 
by Siderits and Garfield (Garfield, 1995, pp. 113–114; Siderits, 2004, pp. 405–406; 2007, pp. 
194–195). Westerhoff also sees an infinite regress, but of a different kind. For him, the infinite 
regress is that you can always add more objects to the “causal complex” that brought about the 
effect (Westerhoff, 2009, pp. 105–107). 
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 Third, Nāgārjuna uses a version of the argument from the three 
times in wondering when the effect produces the cause.26 This 
cannot happen before the effect exists, because it does not make 
sense to call something a cause when its effect does not yet exist: 
you might as well call it a non-cause (5cd) and non-existent ob-
jects cannot have any sort of cause (6c). The effect cannot pro-
duce the cause after the effect exists, because there is no point in 
causing something that already exists (6d). Perhaps there is a 
third time during which the effect is coming into being and thus 
both exists and does not exist simultaneously. But this cannot 
work (7ab): how can something both exist and not exist at the 
same time, especially if the Abhidharma theory of radical mo-
mentariness were true? If ultimately existing things (dharmas27) 
are fully existent in one moment and non-existent the next, then 
this third time simply cannot work. 
Option Three: Perhaps an arisen being could arise through a combi-
nation of self-causation and from something else.28 While Nāgārjuna 
does not deal with this option explicitly, he probably expects his audi-
ence to see that given his arguments against options one and two, a 
combination of the two could not possibly work either. 
Option Four: Perhaps an arisen being arises from no cause at all.29 
Again, Nāgārjuna does not explicitly discuss this option, but we are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
26 Here, I am more-or-less following Siderits, who is in turn more-or-less following Candrakīrti 
in seeing the conclusion of an Argument from the Three Times in 1.7ab (Siderits, 2004, pp. 
406–408; 2007, p. 195). 
27 In Abhidharma, the only things that ultimately exist are dharmas, which are impartite mo-
mentary events or tropes with essences (svabhāva) that do not disappear when philosophically 
analysed by a careful thinker. For more on dharmas in Abhidharma, see Siderits (2007, pp. 
111–113). Goodman (2004) plausibly argues that dharmas (at least as they are treated in 
Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa) are similar to the contemporary metaphysical idea of tropes, 
which are neither substances nor universals. 
28 This is probably the option taken by Jain philosophers (Sullivan, 1988, p. 91; Westerhoff, 
2009, p. 109 n. 56). This makes sense because, as Westerhoff claims, “it coheres well with their 
multiperspectivalist outlook (anekāntavāda) to argue that the effect is already present in the 
cause qua its potentiality (śakti) but not qua its fully developed form” (Westerhoff, 2009, p. 
109 n. 56). 
29 Sullivan (1988, p. 91) claims that this is the Cārvāka position. Westerhoff mentions that the 
Nikāyas place the Cārvākas in option two, while modern commentators such as Murti and Ka-
lupahana place the Cārvākas in option four (Westerhoff, 2009, pp. 104, 111 n. 60). I do not 
think either option two or option four fits the Cārvāka view presented in the Sar-
vadarśanasaṃgraha (SDS). There, Mādhava has Cārvākas consider an objection that their view 
leads to the variety of things in the world being causeless or without explanation (ākasmikaṃ). 
The Cārvāka answer is: “If someone were to say that (iti cet), this is not valid, because the 
arising of that [variety] is just from its nature (svabhāvāt)” (SDS, p. 4). The idea that things 
arise from their own nature is corroborated by Cārvāka fragments found in other texts as well 
(Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 604). This theory sounds more like option one than option two or option 
four. It may be that Nāgārjuna has no specific opponent in mind in option four, but rather that 
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presumably supposed to grasp for ourselves that this option is either 
absurd because it contradicts our experience or at the very least that it 
will not work for any would-be causal theorist, since it gives no expla-
nation at all for causes and conditions. 
Nāgārjuna uses these arguments against the material cause (hetu), the object 
of a cognition (ālambana), the immediately preceding cause (anantara), and 
the dominant cause (ādhipateya) in verses 7, 8, 9, and 10 respectively. Verses 
11 to 14 focus on similar issues concerning the effect (phala). 
The key here is that these are all negative arguments against the causal 
theories of various opponents. While some contemporary scholars take 
Nāgārjuna’s text to contain or imply a positive causal theory, particularly in 
light of what he later says about emptiness (e.g., in MMK 24), such a move 
is blocked by phase two. In the last two verses of the MMK (27.29–30), 
Nāgārjuna demonstrates that emptiness leads to the abandoning of all views. 
If Nāgārjuna means what he says, then we should take everything he says 
that looks like a view about emptiness as a provisional view that ought to be 
abandoned later.30 I see the shape of Nāgārjuna’s argument on causation and 
emptiness as follows: MMK 1 undermines other views about causation, MMK 
24.18–19 develops a provisional view of emptiness, and MMK 27.29–30 
demonstrates that this provisional view undermines itself. 
I have not attempted to evaluate these arguments (which is a worthwhile 
task that has been taken up elsewhere31), but rather to engage with the ques-
tion of what Nāgārjuna intends his arguments to do: Nāgārjuna’s intention is 
to guide readers from the emptiness of phase one to the mental peace of phase 
two—the cessation of conceptual proliferation and the relinquishment of all 
views.32  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
he presents this option as a logical possibility to be considered: a common tactic in prasaṅga 
arguments. 
30 See also MMK 13.8. Additionally, there are passages in the Ratnāvalī in which Nāgārjuna 
argues against the existence of dependent origination (e.g., 1.37, 1.65, etc.). Frauwallner trans-
lates Ratnāvalī 1.37 as follows: “Since it (= the dependent becoming of the cycle of existences) 
cannot come about from itself, from something other, and from both, and this in all three time 
periods, the belief in an ‘I’ becomes invalid and thereby deed and birth also” (Frauwallner, 
1958/2010, p. 223). Frauwallner takes this to mean: “Liberation takes place […] through recog-
nition of the unreality of dependent origination” (Frauwallner, 1958/2010, p. 217). 
31 For just a few examples of more evaluative approaches, see Burton (2002), Hayes (1994), 
Taber (1998), and Tillemans (2007). 
32 I should note that similar cases can be made on other topics, such as Nāgārjuna’s critique of 
the means of knowledge in the Vigrahavyāvartanī. I have done so in other work (Mills, 2016). 
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Buddhist Scepticism: Religiosity Without Belief 
An incredulous reader may wonder how Nāgārjuna could possibly be a Bud-
dhist philosopher if he is also a sceptic. It may seem that no interpretation of 
Nāgārjuna that has little relation to Buddhist soteriological goals of gaining 
knowledge of the true nature of reality could be correct. More generally, one 
may also wonder how he could be religious in any meaningful sense if his 
goal is to eschew all beliefs of a philosophical or religious nature. These are 
worthwhile objections, and I will respond to them in turn. 
The first objection is that my interpretation, in which Nāgārjuna’s goal is 
to pacify our tendency to engage in conceptualization, neglects other Bud-
dhist goals of insight into the true nature of reality, knowledge of things as 
they are, and the notion of right view as one of the elements of the Eightfold 
Path. It might be thought that no Buddhist can be a sceptic of this sort since 
a Buddhist must aim at liberating knowledge. It is probably the persistence 
of objections such as this that makes it so difficult for many interpreters to 
take phase two seriously, leading such interpreters to posit various truth-
claims (e.g., anti-realist conclusions, mystical apprehension, etc.) as what it 
is that liberated Buddhists come to know. 
My response is that the two phases of Nāgārjuna’s philosophical practice 
are representations of two tendencies that have been present in Buddhist phi-
losophy from the beginning. As Steven Collins points out,  
one approach to the attainment of the “emptiness” of nibbāna, naturally, was 
a direct assault on any form of conceptualization, any view whatsoever. […] 
The other approach […] was to proceed through an analysis of what does have 
conceptual content, in order to classify it into known categories; the ability to 
classify any experience or concept into a known, non-valued impersonal cate-
gory was held to be a technique for avoiding desire for the object thus classi-
fied. (Collins, 1982, p. 113)33 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
33 Richard Hayes has identified a kind of scepticism within the Buddhist tradition from the 
Nikāyas up until at least Dignāga, which he calls “skeptical rationalism […] according to which 
there is no knowledge aside from that which meets the test of logical consistency, and moreover 
very few of our beliefs meet this test” (Hayes, 1988, p. 41). Hayes also claims that Nāgārjuna 
exemplified this type of scepticism (Hayes, 1988, pp. 52–62). See also Mills (2018b, chapter 
1), in which I discuss four examples of early Buddhist quietism: the anti-speculative attitude 
(e.g., Cuḷamāluṅkya Sutta and Alagaddūpama Sutta), the elimination of conceptual proliferation 
(papañca) (e.g., Madhupiṇḍika Sutta), the fact that many arguments against the self have non-
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This second tendency is the more popular one in which the purpose of Bud-
dhism is to decrease desire through insight into the true nature of reality. This 
tendency was developed to an unparalleled degree in the Abhidharma tradi-
tions, but its seeds are present in early Buddhism. The other tendency is what 
Collins calls “quietism,” which is “an attitude which emphasizes passivity in 
religious practice, and which seeks to attain as its final goal a state of beatific 
‘inner quiet’” (Collins, 1982, p. 139). Similarly, Paul Fuller suggests that 
there are two main ways of understanding the role of views (diṭṭhi) in early 
Buddhism: the opposition understanding, in which right views are opposed 
to wrong views, and the no-view understanding, in which the goal is to avoid 
all views whatsoever (Fuller, 2005, p. 1). 
A clear example of early Buddhist quietism can be found in the following 
line from the Sutta Nipāta: “(Only) when a man renounces all opinions, does 
he make no quarrel with the world” (Collins, 1982, p. 130). Consider also the 
famous Ten Unanswered Questions in the Cuḷamāluṅkya Sutta or the para-
bles of the water snake and the raft in the Alagaddūpama Sutta.34 In the Ag-
givacchagotta Sutta, the Buddha describes the cessation of conceptualization 
and “I-making” in terms strikingly similar to MMK 27.30: 
Therefore, I say that because of the destruction, fading away, cessation, aban-
doning, and relinquishing of all conceptions, all cogitations, all predispositions 
of I-making, mine-making, and conceit, the Tathāgata is without attachment. 
(MN 1.485–86; trans. Holder, 2006, pp. 119–20) 
My sceptical interpretation shows Nāgārjuna’s innovation in bringing the 
analysis-insight and quietest strands together. Nāgārjuna transforms this un-
easy dichotomy into a single dialectical practice: he aims to show that the 
practice of analysis, when pursued to the emptiness of emptiness, can be used 
as a means to the practice of pacifying conceptualization. On my interpreta-
tion, Nāgārjuna, while a reformer and innovator, is working entirely within 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
dogmatic conclusions (e.g., Mahānidāna Sutta), and the goal of relinquishing all views (e.g., 
Aggivacchagotta Sutta and Sutta Nipāta). 
34 Fuller’s concern is more with modern interpretations that the early Buddhist tradition has a 
single attitude towards views, as opposed to Collins’s and my understanding that the tradition 
contains both attitudes. Also, Fuller argues against both the opposition and no-view understand-
ings: “The opposition understanding is challenged because there is not an opposition between 
wrong-view and right-view as incorrect and correct truth claims but an opposition between 
craving and the cessation of craving. […] The rejection of all views is not being advised, but 
the abandoning of craving and attachment to views. […] The early texts do not reject 
knowledge, but attachment to knowledge” (Fuller, 2005, p. 8). Fuller argues in favour of what 
he calls the “transcendence of views,” which is a “different order of seeing” in which right view 
“apprehends how things are and is a remedy for craving” (Fuller, 2005, p. 157). 
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Buddhist parameters by synchronizing two seemingly disparate strands of 
Buddhist philosophy.  
The second objection is more general: how could a sceptic possibly be 
religious in any meaningful sense? Nāgārjuna is a Buddhist philosopher and 
as such, one would expect his text to serve some religious purpose, such as 
the philosophical elucidation of religious beliefs or a defence of religious 
practices. A sceptical interpretation of Nāgārjuna shows that the radical pro-
gramme of purging oneself of philosophical views is an interpretation of the 
Buddhist goal of non-attachment, perhaps just the remedy needed for intel-
lectuals prone to grasping at theories. Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is, in other 
words, a quietist Buddhist practice that does not rely on the ultimate ac-
ceptance of any beliefs. A quietist, sceptical Mādhyamika might even partic-
ipate in Buddhist religious rituals without affirming any real beliefs about 
merit, karma, and so forth. This attitude would be like that of Sextus Empir-
icus, who says that Pyrrhonian sceptics can engage in religious rituals and be 
pious towards the gods without having any religious beliefs.35 Many religious 
people would find it odd, if not offensive, to engage in a religious practice 
without believing in the tenets of that religion, but as Harald Thorsrud sug-
gests, for Pyrrhonian sceptics, “piety is […] reduced to certain kinds of con-
ventional behaviour along with the relevant dispositions. Belief or lack of 
belief is no longer essential” (Thorsrud, 2009, p. 190). 
Religious philosophers generally see scepticism about religion as a threat; 
if we are unable to know anything about topics such as whether God exists 
or whether there is an afterlife, this is seen as a problem. Rather than arguing 
against scepticism about religion, Nāgārjuna might say that a good Buddhist 
could embrace scepticism insofar as it can destroy dogmatic attachment. 
Contemporary philosophers such as William Alston have maintained that ex-
ternalist, reliabilist accounts of knowledge answer religious scepticism by 
showing that theology can be an autonomous, reliable belief-forming mech-
anism that gives us genuine knowledge of God (Alston, 1992). Nāgārjuna, 
on the other hand, does not need to engage in such philosophical enterprises 
because his practice does not rest on knowledge claims or beliefs, but rather 
on the elimination of the sorts of beliefs that provide the foundation for most 
religions, including most forms of Buddhism. 
Nāgārjuna’s religiosity without belief may not work for other religions, 
especially those that are explicitly tied to the acceptance of a creed, but it 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
35 For instance, at PH 3.3. For a short but illuminating discussion of the Pyrrhonist attitude 
towards religious practice, see Thorsrud (2009, pp. 188–190). See also Annas (2011). 
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could work for Buddhism of a sceptical, quietist variety. Unlike fideists such 
as Montaigne,36 Nāgārjuna has no interest in “annihilating his intellect to 
make room for faith” (Montaigne, 1580/1987, p. 74). Rather, he engages in 
philosophical destruction in order to bring about mental quietude, the ab-
sence of any faith or belief.37  
Historical Precedents 
There may be historical precedents for my sort of sceptical interpretation. 
While agreement with some historical commentator is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for a good philosophical interpretation of a Bud-
dhist text, the fact that there are some precedents for sceptical interpretations 
is historically interesting in that it demonstrates continuity with Buddhist tra-
ditions. Contemporary sceptical interpreters such as myself may be wrong, 
but we are not alone. Such historical precedents also help respond to the ear-
lier objection that my interpretation of Nāgārjuna is insufficiently Buddhist. 
My first example is Candrakīrti.38 Recall his commentary on verse 25.24 
of Nāgārjuna’s MMK:39  
That which is the pacification, or cessation, of all bases of conceptual prolif-
eration, that is nirvāṇa. […] Also, pacification of conceptual proliferation, be-
cause there is non-activity of words, is peace, because of the non-functioning 
of thought. (PP, p. 236)40  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
36 Whether Montaigne is a fideist remains a matter of interpretive dispute, but I think it makes 
sense of the Apology. See Hartle (2005) and M. A. Screech’s introduction in Montaigne 
(1580/1987). 
37 For more on Sextus and Nāgārjuna on scepticism and religious belief, see Mills (2018a). 
38 For a more in-depth treatment of Candrakīrti’s scepticism, see Dreyfus and Garfield (2011, 
pp. 124–130). While I ultimately disagree with their interpretation of Candrakīrti as a “Con-
structive Pyrrhonian” (p. 126) because it seems to me that even Candrakīrti’s “constructive” 
tendencies are purely therapeutic, Dreyfus and Garfield make some worthwhile points about 
Candrakīrti, Academic Scepticism, and Pyrrhonism. 
39 There are also his arguments against Dignāga’s epistemology and disagreement with Bhāvi-
veka on whether Dignāga’s form of reasoning is appropriate for Mādhyamikas (for instance, 
PP, p. 20; see also Bhāviveka’s arguments in Bhāvaviveka, 1993). I see the purpose of these 
arguments as a refusal of any serious attempt at epistemology rather than any endorsement of 
an anti-realist, contextualist epistemology. 
40  sarveśām prapañcānāṃ nimittānāṃ ya upaśamo ’pravṛttis tān nirvāṇam. […] vācām 
apravṛtter vā prapañcopaśamaś cittasyāpravṛtteḥ śivaḥ (PP, p. 236). 
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This passage is an obvious example of what I am calling phase two, because 
it concerns the “pacification of conceptual proliferation” (prapañcopaśama), 
which is the freedom from philosophical speculation. 
When Madhyamaka was transmitted to China by Kumārajīva in the late 
fourth and early fifth centuries, he may have brought with him a sceptical 
understanding of Nāgārjuna. According to Richard Robinson, Kumārajīva 
“rejected all notions of existent and nonexistent, while maintaining that the 
negation of these notions was simply a therapeutic device” (Robinson, 1967, 
p. 95). His student, Sengzhao, says that “the Holy Mind is void and still” and 
that “Prajñā is devoid of the marks of arising and ceasing, devoid of all marks 
of existing things. It has no thing that is known and no thing that it sees” 
(Robinson, 1967, pp. 126, 124).41 Kevin Sullivan calls Kumārajīva’s attitude 
“religious pragmatism” because the role of emptiness is purely soteriological 
rather than descriptive (Sullivan, 1988, pp. 98–100). Although Kumārajīva 
and Sengzhao may ultimately be mystics rather than sceptics, there is at least 
some affinity with my sceptical interpretation in their use of philosophical 
negation to cultivate stillness of mind. 
Perhaps the clearest historical precedents for sceptical interpretations are 
found in the Tibetan tradition. The Great Digest of the 15th-century philoso-
pher Khedrupjey contains a section refuting an opponent who claims that 
“the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamikas have no system of their own, no belief, and 
nothing at all that they accept” (mKhas-grub dge-legs-dpal-bzang-po, 1992, 
p. 257). The opponent here is a radical sceptic, or perhaps a mystic, and 
Khedrupjey does a thorough, Geluk job of attempting to demolish this inter-
pretation (mKhas-grub dge-legs-dpal-bzang-po, 1992, pp. 256–272). 
The clearest sceptical precedent of them all, however, is the 12th-century 
Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka philosopher Patsab Nyimadrak. Patsab, according 
to Dreyfus, has the following attitude:  
Mādhyamikas do not have any thesis to establish, view to defend, or position 
to eliminate about how things really are. They merely proceed by conse-
quences exposing the contradictions to which the views of their adversaries 
lead. Mādhyamikas are not in the game of demonstrating the truth or falsity of 
claims about how things are. (Dreyfus, 2011, p. 99) 
Like Sextus, Patsab sees his philosophical practice as therapy for those under 
the sway of dogmatic views and aims for a tranquil mental state. As a 
Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, however, Patsab’s method is not the Pyrrhonian 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
41 These are Robinson’s translations, or, as he calls them, “restatements”: “I furnish a periphras-
tic restatement in order to elucidate certain modes of meaning” (Robinson, 1967, p. 101). 
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method of demonstrating that two opposing theses are equal in their convinc-
ingness and unconvincingness. Rather, he uses the Prasaṅga method, which 
Tibetan philosophers identified with Candrakīrti in opposition to Bhāvi-
veka’s Svātantra method. In this method, Mādhyamikas demonstrate the in-
coherence, and hence unconvincingness, of all views on a subject.  
Patsab interprets such seemingly positive Madhyamaka notions as the two 
truths as therapeutic devices to be used in a sceptical practice of undermining 
views (Dreyfus, 2011, p. 104). Unlike a mystic, he refuses to accept that emp-
tiness itself can be an object of inference or perception, even of the “yogic” 
variety, because to do any of those things would be to make emptiness into 
an object, and this alleged “object” always disappears under analysis (Drey-
fus, 2011, pp. 98–99, 104–105). Patsab is pointing out that all the Madh-
yamaka tropes of phase one—the two truths, dependent origination, and even 
emptiness itself—lead in the final analysis to what Nāgārjuna claims is the 
goal of Madhyamaka all along: “the abandoning of all views” (MMK 27.30). 
Patsab describes this as a state of “wisdom.” However, as Dreyfus points out, 
“this wisdom is not a cognitively active state engaged in figuring particular 
objects but, rather, is the cessation of any attempt to cognize reality” (Drey-
fus, 2011, p. 105). Having this complete cessation of any attempt to know or 
apprehend reality as his goal makes Patsab a genuine sceptic about philoso-
phy.  
This historical interlude shows that sceptical readings of Nāgārjuna may 
be unpopular, but they are not without basis in Buddhist traditions. This has 
been an uncommon reading because of the two main tendencies in the history 
of Buddhist philosophy, the analysis-insight tendency has been more perva-
sive than the sceptical, quietist tendency. Nonetheless, the sceptical, quietist 
tendency is a legitimate interpretation of Buddhist philosophy with a long 
historical pedigree. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have defended my interpretation of Nāgārjuna as a sceptic 
about philosophy. On this interpretation, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical activity 
takes place in two phases: phase one, in which he seeks to support a thesis of 
universal emptiness and to criticize alternative views, and phase two, in 
which he demonstrates that the thesis of emptiness undermines itself along 
with all competing philosophical theories, leaving a thorough Mādhyamika 
in a state of the pacification of conceptual proliferation with no view, thesis, 
or theory at all. I then demonstrated how this interpretation can make sense 
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of Nāgārjuna’s critiques of causation and defended the prospects for Bud-
dhist scepticism. I discussed a few Buddhist philosophers (such as Can-
drakīrti, Kumārajīva, and Patsab) who developed interpretations of Nāgār-
juna that are similar to mine, although this in itself does not give a sufficient 
reason to accept my interpretation: they could all be wrong, but at least I am 
in interesting company. 
Nonetheless, some contemporary philosophers may feel that my interpre-
tation has the unforgivable defect of not being philosophically interesting, 
since the way I paint him, Nāgārjuna turns out to be uninterested in construc-
tive philosophy. I would point out that the label “philosophically interesting” 
is largely applied in line with one’s personal intellectual taste. I do think, 
however, that my interpretation renders Nāgārjuna philosophically interest-
ing in at least three senses. First, it allows Nāgārjuna to take his place, along 
with Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa, in the Indian chapter of the history of philosoph-
ical scepticism.42 This is of interest for those who would like to expand the 
history of philosophy to include classical Indian philosophy. Second, as a 
Buddhist sceptic, Nāgārjuna gives us interesting material for further inquiries 
into questions of the relation between scepticism and religion and whether 
sceptical religiosity is a viable option for people in the 21st century. Lastly, 
a sceptical Nāgārjuna prompts serious metaphilosophical reflections on the 
uses (and abuses) of philosophical practice, including, of course, interpreta-
tions of Nāgārjuna’s texts themselves. What would Nāgārjuna think of con-
temporary scholars’ vociferous debates about his work? In a Nāgārjunian 
spirit, I will end here lest I extend my own conceptual proliferation too far. 
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Yavanayāna: Buddhist Soteriology in the Aristocles  
Passage  
Georgios T. Halkias  
We are all serving a life sentence in the dungeon of self.  
 
– Cyril Connolly 
 
The German savant Nietzsche (1844–1900) characterized Pyrrho of Elis 
(Πύρρων ὁ Ἠλεῖος, c. 365–275 BCE) as a Buddhist for Greece, a weary 
latecomer, and the very expression of a protest of weariness against the zeal 
of the dialecticians.1 Nietzsche is not remembered for his astute reading of 
Buddhism, but his characterization foreshadows a theme taken up by gener-
ations of readers who recognized a striking affinity with Buddhism in Pyr-
rho’s life and thought. Not long after Nietzsche, the classicist Burnet (1921, 
p. 229) stated that without any doubt, we should regard Pyrrho as a sort of a 
Buddhist saint, an arhat. However, it was not until the work of the Buddhist 
scholar Conze (1963) that revealing correspondences between Pyrrhonism 
and one of the principal schools of Indian Mahāyāna, the Madhyamaka, be-
gan to emerge. In time, more nuanced comparisons between Pyrrhonism and 
the Middle Way school surfaced in ground-breaking studies by the classicist 
and critic McEvilley (1982, 2002) and in Kuzminski’s seminal work Pyrrho-
nism: How the Ancient Greeks Re-Invented Buddhism (2008). Kuzminski’s 
monograph stands out as the first thorough comparison between the liberat-
ing exercise of abandoning all views expounded by Nāgārjuna and com-
mented on by Candrakīrti and the works of a Pyrrhonian sceptic, the Greek 
physician Sextus Empiricus (c. second to third century CE). While Kuzmin-
ski acknowledged that the Indian philosophers lived hundreds of years after 
Pyrrho and the Buddha, he reasonably argued that they were incorporating 
and commenting on earlier material.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 Nietzsche (1888/2009–, 14[99]). 
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In 2015, Beckwith published a controversial study entitled Greek Buddha: 
Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia, where he reas-
sessed epigraphical, textual, and archaeological evidence from a staggering 
variety of sources and offered a number of radical points of departure from 
established interpretations. He aligned the “three marks of existence” (Skt. 
trilakṣaṇa) with Pyrrho’s assertion that “things” (Grk. πράγματα) are by 
their nature “indifferent, unmeasurable and unarbitrable” and argued that 
Pyrrho adopted a form of Early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and 
Gandhāra. The similarities between Pyrrhonian and Buddhist scepticism 
have also not gone unnoticed by Dreyfus and Garfield (2011), who com-
mented that it is fruitful to study Madhyamaka in the context of Western 
scepticism in order to gain a better understanding not just of the Middle Way 
school, but also of the tensions between the Academics and other Pyrrhonian 
schools of scepticism.  
The most meticulous and systematic comparison between Sextus and 
Madhyamaka to date has been the doctoral dissertation by Matthew Neale, 
Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism: Doctrinal, Linguistic and Historical Parallels 
and Interactions between Madhyamaka Buddhism and Hellenic Pyrrhonism 
(2014). Neale methodically assessed the criteria of identification laid out by 
later Pyrrhonists and Mādhyamikas and revisited some of the historical evi-
dence in support of their interactions. Inspired by Walser’s (2005) study, he 
considered the “skilful diplomat” Nāgārjuna to be presenting his unique in-
sights in the guise of acceptable Buddhist discourses drawn from the mythol-
ogy of the Perfection of Wisdom sutras and suggested that these resonated 
with wisdom traditions also known in Greece. 
This brief overview of publications is not exhaustive, but it is indicative 
of the attention that this topic has received from scholars from various disci-
plines, vindicating an observation made by Flintoff some time ago in his in-
fluential article “Pyrrho and India” (1980). He argued that in light of the phil-
osophical and historical evidence, there is no justification for not engaging 
in an appraisal of Pyrrho and Indian religions given that Pyrrho’s style of 
sceptical argumentation is “a recurrent hallmark of Buddhist thought” (91). 
He proposed that we examine Pyrrho’s philosophy not as a series of separate 
positions taken from equally detached positions in early Greek philosophy, 
but as a combination of similarities which, as a whole, bear remarkable af-
finities with one or more of the Indian philosophical schools.  
In 2015, I explored evidence for a horizontal transmission of Buddhist 
ideas to Greece resulting from the encounters of Alexandrian philosophers 
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with both the Indian ascetics at Taxila and the Indian gymnosophist Kalanos, 
who took up residence in Alexander’s mobile court.2 I still regard the evi-
dence discussed there to be suggestive that Kalanos was not affiliated with a 
Brahmanical or Jain order, but rather with an early Buddhist ascetic orienta-
tion. It is true that to date, there is no epigraphic or archaeological evidence 
to support the hypothesis that mendicant Buddhism was established in 
Gandhāra during Alexander’s campaigns. However, an absence of material 
evidence is not evidence of absence, and it is probable that wandering Bud-
dhist ascetics had already settled in Taxila during Pyrrho’s visits to these 
areas. 
Since then, I have come to doubt the overall simplicity of a linear diffu-
sion of soteriological principles from India to Greece, to which I will allude 
at the end of this chapter. While it is possible that similar ideas can arise 
independently in separate cultures without a direct line of transmission, I am 
not convinced that this was the case with the soteriological methods advanced 
by Pyrrho and the Buddha. The intricacy and subtlety of their views and ar-
guments, aimed at challenging our most basic belief structures and assump-
tions about reality, could hardly have been self-evident to anyone back then 
any more than they are obvious to us nowadays. In fact, they are counterin-
tuitive and go against common convictions of certitude about the nature of 
our experiences that seem to describe a world that is independent of our sense 
faculties and reasoning.  
This essay will not be exploring the complex issue of transcultural inter-
actions,3 but will entertain, for what it is worth, the development of two com-
parable philosophical enterprises that share a common teleology. The under-
lying hypothesis is that similarities between religious formations are not, for 
the most part, accidental or typological, but rather the outcome of synchronic 
entanglements and diachronic exchanges between wisdom traditions (i.e., 
Hellenistic, Egyptian, Indian, Central Asian) throughout recorded and unre-
corded history. It will consider the Buddhist critiques of the constructed na-
ture of self-identity and reality not as philosophical discoveries fixed at a 
particular time and place or belonging to a specific Buddhist school, but as a 
continuum of ideas developed in different geographical and historical set-
tings and cultural idioms of articulation. With these parameters in mind, I 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 Cf. Halkias (2015). 
3  For a sketch of the historical encounters between Hellenism and Buddhism, see Halkias 
(2014). 
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propose to trace the roots of compatibility between Madhyamaka and later 
Pyrrhonism back to the father of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho of Elis. Specifically, I 
will examine how a contemplative method (Grk. σκεπτική ἀγωγή) formu-
lated in a Hellenistic idiom matches the liberational goals of Buddhism—a 
yāna (Pāli & Skt.) or soteriological vehicle (Grk. ὄχημα) propagated by the 
Greeks for the Greeks (Skt. yavana)4 whose aim is to transpose us beyond 
recurring states of mental and emotional disturbance (Pāli dukkha; Grk. 
ταραχή) to a place of lasting peace and tranquillity (ἀταραξία). 
Yavanayāna is a neologism not attested in ancient Greek or Indian litera-
ture.5 It is arguably an apt designation for exploring how the philosophical 
insights of early and later Pyrrhonism formulated in the West chart an edify-
ing system that is intriguingly akin in its View (sceptical outlook), Path 
(course of mental training), and Fruit (result) to early and later Buddhist con-
ceptions modelled in the East. As we will see, they both defend basic ele-
ments and the interpretation of the relations between these elements in order 
to advance a way of life guided by a nondogmatic approach towards phenom-
ena and by the underlying proposition that our emotional and mental ailments 
are caused by our desire to uphold and defend beliefs which, when pacified, 
lead to a condition of inner serenity and contentment.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 The Sanskrit term yavana (yona in the edicts of Emperor Aśoka) is commonly employed in 
Indian literature to refer to the Hellenic populations known to Indians before the common era. 
Although no definable correspondences between yāna and the Greek term for “vehicle,” 
ochema (ὄχημα), have been attested, the latter was employed in a religious sense by Plato (Ti-
maeus 41e & Phaedrus 247b) and the Neoplatonists as the chariot of the soul on her journey in 
this life and beyond. The metaphor of yāna is expounded in many Mahāyāna sutras and com-
mentaries and from the perspective of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, there is no end of possible vehi-
cles as long as “there is a mind making conscious efforts […] [but] when a revulsion takes place 
in the mind, there is neither a vehicle nor one who rides in it” (translation from Sanskrit by 
Suzuki, 2000, p. 116) 
5 I am indebted to Dr. Amod Lele, who coined the term yavanayāna on 16 July 2009 in his blog 
‘Love of All Wisdom.’ His use of the term, which he retracted on 22 January 2017, was in 
reference to “a new modernized, Western influenced Buddhism (including engaged Buddhism) 
that focuses on meditation and denies the supernatural.” My use of the term diverges from his 
definition. 
 Yavanayāna: Buddhist Soteriology in the Aristocles Passage  87 
 
 
A Man of Windless Calm 
στρεπτὴ δὲ γλῶσσ᾽ ἐστὶ βροτῶν, πολέες δ᾽ ἔνι μῦθοι 
(2.20.248–250) 
 
In a well-known chapter of Hellenistic history, Alexander marched from the 
Macedonian capital of Pella with an army of around 36,000 men in 334 BCE 
and reached the far eastern borders of the Achaemenid empire after a series 
of successful military campaigns against the Persians. After the conquest of 
Bactria, Sogdiana, and western Gandhāra, he crossed the Hindu Kush into 
eastern Gandhāra, the northwesternmost part of India. Pyrrho accompanied 
his teacher, the philosopher Anaxarchus of Abdera, during Alexander’s 
Asian campaigns. Teacher and pupil spent a total of three years in Bactria 
(330–327 BCE) and nearly two in north-west India: sufficient time in which 
to fraternize (συμμῖξαι) with Iranian Zoroastrian priests (Μάγοι) and Indian 
recluses called gymnosophists (γυμνοσοφισταῖ) or naked masters.6  
According to Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 9.11), Pyrrho’s encounters with the 
Indian ascetics led him to philosophize in a most radical way promoting the 
notion of “ineffability” (ἀκαταληψία) and the “suspension of assertions” 
(ἐποχῆς εἶδος εἰσαγαγών) concerning what is honourable or dishonourable, 
just or unjust, “for the same holds for all things nothing is in truth” (ὁμοίως 
ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀλῃθείᾳ), “but laws and conventions” (νόμῳ 
δὲ καὶ ἔθει) that motivate human actions. On one recorded occasion, Pyrrho 
and his mentor Anaxarchus exchanged philosophical observations with the 
gymnosophists, who were known for rejecting the world of human conven-
tions and displaying a self-assured “indifference” (ἀπάθεια) towards death. 
In his prologue, Diogenes Laertius reports that the gymnosophists “repudi-
ated death” (θανάτου καταφρονεῖν), an observation affirmed by Kleitar-
chos in his twelfth book.7 Similarly, for Pyrrho, there was no difference 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 As recounted by Diogenes Laertius in the Lives of Eminent Philosophers (9.11). The term 
“sophist” (σοφιστής) refers to someone who has mastery over something, such as art, poetry, 
oration, knowledge, and so forth—in short, a master of a certain craft.  
7 The same phrase θανάτου καταφρονεῖν, “repudiating death,” is echoed in reference to the 
self-immolation of Peregrinos Proteus in Lucian’s The Death of Peregrinus (Περὶ τῆς 
Περεγρίνου Τελευτῆς, 23) and in the Historical Library (Ἱστορικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, 17, 107, 5) 
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(μηδὲν διαϕὲρειν) between life and death (Stob. Anth. 4.53.28): a statement 
we would expect from an ascetic who attained liberation in this life and who 
is neither attached to this life nor frightened of death.8  
Timon’s Silloi, our earliest source of information on Pyrrho’s Greek 
teacher, refers to the Abderite as an unconventional man who espoused “an 
infinity of worlds.” He likened all existent things to a painting and supposed 
them to resemble the impressions experienced during sleep or delusions (M 
7.88). In anecdotal citations, Anaxarchus is portrayed as a valiant adept who 
faced a gruesome death with tenacity. Pounded by iron pestles, his last words 
to his vengeful executioner were also his most striking testament: “Pound, 
pound the bag of Anaxarchus’s flesh, you are not pounding Anaxarchus him-
self.” Moreover, when Nicocreon, annoyed, ordered Anaxarchus’s tongue to 
be cut out, he bit it off and spat it at him (Diog. Laert. 9.59). His death alludes 
to shared themes in Indian and Greek asceticism, such as corporeal tran-
scendence and freedom from physical and mental processes. They are reiter-
ated in the circumstances surrounding Socrates’s death and in the remarkable 
accomplishments of Buddhist meditators who are said to have “touched the 
deathless dimension of the body.”9 
We do not know for how long Pyrrho resided in India and whether he 
returned to Greece with Alexander’s army; he is certainly not accounted for 
among those who witnessed the self-immolation of Kalanos at Susa.10 During 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
by Diodorus of Sicily, who recounts the various reactions of bystanders to the luminous spec-
tacle. For Buddhist antecedents to self-immolations, see Halkias (2015).  
8 This view, which stems from a particular understanding, is echoed centuries later by another 
Greek philosopher, Apollonius of Tyana (c. 15–c. 100 CE), who is also said to have travelled 
in India. He wrote Θάνατος οὐδείς οὐδενός ἤ μόνον ἐμφάσει, καθάπερ οὐδέ γένεσις 
οὐδενός ἤ μόνον ἐμφάσει, which translates as “there is no death for anyone, save in appear-
ance only, nor is there birth for anyone, except only in appearance” (Philostratus, 2006, 48). 
9 In Phaedo, Plato portrays Socrates as someone who welcomes death without fear and with the 
understanding that having led a philosophical life, he will be attaining a desirable condition 
unburdened by physical constraints. For example, in the Itivuttaka (It 51), we read: “Under-
standing the realm of form, but not abiding in the formless [realms], released in cessation, those 
people abandon death. Touching the deathless dimension, which lacks material substratum, 
with the body, witnessing the relinquishing of material attachment, being without defilements, 
the Fully Awakened One teaches the state devoid of grief and defilement” (translated in Wynne 
2018, pp. 81–82). Wynne (2018, p. 82) interprets this to suggest that “for some early Buddhists, 
‘touching the deathless realm with the body’ was the same thing as attaining ‘cessation of per-
ception and feeling.’” 
10 McEvilley (2002, p. 450) suggests that he may have stayed in India for ten years or more, but 
provides no evidence for his hypothesis. 
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his time in Alexander’s mobile court, Pyrrho mingled with prominent phi-
losophers from different Greek schools, including the Indian ascetic Kalanos, 
who joined Alexander and acquired a good number of students among the 
Hellenes for the last two years of their fellowship. While fraternizing with 
the Indian gurus, Pyrrho heard Anaxarchus being reproached by one of them 
for pandering behaviour in royal courts and for failing to uphold his role as 
a teacher of that which is “beneficially good” (ἀγαθόν): a reprimand one 
would expect a disappointed master to give his pupil. Diogenes Laertius 
(9.66) reports that Pyrrho was greatly moved by the instructions of this anon-
ymous Indian master and renounced the world (ἐρημάζειν), attending to his 
basic needs with equanimity and, like a yogin, ever aspiring to “strip away 
what is human” (ἐκδῦναι τόν ἄνθρωπον). 
Pyrrho’s moral authority stemmed from his teachings and exemplary life-
style, which attracted a good number of disciples to the Olympian city of 
Elis.11 He taught them “antinomial methods of contemplation’ (τῆς παντὶ 
λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται), “equanimity towards all assertions” 
(ἰσοσθένεια), “indifference towards their differentiation” (ἀδιαφορία), and 
“moderation towards desires and wants” (μετριοπάθεια) (Diog. Laert. 9.74). 
He also expounded on the suspension of prejudice and judgement, the culti-
vation of verbal abstinence (ἀφασία), and the desired goal of ataraxia, a state 
unburdened by mental and emotional turmoil. Sextus Empiricus (PH 1.192), 
the last in a line of Pyrrhonian philosophers and our most detailed source on 
Greek scepticism, echoes the same concerns, declaring that non-assertion 
(ἀφασία) is our decision to avoid becoming entangled in a web of affirma-
tions and rejections since each argument raised for or against a given inter-
pretation has equal force with any other (ἰσοσθένεια). He explains that no-
where in “our future statements do we positively affirm that fact is exactly as 
we state it, but we simply narrate each fact, like a chronicler, as phenomena 
experienced by us at the moment” (PH 1.4).  
It is said that Pyrrho was a painter when he joined Alexander’s expedition, 
and also a poet: his one mentioned written work was a poem, which is unfor-
tunately lost. It is indeed remarkable and telling that after his sojourns in the 
far East, Pyrrho transformed from an unknown student of philosophy into a 
luminous guide of men likened to the sun, illuminating like the “orb of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
11 Diogenes Laertius (9.11; 9.68; 9.102) lists Noumenios, Timon of Phlius, Nausiphanes of 
Teos, Aenesidemos of Cnossos, Hekataios of Abdera, Eurylochos, and Philon among some of 
his better-known disciples. 
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burning sphere” (σφαὶρας πυρικαὺτορα κὺκλον), a teacher who single-
handedly steered others towards the recognition of their divinity (μοῦνος ἐν 
ἀνθρὼποισι θεοῦ τρὸπον ἡγεμονεὺεις) (Diog. Laert. 9.65). The Greeks 
passed on endearing anecdotes about his renunciant lifestyle, portraying him 
as a master who was faithful to his doctrines (ἀκόλουθος δ᾽ ἦν καὶ τῷ βίῳ) 
and who personified a cure for the illness of dogmatism. Sextus (PH 1.7) 
shares a striking memory of Pyrrho as someone who embodied his philoso-
phy in ways that were more physically manifest (σωματικὼτερον) and vis-
ible (ἐπιφανὲστερον) than those Pyrrhonians who came after him: “a man 
of windless calm” (M 2.141).  
The Aristocles Passage 
The classical scholar Bett (2000, pp. 169–177)—a prominent authority on 
Pyrrho who is unduly dismissive of the possibility of Indo-Greek exchanges 
ever having transpired on a philosophical level—unequivocally admits that 
the most distinctive element of Pyrrho’s thought is the way in which it com-
bined ataraxia and the indeterminacy thesis, for “neither Plato and the Ele-
atics nor Anaxarchus furnish a parallel here, and nor, with the possible ex-
ception of the Indian sages, does anyone else.”12 There is no doubt that Pyr-
rho was drawing from a Greek philosophical milieu to formulate his teach-
ings and that he was familiar with the theories of Democritus of Abdera (c. 
460–370 BCE). Nevertheless, he did not advance a thesis of epistemic inde-
terminacy for the purpose of self-promotion in order to defeat others in pub-
lic debates,13 nor was he pursuing the materialist teleology of Democritus. 
Kuzminski (2008, pp. 42–43) seriously doubted that Democritus, who may 
also have fraternized with Indian renunciants during his travels to Asia, em-
ployed the term ataraxia in any way that is identical to the way in which 
Pyrrho used it, and Flintoff (1980, pp. 94–96) could not ascertain fruitful 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 Bett (2000, p. 178) contended that any connection between Pyrrho and the Indian gymnoso-
phists was highly unlikely due to difficulties of translation at a profound doctrinal level. This is 
a questionable claim given that multilingualism was a given in the Persian Empire and among 
experts in Alexander’s entourage and army. 
13 See, for example, Diogenes Laertius’s assertion that Pyrrho escaped from servitude to the 
opinions and empty theorizing of the Sophists (9.65). 
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correspondences between the Democritean conception of euthemia and Pyr-
rho’s ataraxia.14 Sextus states in no uncertain terms that Democritus’s phi-
losophy is essentially different from scepticism, which he defines as the abil-
ity  
to set in opposition appearances and ideas in any manner whatsoever, the re-
sult of which is first that, because of the equal force of the opposed objects and 
arguments (ἰσοσθένεια), final suspension of judgment is achieved (ἐποχή), 
and then freedom from disturbance (ἀταραξὶα) (PH 30.213–15). 
Pyrrho did not write any books on philosophy. Our knowledge of his life and 
works comes from passing observations and testimonies preserved by Diog-
enes Laertius, Sextus Empiricus, and a few others. The single most important 
source is a summary of his teachings attributed to his student Timon of Phlius 
(c. 320–230 BCE), which is preserved in the eighth book of the History of 
Philosophy (Περί Φιλοσοφίας) written by the Peripatetic Aristocles of Mes-
sene (Ἀριστοκλῆς ὁ Μεσσήνιος, end of the first century BCE/early first cen-
tury CE).15 It is quoted ipsissima verba in the Praeparatio evangelica by the 
fourth-century bishop of Caesarea Eusebius and is commonly known as the 
Aristocles Passage (hereafter AP).  
The long line of transmission from Pyrrho to Timon to Aristocles and then 
to Eusebius raises the question of whether it faithfully represents Pyrrho’s 
own thought.16 Bett (2018, sect. 3, para. 3) opines: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 Warren (2002), among others, points out that ataraxia occurs in the teachings of Epicurus 
and Pyrrho and concludes that this is because they had the same source; namely, Democritus. 
McEvilley (2002, pp. 492–495) argued that Pyrrhonian scepticism formed part of the 
Democritean tradition, stating that “there is nothing in Pyrrhonism which requires the hypoth-
esis of foreign input. The other possibility, that the Mādhyamika dialectic somehow ‘came 
from’ Greece, has never been seriously considered, yet there is a good deal to be said for it, not 
only the abrupt appearance of the dialectic in India and the uncanny similarity in both form and 
content of Sextus’s and Nāgārjuna’s writings, but also several explicit philosophical formulae: 
fourfold negation, wood/fire, rope/snake, all of which are attested earlier in Greece than in 
India” (McEvilley, 2002, p. 499). 
15 Very little is known of Aristocles and his dates are obscure. There is a compelling argument 
in assigning an earlier date to Aristocles in Brunschwig (1994, p. 190 n. 2). Chiesara (2001, p. 
136) and more recently Polito (2014, p. 290) have argued that Aenesidemus (first century BCE) 
was more likely an intermediary source of the Aristocles Passage. 
16 Among others, Kuzminski (2008, p. 39) questioned the reliability of this passage on the 
grounds that Aristocles was hostile to scepticism. For a summary of different interpretations, 
see Brunschwig (1994), who goes to some length to argue that part of the text reflects Timon’s 
own views, not Pyrrho’s. 
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There is no reason, first, to doubt Eusebius’ explicit claim to be quoting Aris-
tocles verbatim. Aristocles is not quoting Timon verbatim; some of the vocab-
ulary in this passage is clearly reminiscent of Aristocles’ own vocabulary in 
other chapters. However, other terms in the passage are quite distinct both 
from Aristocles’ own normal usage and from any of the terminology familiar 
to us from later Pyrrhonism, yet were in use prior to Timon’s day; it seems 
easiest to account for these as authentic reproductions of Timon’s own lan-
guage. In addition, the frequent mention of Timon either by name or by the 
word phêsi, “he says,” suggests that Aristocles is taking pains to reproduce the 
essentials of his account as faithfully as possible. And finally, Aristocles’ other 
chapters, where we are in a position to check his summaries against other ev-
idence of the views being summarized, suggest that he is in general a reliable 
reporter of other people’s views, even views to which he himself is strongly 
opposed.  
He concludes on a sceptical note that while we cannot be certain that every 
detail of the AP accurately reflects Pyrrho’s own thought, “it appears to be 
based on a systematic account of the central points of Pyrrho’s outlook.” 
Aristocles appears to be well versed on the subject of early Pyrrhonism,17 
and it seems reasonable to side with Bett’s assessment that “all the indica-
tions are that the passage deserves to be taken seriously as evidence for Pyr-
rho’s philosophy.”  
The title of the relevant chapter reads Against the Pyrrhonian Sceptics, or 
Ephectics, Who Assert That Nothing Can Be Apprehended. What follows is a 
translation of the passage, with sections in square brackets for ease of refer-
ence in the analysis that follows. 
It is important to inquire about our knowledge, for if by nature we cannot know 
anything, then there is no necessity to keep looking. There were some people 
who voiced [this argument] in the past, but they have been repudiated by Ar-
istotle. Pyrrho of Elis prevailed by arguing thus, and while he left nothing in 
writing, his student Timon says that anyone who wants to live a life of well-
being (εὐδαιμονήσειν) must contemplate these three [questions]: [Q1] First, 
what is the nature of things (πράγματα)? [Q2] Second, what disposition 
should we adopt when dealing with them? [Q3] Third, what will the outcome 
be if we adopt this disposition? [R1a] According to Timon, Pyrrho says 
that things are equally without distinction (ἀδιάφορα), without measure 
(ἀστάθμητα), and without judgment (ἀνεπίκριτα). [R1b] In this respect (διά 
τοῦτο), neither our sense perceptions (αἰσθήσεις) nor our views (δόξας) tell 
us the truth or lie; therefore, [R2a] it follows that it is necessary not to have 
faith in them. [R2b] Rather, we should be “without views” (ἀδόξαστους), 
“uninclined towards taking sides” (ἀκλινεῖς), and “unwavering” [towards our 
dealings with phenomena] (ἀκραδάντους), [R2c] saying of every single thing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
17 For example, see his references to Timon’s Python (14.18.14.), his Silloi (16.1), and Aene-
sidemus (11.1). 
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that it is [no more in a certain way] than it is not, or that it both is and is not, 
or that it neither is nor is not. [R3a] Timon says that the result for those so 
disposed will lead to verbal abstinence (ἀφασίαν) [R3b] and then to tranquil-
lity (ἀταραξὶαν), [R3c] and Ainisidimos says [that it will lead] to bliss 
(ἡδονή). Those are the main points of what they have said, so let us examine 
whether they are correct.18  
Aristocles’s bias towards Pyrrho’s project is apparent in the opening lines of 
the AP and there seems to be no compelling reason why he would deliberately 
distort his position, which in any case he dismisses as a case of epistemolog-
ical nihilism repudiated by Aristotle. The density of this passage has led to it 
being the subject of strenuous debate, and there is no consensus among schol-
ars as to its meaning and overall bearing on later traditions of scepticism. 
There are some who continue to read a metaphysical argument about the na-
ture of reality in Pyrrho (Bett 2000, p. 68), others who read a combined epis-
temological and metaphysical argument for the sake of an ethical conclusion, 
and yet others who read a strictly ethical or phenomenological stance.19 We 
may avoid these hermeneutical difficulties if we accept Aristocles’s claim in 
the opening passage that it is necessary to investigate our capacity for 
knowledge and not our capacity to know the nature of things, citing Pyrrho 
as a proponent of the view that we know nothing. Save for an inflexible on-
tology that is not tenable in Pyrrho’s agenda and in later Pyrrhonism, it ap-
pears to me that many of these interpretations are partial approximations in 
the service of a personal soteriological exercise, whose aim is to overcome 
dogmas about what is and what is not. The suspension of contradictory deci-
sions about the world facilitates the kind of preparation that results in libera-
tion from emotional and mental restlessness and release from the compulsive 
need to defend, impose, and perpetuate our beliefs for posterity. It is true that 
Pyrrho may not stand as a champion of the more refined elements of scepti-
cism propagated by his successors. Based on testimonies of his life, he was 
more of a quiet thinker whose training led him to the professed goal of liber-
ation from perturbation than a proponent of intellectual vistas detached from 
practical aims. Whichever way we see it, the avowed goal of ataraxia cannot 
be attained by holding on to any dogmatic convictions about the nature of 
reality, since our attachment to such views is the very cause of our discontent.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 Praeparatio evangelica (14.18.1–5 = T 53 Decleva Caizzi, 1981). The English translations of 
primary sources are mine unless otherwise indicated. 
19  Beckwith (2011, pp. 289–290) argued for an ethical reading of the Aristocles Passage, 
providing a brief overview of the different interpretations. 
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In the next section, I want to propose a Buddhist reading of the AP draw-
ing on a juxtaposition of some critical characteristics that define Buddhism 
and Pyrrhonism as two congruent soteriological enterprises. Though some 
readers may object to my forcing a Buddhist reading on non-Buddhist mate-
rial, I hope that this comparison will provide much-needed clarity on Pyr-
rho’s philosophy, which has divided scholars in their attempt to reconcile the 
sceptical Pyrrho as portrayed by Sextus and the former’s assertions about the 
subjective nature of the world. It will be shown that Timon outlines a coher-
ent system that relies upon three interrelated topics formulated as questions 
Q1, Q2, and Q3. They can be structured in a tripartite fashion as the “base, 
position, or view” [Q1], the “path, practice, or training” [Q2], and the “fruit 
or benefits of the training” [Q3].20 The responses to these questions are given 
as R1a and R1b corresponding to Q1, R2a corresponding to Q2, and so on. 
The View: [Q1] What Is the Nature of “Things” (πράγματα)? 
Pyrrho intentionally uses the term pragmata (the plural form of pragma), 
which generically translates “things”; a vague designation encompassing a 
range of elements, not just material, but also abstract and mental.21 In the 
reading below, I will take pragmata to mean both phenomena and noumena 
and therefore to be translatable as those elements subsumed under appear-
ances.22 Pyrrho’s response to Q1 is that the sense-derived conceptions and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
20 This organizational scheme corresponds to a common Tibetan classification of the Buddhist 
teachings according to the Base (Skt. ādhāra; Tib. gzhi), the Path (Skt. mārga; Tib. lam), and 
the Fruit (Skt. phala; Tib. ’bras bu). While this triadic structure is standard in all post 14th-
century Dzogchen expositions and in the Sakya School of Tibetan Buddhism, where it is known 
as the triple continuum or three tantras (Skt. tritantra; Tib. rgyud gsum), it has arguably been 
present in Buddhism from the very beginning. At the very basic level, it is an interpretation of 
the triratna, where the basis or support is no other than the Buddha, his Dharma features the 
path of training, and the result or fruit is the āryasaṃgha. Theoretically, the first three of the 
Four Noble Truths are representative of the View of one’s practice, and the fourth represents 
the Path of contemplative instruction (magga or mārga). The magga is commonly described as 
the Noble Eightfold Path, which begins with right view and culminates in liberation, the fruition 
of the Path, the fruit (phala), with the attainment of the right samādhi. 
21 The word pragmata has a wide range of meanings beyond all kinds of material objects, in-
cluding “deeds,” “acts,” “facts,” “occurrences,” “matters,” or “affairs”; see Liddell and Scott 
(1968). 
22 The phenomenological use of the term appearance resonates with Timon’s lost work Indalmoi 
(Ἰνδαλμοῖ), from the rare word indalmos (ἰνδαλμός), meaning “form,” “mental image,” or 
“appearance,” and the frequently used verb indallomai (ἰνδάλλομαι), meaning “to appear,” “to 
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beliefs we hold about phenomena do not support any rigid outlook or dogma 
(δόξα) concerning their nature. 
R1a. All things are equally of the same nature, undifferentiable 
(ἀδιάφορα), without measurement or fixed essence (ἀστάθμητα), and 
beyond (the range of) prejudice and judgement (ἀνεπίκριτα). Per-
plexing as Pyrrho’s use of the term “nature” may appear, he does not 
seem to be saying that reality is inherently indeterminate, but rather 
that phenomena appear to us to be variable, indeterminate, and unqual-
ifiable. This statement harmonizes with a Buddhist formulation that 
the nature of all experiences is empty, which is to say that they are 
dependently arising events without a fixed essence. Insofar as no phe-
nomenon perceived by us has an inherent essence lending itself to a 
universal interpretation on that basis, it cannot be differentiated from 
any other, nor can our value judgements be in any way definitive and 
superior to any others.23  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
seem,” “to manifest itself,” to “present itself before one’s eyes,” “in one’s memory,” or “in 
one’s mind” (Brunschwig 1994, p. 215). 
23 In the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist teachings on Mahāmudra, we find a formulation of the nature 
of diverse appearances being one and the same from the standpoint of their mode of arising. 
The Path includes the yoga of one taste (Tib. rog gcig), where one trains to perceive all phe-
nomena, internal and external, as being of one taste (i.e., one nature), following the yoga free 
of conceptualization (Tib. spros bral), where one refrains from superimposing one’s views and 
judgements on reality. Among the earliest scriptures of Dzogchen heralding from Oḍḍiyāna—
the region of Gandhāra where Pyrrho first met with the gymnosophists and which remained a 
Hellenic stronghold until the beginning of the millennium—we find a testament known as the 
“six final vajra verses” (zhal chems rdo rje tshig drug). This is said to have been transmitted to 
Tibet by the semi-legendary yogin Padmasambhava (seventh to eighth century CE). The paral-
lels with the Aristocles Passage will soon become apparent, especially in their generic use of 
the term “things” (Skt. dharmas; Tib. chos rnams) to refer to “all phenomena, events and mean-
ings, and factors and entities” and in the pithy instructions on how to deal with them. The Ti-
betan text reads: chos rnams rang bzhin bdag med pas dngos po med pa’i 'du shes bsgom | chos 
rnams dngos por gzung med pas gzung 'dzin med pa'i 'du shes bsgom | chos rnams rang bzhin 
ltar med pas gsal stong dag pa'i 'du shes 'du shes bsgom | chos rnams rang bzhin bsgom med 
pas dmigs gtad bral ba'i 'du shes bsgom | chos rnams rang bzhin phyogs med pas bla 'dzin dag 
pa'i 'du shes bsgom | chos rnams rang bzhin rgyus med pa bya btsal bral ba'i 'du shes bsgom | 
It translates: “Things are insubstantial and without identity, so contemplate their intangibility 
with discernment. Things are devoid of anything tangible to grasp at, so contemplate the non-
duality of perceiver and perceived with discernment. Things have no observable identity, so 
contemplate their pure mode of appearance and emptiness with discernment. Things have no 
identity to contemplate on, so contemplate the notion that transcends all reference points with 
discernment. Things have no identity with fixed positions, so contemplate the notion that trans-
cends all notions. Things have no identity within the realm of knowing, so contemplate free 
from conscious striving and deliberate seeking” (“Sangs rgyas kyi chos tshig,” 1982, 14:516–
517). 
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R1b. It follows that neither our sense perceptions nor the views we 
hold about things are essentially true or false (μήτε τὰς αἰσθήσεις 
ἡμῶν μήτε τὰς δόξας ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι). Pyrrho is not claim-
ing that there is something intrinsically wrong with our sense percep-
tions (for after all, that is all we have), nor is he questioning the ap-
pearance of phenomena.24 Instead, he seems to be saying that what we 
understand to be the nature of the world is not independent of how we 
perceive and think about it and that therefore, unable to claim a van-
tage point, we cannot assert that our views are either true or false. This 
reading finds support not only in Sextus, but also in Timon, who re-
portedly said: “There is nothing really (φύσει) good or bad, but 
‘among men these things are judged according to mind’ (νόω)” (T 64, 
Decleva Caizzi, 1981). For, Sextus explains (PH 1.27): 
For those who hold the opinion that things are good and bad by nature 
are perpetually troubled. When they lack what they believe to be good, 
they take themselves to be persecuted by natural evils and they pursue 
what (so they think) is good. And when they have acquired these things, 
they experience more troubles; for they are elated beyond reason and 
measure, and in fear of change they do anything so as not to lose what 
they believe to be good. But those who make no determination about 
what is good and bad by nature neither avoid nor pursue anything with 
intensity; and hence they are tranquil. 
It therefore seems sensible that we should forsake our views about how 
things are by nature. The Buddha similarly challenged our ability to 
make any definitive pronouncements about the nature of the world 
given that our sense faculties are conditioned and what appears to us 
as reality arises in dependence on our sense faculties and mind. The 
same holds true for our belief systems, which are equally subjective 
and conditioned by a variety of factors such as our culture, language, 
understanding, and so forth. The Madhupiṇḍika Sutta (MN 18) reads:  
Bhikkhu, as to the source through which perceptions and notions [born 
of] mental proliferation beset a man: if nothing is found there to delight 
in, welcome and hold to, this is the end of the underlying tendency to 
lust, of the underlying tendency to aversion, of the underlying tendency 
to views, of the underlying tendency to doubt, of the underlying ten-
dency to conceit, of the underlying tendency to desire for being, of the 
underlying tendency to ignorance; this is the end of resorting to rods 
and weapons, of quarrels, brawls, disputes, recrimination, malicious 
words, and false speech; here these evil unwholesome states cease 
without remainder. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
24 Sextus’s response (PH 1.20), aimed at those who accuse the sceptics of denouncing phenom-
ena (ἀναιρεῖν τά φαινόμενα), is instructive here, for their questioning does not bear upon 
incidents, but on what is said about them. As Timon declared, “the phenomenon always persists 
wherever it arises” (AL 1.29). 
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Holding an undistorted vision of the nature of reality is the basis or support 
for entering the Buddhist path of training and for overcoming the disturb-
ances that ensue from clinging onto our views as dogmas. And while right 
view (sammā-diṭṭhi) is communicated in various ways in the Pāli sources and 
often in terms of abandoning wrong views (micchā-diṭṭhi), Fuller (2005, p. 
41) explains that the aim of the Buddhist path is often formulated as “seeing 
things as they are” (yathābhūtadassana). In fact, the commentaries often 
gloss sammā-diṭṭhi as yāthāva-diṭṭhika, “the view of things as they are.” And 
seeing the nature of things “as they are” anticipates the Mādhyamikan for-
mulation25 in that it entails the abandoning of all viewpoints, even right view, 
according to some traditions of early Buddhist thought.26  
The Path: [Q2] What Disposition Ought We to Cultivate in Order to 
Relate to Pragmata? 
The next question addresses the mental dispositions we ought to cultivate 
after having ascertained the epistemological unreliability of sense data and 
reasoning. Pyrrho’s answer is that we should not cling to any interpretations 
and that we should remain impartial and unpersuaded by the modalities of 
phenomenal appearance. Specifically, we should not believe that anything is 
any more [x] than it is not, that it both is and is not, or that it neither is nor is 
not.  
R2a. It follows [from R1a and R1b] that it is necessary not to have 
blind faith in our sense perceptions and cultures of belief, since there 
is no reality independent from the subjective processes of perception 
and cognition. Therefore, there is no external criterion to employ in 
order to judge the truth or falsity of what we perceive as real in any 
particular way. Similarly, the Buddha reportedly said (MN 18):  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
25 Arguments for doctrinal continuity have been advanced by Kalupahana (1986), who reasoned 
that Nāgārjuna’s Kārikā is not (as most scholars have assumed) solely indebted to Mahāyāna 
scriptures and ideology, but was rather composed as a grand commentary on the Kaccānagotta 
Sutta (SN 12.15) (cf. MMK, chapter 15). This line of analysis was pursued further by Vélez de 
Cea (2005), who argued that Nāgārjuna’s insights were not “revolutionary innovations,” but 
“orthodox philosophical moves” found in early Buddhism.  
26 For Fuller (2005, p. 1), according to the Sutta Nipāta verses and certain suttas from the 
Nikāyas, “just as objects of the senses are a hindrance, so all views and opinions, both ‘wrong’ 
and ‘right’ and even ‘knowledge’ (ñāṇa), are rejected as the means towards the goal of non-
attachment. The aim of the path is not the cultivation of right-view and the abandoning of 
wrong-views but the relinquishment of all views, wrong or right.” 
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Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meet-
ing of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. 
What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks 
about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what 
one has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions 
[born of] mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future, 
and present forms cognizable through the eye. 
R2b. Pyrrho recommends that we remain without stubborn beliefs, im-
partial, and unwavering. This triadic scheme relates to the triad intro-
duced earlier. We can draw correspondences between pragmata, 
which are without differentiation with respect to their mode of arising 
(ἀδιάφορα), leading us to abandon dogmas concerning their nature 
being one way or another. They are without inherent criteria of meas-
ure (ἀστάθμητα), predisposing us to stay impartial, not favouring 
some and avoiding others. And they are without inherent characteris-
tics to support a particular assessment (ἀνεπίκριτα), so we ought to 
remain free of conclusions.  
Among the earliest extant Buddhist literature, the Aṭṭhakavagga denies 
the epistemological value of any particular conviction. Hence, a (true) 
brahmin is one who does not grasp any view as supreme (Bodhi 2017, 
p. 795), who does not posit even a subtle notion about what is seen, 
heard, or sensed, and who does not cling to any view (p. 802). A brah-
min does not indulge in mental constructs; he is not a pursuer of views; 
he maintains equanimity while others grasp (p. 911). He has relin-
quished everything and is called peaceful (p. 946).27 In The Book of 
Fours (AN 4.24), we read that the Tathāgatas [Buddhas] cling to noth-
ing, for they do not “posit as categorically true or false anything seen, 
heard, or sensed, clung to and considered truth by others.”  
R2c. Evidently, the education of the contemplative who aims for a life 
devoid of strife is to neither support nor discard any conviction. For 
this reason, Pyrrho instructs us not to make any of the four possible 
claims concerning the nature of pragmata: A, ~A, A & ~A, ~A & not 
~A (οὐ μᾶλλον ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ και ̀ἔστι και οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ οὔτε 
ἔστιν οὔτε οὐκ ἔστιν). The stratagem of four options was a common 
Indian and particularly Buddhist form of argumentation known in San-
skrit as the catuṣkoṭi and in Greek as the tetralemma (τετράλημμα).28 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
27 Bhikkhu Bodhi (2017, p. 44) explains that the rejection of adherence to beliefs is a prominent 
theme in the Aṭṭhakavagga, and asserts: “The Buddha is shown maintaining that views are a 
spiritual blind alley. One who adopts a view grasps it tightly, proclaims it as supreme, and 
thereby becomes embroiled in conflict with those who hold contrary views. When views are 
grasped, sincere inquiry gives way to dogmatism as rival thinkers reject the impartial search 
for truth in favor of frenzied attempts to bolster their own standpoint. Like a hunter caught in 
his own snare, the theorists become trapped in systems of their own devising” (Bodhi, p. 47). 
28 Also known as the four extremes, this concept played an important role in the logical structure 
of refutation in Sextus denying the assertion of being, non-being, both being and non-being, 
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For the Nāgārjuna of the MMK (18), the catuṣkoṭi exemplifies the Bud-
dha’s stance in that “everything is real and is not real, both real and 
not real, neither real nor not real” (Garfield 1995, p. 250). 
The Fruit: [Q3] What Is the Outcome If We Adopt This Path of  
Training? 
The application of these instructions leads one to experience verbal absti-
nence followed by inner serenity and also bliss. “This is the teaching of the 
skepsis: it aims to secure a happy life, since happy (εὐδαίμων) is the man 
who lives without perturbations (ἀταράχως), and as Timon said, remaining 
in peace (ἡσυχία) and calm (γαλήνη)” (T 64; Decleva Caizzi, 1981). The 
states facilitated by sceptical training are given as R3a–c. 
R3a. The condition of speechlessness, dwelling in silence (ἀφασία), 
ensues from R2c. Non-assertion is perhaps a more illustrative transla-
tion, as Sextus suggests (PH 1.192) when he says that aphasia is nei-
ther affirmation (κατάφασις) nor negation (ἀπόφασις). Elsewhere, it 
seems that Timon is using the word apatheia, or emancipation from 
passions (Chiesara 2001, p. 107). 
R3b. Attaining a state unhampered by perturbations, dwelling in tran-
quillity (ἀταραξὶα).  
R3c. According to Aenesidemus, one experiences pleasure (ἡδονή). 
The use of this term has been the cause of some bafflement among 
scholars given that elsewhere (Phot. Bibliotheca, 212.170b31), Aene-
sidemus is reported to have declared that “neither happiness 
(εὐδαιμονία), nor pleasure (ἡδονή), nor prudence (φρόνησιν) are the 
goal of life.”29 In this context, we may understand pleasure not as the 
goal of life, but as the by-product of an introspective practice, similar 
to the psychophysical bliss induced by meditation during release from 
the defilements that have been eradicated on the Buddhist path 
(mārga).30 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
and neither being nor non-being. This argumentation, though rarely used in its quadric formu-
lation before the Sceptics, was not foreign to the Greeks, as it can be discerned in Plato’s Par-
menides (165d) and especially in Aristotle’s critique of Pyrrho in Metaphysics (1008a 30–4) 
(Chiesara 2001, p. 93).  
29 For a discussion of the arguments, see Chiesara (2001, pp. 107–108). 
30 There are numerous references in the Buddhist scriptures to the bliss attained by the Buddha 
and anyone who realizes the dhamma. Some examples from the Sutta Nipāta will suffice: “One 
who has understood the Dhamma can obtain bliss” (323); “For this Dhamma, subtle and bliss-
ful, has been well proclaimed by you, O Blessed one” (383); “A weak person concerned with 
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These forms of well-being (R3a–c) are facilitated by sceptical practice. A 
Pyrrhonist trains in order to maintain awareness of how things are in their 
subjective mode of appearance, only to discover that diverse events are ex-
perienced as a continuum of sense data that are indistinguishable in their 
mode of appearing (ἀδιάφορα), without rest (ἀστάθμητα), and unqualifia-
ble (ἀνεπίκριτα). Like the Buddhist, he suspends convictions and neither 
avoids nor intensely pursues anything (PH 1.28). This direction is intimately 
connected with the development of discriminating insight, or wisdom (Skt. 
prajñā; Pāli paññā). Happiness (pīti) and its coeval pleasure, bliss, is de-
scribed in terms of five factors of meditation (Skt. dhyāna; Pāli jhāna) in 
early canonical scriptures, such as the Samādhaṅga Sutta (AN 5.28). The goal 
of the Buddhist path, nibbāna, is attained by one “who is not overwhelmed 
when in contact with worldly phenomena,” “freed from sorrow, taintless and 
secure.”31 
Bliss (ἡδονή) and tranquillity (ἀταραξὶα) are here given as the side-ef-
fects of such contemplative schooling and not as causal results. Arguably, for 
both Buddhism and Pyrrhonism, a state that is free of agitation is the natural 
condition of a mind unoccupied by dogmatic assertions and preoccupations 
with beliefs, attachments, and verdicts. It is not the outcome of any particular 
cause such as nibbāna, which is unconditioned, and as an uncompounded 
phenomenon, it is not the effect of any cause. In the writings of Sextus (PH 
1.25–26), ataraxia, “the undisturbance and calmness of soul” (PH 1.10), is 
fortuitous. Sextus explains: 
We assert still that the Sceptic’s outcome is unperturbedness in matters of 
opinion and moderation of feelings towards things unavoidable. For having 
begun to philosophize with the aim of deciding among the sense-impressions 
and apprehending which are true, and which are false, so as to become unper-
turbed, he encountered an equipollent disagreement; being unable to decide it, 
he suspended judgment. And while he was suspending judgment, unper-
turbedness in matters of opinion closely followed him by chance (τυχικώς 
παρακολούθησεν). (PH 1.10, italics mine) 
For Sextus, ataraxia is not the result of suspending judgement (ἐποχή), 
though it is clear that holding onto fixed ideas prevents one from attaining 
tranquillity and well-being (εὐδαιμονία). The desired goal of a sceptical life 
follows by “chance, as it were” (οἷον τυχικώς), as a shadow [follows] a body 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
his body and life does not conquer such an army of yours, but a hero conquers, and having 
conquered, he achieves the bliss of the path and the bliss of the fruit” (439). 
31 Mahāmaṅgala Sutta (SN 2.4). 
 Yavanayāna: Buddhist Soteriology in the Aristocles Passage  101 
 
(PH 1.29).32 The example he gives is that of the painter Apelles, who wanted 
to paint a horse’s foam, but was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt 
and flung the sponge that he was using to wipe the paint off his brush at his 
painting. The mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse’s foam. So 
too, Sextus explains,  
the Sceptics were in hopes of gaining ataraxia by means of a decision regard-
ing the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to 
effect this they suspended judgement; and they found that ataraxia, as if by 
chance, followed upon their suspense, even as a shadow follows its body. (PH 
1.29) italics mine) 
On Divinity and Goodness 
Given Pyrrho’s sceptical legacy, a fragment where he reportedly discoursed 
on truthful speech (μῦθον ἀληθείς), correct standard (ὀρθὸν κανὸνα), and 
the nature of the divine and goodness (θείου τε φύσις καί τἀγαθοῦ) has led 
many perplexed philologists to squabble over punctuation.33 It is quoted in 
Sextus (M 11.20) and comes from Timon’s Indalmoi.  
ἦ γάρ ἐγών ἐρέω ὥς μοι καταφαίνεται εἶναι, μῦθον ἀληθείς  
ὀρθόν ἔχων κανόνα, ὡς ἡ τοῦ θείου τε φύσις καί τἀγαθοῦ αἰεί,  
ἐξ ὦν ἰσότατος γίνεται ἀνδρί βίος.  
I will tell you a truthful saying as it appears to me,  
to hold a standard of measurement that takes, at any time, the nature 
of divinity and goodness through which a man’s life becomes most 
equable.34 
This seems to have been Pyrrho’s response when asked how he managed to 
be so serene and without agitation when he was merely a man. He answered 
that it appeared to him (καταφαὶνεται) to be a proverbial truth to take on 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
32 For an extended version of this argument, see Machuca (2006). 
33 This passage quoted by Sextus has been the subject of much dispute, leading some to assert 
that Pyrrho was a dogmatist after all: see Svavarsson (2002, pp. 250–255). Bett (1994) offers 
an assessment of various proposed emendations to this passage to make it sound “less dog-
matic.”  
34 My own translation of the passage. The word kanon (κανόνας; κανών) is a convention, a 
measuring tool used to test straightness and crookedness in construction, art, music, and so 
forth. In an epistemological context, the word appears in Democritus, but its use is not all that 
clear (Striker 1996, p. 31). 
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the qualities (φύσις) of spiritual excellence (θείου) and benevolence 
(ἀγαθοῦ) as the conventional standards for living a life that would be equal 
in relation to all others.35 This is in agreement with Antigonus’s claim that 
Pyrrho’s end (τέλος) was virtue (ἀρετή), for once, when he was discovered 
talking to himself and was asked the reason for this, he replied that he was 
practising in order to be useful (χρηστός εἶναι) (Diog. Laert. 9.64). It is un-
clear how talking to himself would constitute training in usefulness 
(χρηστός), and the only thing that readily comes to mind is that he may have 
been reciting some prayers or passages of texts as a means of mental cultiva-
tion.  
It would be erroneous to attribute the dogma that anything is essentially 
good or bad to Pyrrho, for we are only in the habit of conventionally labelling 
things with such designations.36 Sextus (PH 3.14) asserts that there are two 
criteria (κριτήρια), one to judge “reality and non-reality” and one to use “as 
the guide of life,” for he writes: “Holding then to appearances, we live un-
dogmatically (ἀδόξαστος) in accordance with the ordinary regiment of life 
since we cannot remain entirely inactive” (PH 1.23–24). Not unlike the dis-
tinction drawn between ultimate (paramārtha) and conventional (saṃvṛti) 
truth in Madhyamaka, Sextus allows for conventional practices without com-
mitting to a thesis about the ultimate reality of things. 
It seems fair to read Pyrrho along these lines, since the so-called nature 
of the divine and goodness is a guide for leading an equable life in relation 
to others. There is no denying that Pyrrho, like the Buddha, may very well 
have trusted in an ultimate truth that is not accessible through our conven-
tional, language-bound interpretive structures. In the absence of Pyrrho’s 
complete teachings, it is impossible to provide a conclusive reading, but a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
35 The term isos (ἴσος), equal, was used by Timon to describe Pyrrho’s way of life (T 62 De-
cleva Caizzi 1981). 
36 We should bear in mind that the controversial passage quoted and attributed to Timon’s In-
dalmoi was specifically cited by Sextus (M 11.20) as an illustration to clarify the conventional 
use of term “good by sceptics. He writes: “Whenever we say as Sceptically ‘Of existing things 
some are good, others evil, others between these two,’ we insert ‘is’ as indicative not of reality 
but of appearance. For concerning the real existence of things good and bad and neither we 
have quite some dispute with the Dogmatists: but we have the habit of calling each of them 
good or bad or indifferent according to how they appear”; translation in Machuca (2006, p. 
119). Furthermore, according to Diogenes Laertius (9.101), Pyrrho taught that “there is nothing 
good or bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it must be good or bad for 
all persons alike. […] But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in common; 
therefore there are no such things as good or bad by nature.” 
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passing mention by Diogenes Laertius (9.64) may shed some additional light 
on this passage. He reports that Pyrrho was made chief priest (ἀρχιερεύς) of 
the town of Elis, perhaps presiding over the rites of Apollo Akesios, the 
healer and averter of evil, whose temple and image were located in the open 
part of the market place (Paus. 6.24.6). As chief minister presiding over reli-
gious ceremonies at Elis, Pyrrho would have not divulged the sacred truths 
(ἱεροί λόγοι) to anyone except those who had been admitted and initiated 
into the rites, lest he be accused of impiety. While the above-cited passage 
may have been uttered in relation to his public duties as a priest, it may also 
be a sober affirmation that many of his disciples were not able to transcend 
the equipollence of all views concerning good and evil and resorted to moral 
relativism as a justification for engaging in destructive behaviour. For those 
who have yet to reach the unperturbed goal of ataraxia, it would be advisable 
to abide by conventional morality concerning the nature of divinity and good-
ness as a guiding principle for maintaining a harmonious life in relation to 
others.37  
There is yet another side to this argument that recognizes people’s differ-
ent dispositions and, by extension, different approaches to cure them of their 
dogmas. In the Outlines (PH 3.280–81), Sextus writes that sceptics, like phy-
sicians, skilfully promote diverse methods of contemplation for the love of 
human beings (φιλανθρωπία): 
The sceptic, because he loves humanity, wishes to cure dogmatists of their 
opinions and rashness, with reasoning, so far as possible. So, just as doctors 
have remedies of different strengths for bodily ailments and for those suffering 
excessively employs the strong ones and for those suffering mildly the mild 
one, so the sceptic puts forth arguments that differ in strength; he employs 
those which are weighty and able to destroy forcefully the dogmatist’s ailment, 
viz. opinion, in those cases where the disease is caused by excessive rashness, 
and those which are less weighty in the cases where the ailment, viz. opinion, 
is superficial and easy to cure and for those who are able to be healed by less 
weighty persuasions. For this reason, one inspired by scepticism does not hes-
itate to employ on some occasions arguments that are strongly persuasive, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
37 Mahāyāna Buddhism makes a similar point when arguing that while bodhisattvas who are 
well advanced on the path of spiritual development may disregard conventional mores when 
necessary in order to liberate sentient beings from suffering (i.e., upāya), this is plainly not the 
case for those who have not realized the view of no view (i.e., emptiness). The former are 
arguably emancipated by espousing relativism, whereas the latter driven by desires caused by 
holding on to self-serving beliefs will more likely be damaged and cause damage to others. 
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apparently weaker ones on other occasions. He uses the latter on purpose, 
since they are frequently sufficient to accomplish his objective.38 
The analogy of the teacher-physician is reminiscent of the reference to the 
Buddha as an unsurpassed physician and surgeon (anuttaro bhisakko salla-
katto; It 101; SN 560). The Buddha, not unlike the sceptic described by Sex-
tus, is stirred by the suffering of sentient beings and, motivated by compas-
sion, he administers the Dharma as a remedy according to the nature of the 
ailment: 
Monks, doctors give a purgative for warding off diseases caused by bile, dis-
eases caused by phlegm, diseases caused by the internal wind property. There 
is a purging there; I don’t say that there’s not, but it sometimes succeeds and 
sometimes fails. So I will teach you the noble purgative that always succeeds 
and never fails, a purgative whereby beings subject to birth are freed from 
birth; beings subject to aging are freed from aging; beings subject to death are 
freed from death; beings subject to sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress and des-
pair are freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress and despair. Listen and 
pay close attention. I will speak. (AN 10.108) 
Motivated by compassion, the Buddha taught the Dharma in “order for us to 
abandon beliefs,” Nāgārjuna says (MMK 27.30). The parallel use of altruistic 
motives and expedient means (Skt. upāya) is indeed striking, for just as the 
Pyrrhonist resorts to sceptical discourse out of love for others in order to cure 
the dogmatists (δογματικοί) of their self-conceit (οἴησις) and haste 
(προπέτεια) and lead them to a state of lasting well-being, the Buddha taught 
the dhamma to Indian heretics (Skt. tīrthika) out of similar concerns, in order 
to liberate them from clinging to opinionated disputations that result in con-
flict, tension, and suffering.  
It is fitting and worthwhile to read Pyrrho’s extraordinary vision tailored 
to our human predicament through a Buddhist lens and to outline a common 
philosophical ground for the emergence of two orientations that matured in 
ways that are remarkably similar in their methods and teleology and also in 
their relations between critical aspects that give coherence to the purpose of 
their enterprise. We would be amiss not to find divergences between Bud-
dhism and Pyrrho’s teachings, not least because there are a vast number of 
scriptures inspired by the former and only a few extant sayings attributed to 
the latter. Nevertheless, the foreseeable differences have been defensibly re-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
38 Translation by Inwood and Gerson (1988, pp. 193–194). 
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laxed and relativized in light of a shared practical task at hand: the develop-
ment of an altruistic anthropocentric soteriology that prescribes a course for 
the pacification of suffering and its causes and leads to a blissful state of 
serenity (nibbāna; ἀταραξὶα).  
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The Evident and the Non-Evident: Buddhism through the 
Lens of Pyrrhonism 
Adrian Kuzminski 
This paper offers a short synopsis of Pyrrhonism, a proposed solution to the 
issue of Pyrrho’s connection with Indian thought, and a brief comparison of 
some elements of Pyrrhonism and Buddhism.1 
1. 
Pyrrhonism is an unusual ancient Greek therapeutic philosophy. Pyrrho of 
Elis, generally recognized as its founder, was part of the entourage of philos-
ophers who accompanied Alexander the Great on his Asian conquests, all the 
way to India. According to Diogenes Laertius, writing in the third century of 
the Common Era, Pyrrho 
foregathered with the Indian Gymnosophists and with the Magi. This led him 
to adopt a most noble philosophy […] taking the form of agnosticism and sus-
pension of judgment. He denied that anything was honorable or dishonourable, 
just or unjust. And so, universally, he held that there is nothing really existent, 
but custom and convention govern human action; for no single thing is in itself 
any more this than that. (Diogenes Laertius, 1925, 9.61)2 
As this passage and other sources suggest, Pyrrho suspended judgement, or 
interpretation, about the nature of our immediate experience; that is, our sen-
sations and thoughts as they directly appear to us. Pyrrho found that the abil-
ity to suspend judgement led to ataraxia; namely, peace, or stillness of mind. 
Stripped of the interpretations that we usually give our sensations and 
thoughts, they turn out to have no fixed meaning, no independent existence; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 This paper extends my earlier work. See Kuzminski (2008) et passim. I would also like to 
thank Oren Hanner for his editorial help and advice. 
2 The Hicks translation (1925) has the advantage of facing Greek and English texts; a more 
recent, well-annotated translation without the Greek text is the 2018 translation by Pamela 
Mensch. 
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instead, they continuously fluctuate, appearing not in isolation, but variously 
together in one context or another. 
The historical record of Pyrrhonism is a spotty one. Pyrrho himself wrote 
little or nothing, and the only comprehensive texts to have come down to us 
were written by Sextus Empiricus nearly half a millennium later. Diogenes 
Laertius, writing after Sextus, offers, aside from his intriguing biography of 
Pyrrho, a genealogy of Pyrrhonian philosophers, including Timon and Aene-
sidemus, among others, who, he claims, fill in the long line between Pyrrho 
and Sextus (Diogenes Laertius, 1925, 9.115–116). However, the paucity of 
surviving texts has left this tradition little more than a skeleton, a bare outline 
of names, subject to challenge and controversy. 
It has even been argued that Pyrrho himself was not a Pyrrhonist.3 None-
theless, his successors seemed to think otherwise. They found enough in him 
to acknowledge him as their founder, and thereby distinguished themselves 
as members of a coherent tradition in its own right. My purpose here is not 
to rehearse scholarly controversies, but instead to propose a reconstruction 
of some of the main points of Pyrrhonism, particularly as found in the texts 
of Sextus Empiricus, to see how Pyrrho might most plausibly have reconciled 
his Greek mindset with what he encountered among holy men in India, and 
to bring all this to bear on some basic points of Buddhism. 
2. 
First, we must resolve the confusion between Pyrrhonism and scepticism as 
we know it today. The Pyrrhonists were the only ancient philosophers who 
described themselves as sceptics, to be sure, but only in the original Greek 
sense of the term, as seekers or inquirers, not as doubters. For better or worse, 
the term “scepticism” in modern times has come to mean something quite 
different from inquiry; it now means doubting that any sort of knowledge at 
all is possible and believing that all inquiry is doomed to fail. Thanks to Da-
vid Hume and others (even Nietzsche), the term “Pyrrhonism” has confus-
ingly come to be used for this kind of radical scepticism, or nihilism.4 
The ancient Pyrrhonists were not nihilists. They distinguished between 
things evident—our immediate thoughts and sensations, about which they 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 See Bett (2000, pp. 39–40). 
4 See Hume (1748/1993, pp. 110–111) and Nietzsche (1888/2009–, 14[100]). 
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had no doubt—and things non-evident, or absent, about which doubt is pos-
sible. The Pyrrhonists scorned those who denied the possibility of any 
knowledge at all, such as Arcesilaus and Carneades of the Old Academy, 
who, like modern sceptics, believed that nothing was evident or could be 
known with certainty, as negative dogmatists. The Pyrrhonists also rejected 
the positive dogmatism of the major schools—Platonists, Aristotelians, Epi-
cureans, Stoics, and others—all of whom believed that recalcitrant non-evi-
dent things could in fact be made evident and known. The Pyrrhonists 
avoided both of these extremes: they did not accept dogmatic beliefs, either 
positive or negative, but they did count our immediate experiences as evi-
dent. 
Pyrrhonists observe that our immediate and evident objects of experience, 
our thoughts and sensations, are phenomena that are continuously in flux, 
and that—apparently without exception—they variously combine and re-
combine with one another into facts, or what Sextus calls pragmata. Appear-
ances mean different things depending on the context—the facts—in which 
they appear. “Each thing,” Sextus tells us, “appears relative to a given ad-
mixture and a given composition and quantity and position.” And, “since 
everything is relative,” he says, “we shall suspend judgment as to what things 
are independently and in their nature” (Sextus Empiricus, 2000, 1.135–136). 
So, the significance of appearances—of what they mean to us—depends 
wholly on the shifting factual contexts in which they appear and disappear, 
along with other appearances. Therefore, nothing in itself, they say, is “any 
more this than that.” 
Sextus, our principal source for Pyrrhonism, insists that we cannot deny 
the immediate objects of our experience—that is, our immediate thoughts 
and sensations—and that we cannot be in error about what they are. In his 
Outlines of Scepticism, Sextus writes:  
Those who say that the sceptics [Pyrrhonists] reject what is apparent have not, 
I think, listened to what we say. […] When we investigate whether existing 
things are such as they appear, we grant that they appear, and what we inves-
tigate is not what is apparent, but what is said about what is apparent—and 
this is different from investigating what is apparent itself. For example, it ap-
pears to us that honey sweetens […]; but whether […] it is actually sweet is 
something we investigate—and this is not what is apparent but something said 
about what is apparent. (Sextus Empiricus, 2000, 1.19) 
Sextus points out that we accept appearances involuntarily. Think of it this 
way: if it is a sunny day and I go outside, and if my eyes are normal and I 
look up, I cannot help but see the sunny blue sky. Or this: if my hearing is 
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normal and I stand next to a piano that has been tuned to concert pitch, I 
cannot help but hear middle C if a certain key is struck. And so on for the 
gardenia that I smell, or the fur that I touch. And similarly, if someone says 
“think of your mother,” I cannot help but think of my mother, or if they say 
“think of the Mona Lisa,” I cannot help thinking of—either imagining or rec-
ollecting—the Mona Lisa; that is, some mental image that I have of the Mona 
Lisa. Appearances, which come packaged as pragmata, are evident, or ap-
parent, because they are as involuntary as they are direct and immediate. 
They are literally forced upon us. We have no choice, Pyrrhonists say, but to 
suffer and endure them. We cannot help having them when we have them. 
What is not apparent, by contrast, is what we can say about these experi-
ences; that is, how we interpret pragmata. To interpret an experience is to 
imagine something about it, to take it as a sign of another experience, one 
which is not currently present. I might see a shimmering blur ahead in the 
desert. When I do, there is no mistaking the immediate visual experience of 
the shimmering blur that I see in the distance; only when I interpret the blur, 
when I take it for something else—say, for a body of water—can I make a 
mistake. Appearances, for the Pyrrhonists, cannot in themselves be in error; 
error arises only when we interpret these appearances. For any interpretation 
takes us from something evident to something non-evident, to something we 
could be wrong about. 
This does not mean that our interpretations are necessarily wrong; there 
might in fact be water ahead in the desert. But interpretation necessarily in-
volves a degree of uncertainty. Many signs prove to be reliable enough: Sex-
tus gives the stock examples of smoke as a sign of fire and a scar as a sign of 
a wound, though, of course, even these might be wrong in some circum-
stances. However, for Pyrrhonists, it is never the experience itself that is 
wrong, but only our interpretation of it. 
3. 
We not only experience things evident—that is, our pragmata, our immedi-
ately manifest, involuntary, fluctuating sensations and thoughts—but accord-
ing to Sextus, we also experience previously evident things as non-evident. 
We are able to notice the absence as well as the presence of appearances. I 
notice, for example, the absence of a student who one day fails to come to 
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class. Presence and absence seem to be mutually defining aspects of the im-
mediate objects of our experience, which come and go. It seems doubtful that 
we can have either presence or absence without the other. 
Interestingly, in Against the Logicians, Sextus offers us an intriguing four-
fold classification of pragmata;5 that is, the facts of immediate experience 
(the combinations of phenomena we actually perceive). First, he tells us, we 
have facts which are manifestly evident: these are our immediate, involuntary 
thoughts and sensations, as already noted, like the blue sky we see on a sunny 
day. Second, we have facts which are non-evident, but only temporarily so 
(like the student who does not come to class). Sextus’s examples of tempo-
rarily non-evident facts include thinking about the city of Athens when we 
are in Rome, or a fire that we cannot see, but which we imagine to exist 
because of smoke that we can see. Third, Sextus notes facts which he calls 
absolutely or, we might say, practically non-evident; that is, things which we 
have no way of determining, even though we can see that they could in prin-
ciple be determined. Here, he gives the examples of whether the stars in the 
heavens and the grains of sand in the Libyan desert are odd or even in num-
ber. 
Fourth and finally, and most relevant to our purposes, Sextus notes certain 
facts which he says are naturally or inherently non-evident; these, he de-
scribes as absences that are “everlastingly hidden away.” They include no-
tions such as God, Nature, the Void, and the Soul. Unlike facts practically or 
temporarily non-evident, facts inherently non-evident are things we can im-
agine, or think we can imagine, but which appear to have no realization as 
sensations. We somehow never find the Soul or the Self appearing among 
our sensations, as David Hume famously argued, nor do we find the Void, 
God, or Nature suddenly appearing among the things we sensibly experience 
as manifestly evident. These absences cannot be found in immediate sensory 
experience; they are non-facts which we project, but which remain stub-
bornly absent. Though we can imagine naturally non-evident things in 
thought, or at least imagine that we can imagine them, we find, so far, no 
realization of them in sensation. They are, we might say, evidently non-evi-
dent, in spite of our belief that they may or could be evident. 
The student’s absence is evident to me because the student had previously 
come to class; similarly, the absence of an even or odd number for the stars 
is evident to me because I can see both how to start counting the stars and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 See Sextus Empiricus (1935, 2.145–158). 
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how it is that I cannot finish the job. But the Soul and other inherently non-
evident things, according to Sextus, are experienced only as imaginings, 
never (yet) as sensations. My Soul consistently fails to appear to me, as Hume 
pointed out; it is not present to me in the way that my sensations are present 
to me. All we can experience of the Soul, the Pyrrhonists observe, is its ab-
sence. 
Even though there is no sensible appearance of the Soul, I can nonetheless 
try to fill in the absence I recognize. So argues the dogmatist. Since I can 
recall things temporarily absent, like the student who did not come to class, 
why, the dogmatist asks, can I not believe that the inherently non-evident 
things I imagine nonetheless exist somewhere “outside” or “inside” of my-
self? Why not posit an actually existing Soul for myself, a kind of shadow of 
myself within my body, which survives my body’s death? If I can use words 
to signify something temporarily or practically absent—the student not in 
class, or the exact number of the stars—why can I not use words—such as 
“Soul”—to express something that is inherently non-evident, or entirely ab-
sent, but which I can nevertheless imagine, or imagine that I can imagine, 
existing? 
Nothing prevents anyone from asserting that there is a Soul, that it is im-
mortal, that it currently coexists with the living body, that it has certain pow-
ers, that it has a conscience, that it can do good or evil, that it was created by 
God, and so on, as anyone may please. And anyone can just as freely deny 
all that. What we cannot do, however, is verify the Soul empirically, as an 
actual sensation corresponding to the thought of it that I can imagine. We can 
only believe it exists, or not—either choice being an act of faith. However, 
the Pyrrhonists hold no such beliefs and make no such acts of faith. That my 
Soul might or might not exist, they neither affirm nor deny. They note only 
that we have not been able to experience it as an appearance in sensation. 
All we can know about the Soul—or about similar things widely believed 
to exist, such as Nature, Beauty, Justice, or Art, among many others—is no 
more or less than that if they exist, they are inherently non-evident to us. All 
we can know about them, the Pyrrhonists maintain, is that as sensations, they 
remain absent and therefore indeterminate. It is pragmata, for the Pyrrho-
nists, which provide the only standard, or criterion, of determination; things 
inherently non-evident, which do not appear in sensation, remain indetermi-
nate. This does not mean that the inherently non-evident is nothing. We can-
not say that it does not exist; we can only say that it does not appear. The 
inherently non-evident is an absence which is not realized by any sensible 
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appearance we have. It is, we might say, absence itself, evident only by its 
contrast with such facts, or pragmata, as are evident to us. 
The inherently non-evident, the Pyrrhonists suggest, can be understood as 
pure absence. Temporarily or practically non-evident things, by comparison, 
shape the absences they leave behind, as light shapes the shadows it casts. 
The student not in class is a shadow of that student, so to speak, just as a 
footprint in the sand is a shadow of one who has passed by. Such absences 
are shaped by prior pragmata. Insofar as they can be redeemed by later reap-
pearing, they remain temporary (or practical) absences. However, the inher-
ently non-evident is a wholly indeterminate absence that is not shaped by any 
prior presence we can find. 
Our signs for the inherently non-evident lack any determinate referent. 
We can imagine God, or infinity, or try to do so, and we can use words and 
pictures to represent such imaginings, to be sure, but insofar as no independ-
ent appearances corresponding to these signs can be found, insofar as they 
remain unconfirmed by any referent, they remain empty of any real content 
to us. The only reality they can be given is a fictional one, potential at best, 
something that can only be believed, but not known, to be true. 
Since anyone is free to believe in whatever they think is signified by their 
signs for inherently non-evident things, and since no one can prove that any-
thing corresponds to those signs, conflicts and opposing views inevitably 
arise. With the more important beliefs—the Soul, God, History, Race, Na-
tion, Fascism, Liberalism, Capitalism, Justice, Virtue, Christianity, Islam, 
Atheism, Equality, Gender, and many others—controversy and contradiction 
have routinely led to desperate clashes between groups of believers. 
By suspending judgement about all such beliefs, about all things inher-
ently non-evident, the Pyrrhonists reported that they found relief from con-
flict and thereby peace of mind, or ataraxia. This allowed them to follow a 
way of life rooted in the acceptance of uninterpreted appearances on the one 
hand and the indeterminate absence, or emptiness, which seems to accom-
pany these appearances on the other. 
4. 
The evident and the non-evident, as presented above, can fruitfully be under-
stood, I suggest, as a reworking in a Greek idiom of discoveries made by 
Pyrrho in his contacts with Indian gymnosophists and elaborated by the sub-
sequent tradition he inspired. Diogenes is quite emphatic in stating, as we 
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have seen, that it was those contacts which “led him [Pyrrho] to adopt a most 
noble philosophy.” Diogenes is hardly a perfect doxographer, but his Lives 
overall remains a reasonably reliable source, especially if we recall that he 
had access to numerous texts which are no longer extant. It might also be 
noted that Pyrrho remained in India with Alexander, mainly in Bactria and 
Gandhāra, for perhaps a year, if not longer, enjoying sustained contact with 
indigenous wise men, such as Kalanos, and others (Halkias, 2014, pp. 65–
115; 2015, pp. 163–186). 
There is no particular reason to doubt this strong claim, but, since it stands 
alone in the literature, Western classicists and other scholars have been left 
free to downplay if not ignore it. They have sought, not unreasonably, to find 
the antecedents of Pyrrho’s thinking in his immediate Greek background, es-
pecially in his connection with the Democritean, Megarian, and Cyrenaic tra-
ditions. Pyrrho’s mentor, after all, as Diogenes also tells us, was Anaxarchus, 
a Democritean philosopher, while Megarian philosophers were known to be 
active in Pyrrho’s hometown, Elis. 
A reviewer of my earlier work on this subject, Kristian Urstad, writes that 
Kuzminski attributes Pyrrho’s embrace of the phenomenal world—this notion 
of living in the involuntary world of appearances, free to experience their nat-
ural flow, using them as guides to action—to Indian or Buddhist influences; 
but […] it seems to me that there was some precedent for this sort of view 
native to his own philosophical climate. (Urstad, 2010, p. 65)  
Urstad invokes the Cyrenaics, particularly Aristippus, as a plausible source 
of Pyrrho’s philosophy. The Cyrenaics are said to have made phenomena, 
including the dynamic of pleasure and pain that our phenomena present, the 
standard for conduct before the Pyrrhonists, who could have adopted it from 
them. Urstad puts it this way:  
Both Pyrrhonists and Cyrenaics did not distrust, but accepted and embraced, 
our immediately evident sensations and thoughts. And both took appearances 
as their criteria for action, reacting spontaneously and appropriately to the 
stimulus offered by them. (Urstad, 2010, p. 65)  
The Cyrenaic and Megarian focus on dialectical argumentation may be noted 
as another anticipation of Pyrrhonian practice. 
The most popular Greek candidate as a precedent for Pyrrho, however, is 
Democritus. Indeed, the attempt to derive Pyrrhonism from Democritus has 
been a common theme among Western scholars. Perhaps the most emphatic 
assertion of Democritean sources for Pyrrhonism comes from Thomas 
McEvilley. There is a certain irony here, given that McEvilley’s monumental 
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731-page inquiry, The Shape of Ancient Thought (2002)—which exhaustively 
documents a wealth of interactions and parallels between ancient Greeks and 
Asians before and after Pyrrho—nonetheless insists that there is no serious 
link between Pyrrhonism and Buddhist thought: “It is clear, then,” McEvilley 
writes assertively,  
that the essentials of Pyrrhonism were already to be found among the follow-
ers of Socrates and Democritus in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C., 
well before Alexander’s visit to India. If Pyrrhon encountered such doctrines 
in India, they must simply have reminded him of doctrines that had been com-
mon in Greece for a hundred and fifty years and which his own teachers had 
taught him. Thus the dialectical, ethical, psychological, and language-critical 
levels of Pyrrhonism may be said to have been Greek before Alexander. Still, 
it is possible that Pyrrhon brought back from India some bits or pieces of 
thought or formulation which seemed useful in terms of attitudes he himself 
already held. (McEvilley, 2002, p. 495)  
And which doctrines “common in Greece for a hundred and fifty years” be-
fore Pyrrho does McEvilley have in mind? Democritus, he tells us,  
had taught the nondifference of phenomena and the eudaimonistic approach to 
philosophy—philosophy as a path to a tranquil attitude beyond the effect of 
phenomenal change—which Pyrrhon is sometimes regarded as having re-
ceived from an Indian teacher. (McEvilley, 2002, p. 493) 
A more recent expression of this pro-Democritean view of Pyrrho’s inspira-
tion can be found in a joint essay by Monte Ransome Johnson and Brett 
Shults: “Altogether,” they write, “there is much stronger evidence for an in-
fluence of Democritus on Pyrrho than there is for any influence of Buddhists 
on Pyrrho” (Johnson & Shults, 2018, p. 32). 
What is that evidence? It can be found, Johnson and Shults say, in 
Democritus’s early use of what became the Pyrrhonian mantra of “no more,” 
in the sense of everything being “no more this than that.” This was, they point 
out, a principle of Democritean understanding of phenomena, illustrated in 
his observation (repeated by Pyrrhonists) that honey seems sweet to some 
and bitter to others, and so on, or what McEvilley calls the nondifference of 
phenomena. Democritus seems to have anticipated the relativistic scepticism 
that Pyrrhonists applied to pragmata. Furthermore, Democritus uses a num-
ber of terms (as McEvilley also points out) such as euthymia, athambia, and 
even ataraxia (Johnson & Shults, 2018, p. 34)—all more or less indicating 
some form of tranquillity or freedom from fear, long before the Pyrrhonists 
(and other Hellenistic schools) took it up. 
These are impressive precedents, to be sure. They help to explain why 
Pyrrho is reported by Diogenes to have admired Democritus more than any 
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other Greek philosopher. However, these and similar precedents have to be 
set against the clear repudiation of Democritus by Sextus, who writes:  
The philosophy of Democritus is also said to have something in common with 
Scepticism [Pyrrhonism], since it is thought to make use of the same materials 
as we do. For from the fact that honey appears sweet to some and bitter to 
others, they say that Democritus deduces that it is neither sweet nor bitter, and 
for this reason utters the phrase “No more,” which is Sceptical.  
But the Sceptics and Democriteans use the phrase “No more” in different 
senses. The latter assign it the sense that neither is the case, we the sense that 
we do not know whether some apparent things is both or neither. […] But the 
clearest distinction is made when Democritus says “In verity there are atoms 
and void.” For by “In verity” he means “In truth”—and I think it is superfluous 
to remark that he differs from us in saying that atoms and void in truth subsist, 
even if he does begin from the anomaly in what is apparent. (Sextus Empiricus, 
2000, 1.213) 
Democritus, in other words, is clearly labelled a dogmatist by Sextus, no 
doubt reflecting the Pyrrhonian attitude towards him. 
In practically the same breath, Sextus goes on to make an equally sharp 
distinction between the Cyrenaics and the Pyrrhonists:  
Some say that the Cyrenaic persuasion is the same as Scepticism [Pyrrho-
nism], since it too says that we only apprehend feelings. But it differs from 
Scepticism since it states that the aim is pleasure and a smooth motion of the 
flesh, while we say that it is tranquillity, which is contrary to the aim they 
propose—for whether pleasure is present or absent, anyone who affirms that 
pleasure is the aim submits to troubles […]. Further, we suspend judgment (as 
far as the argument goes) about external existing things, while the Cyrenaics 
assert that they have an inapprehensible nature. (Sextus Empiricus, 2000, 
1.215) 
Their recognition of the importance of phenomena is vitiated, according to 
Sextus, by such dogmatic conclusions. 
Finally, Democritus’s own words can be cited to disabuse anyone of any 
confusion between his views and the Pyrrhonian understanding of experi-
ence: “There are two sorts of knowledge,” he tells us,  
one genuine, one bastard (or “obscure”). To the latter belong all the following: 
sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The real is separated from this. When the 
bastard can do no more—neither see more minutely, nor hear, nor smell, nor 
taste, nor perceive by touch—and a finer investigation is needed, then the gen-
uine comes in as having a tool for distinguishing more finely. (Fragment 11 in 
Freeman, 1966, p. 93)  
No Pyrrhonian would make such a dogmatic distinction. 
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5. 
It would be cavalier, however, to dismiss these important Greek seeds of 
Pyrrhonism as being of no consequence. Although there is no space here to 
show in detail how these precedents were integrated into Pyrrhonian think-
ing, let me offer a preliminary account of how that may have happened. I 
suggest an alternate reading of Pyrrhonism, one which accepts the atomistic 
insight of Leucippus and Democritus, but radically transforms it. The Pyr-
rhonists, as Sextus makes plain, rejected the dogmatic physical atomism of 
Democritus, in which atoms were believed to be invisible, impenetrable par-
ticles moving through the void. They substituted instead, I suggest, a phe-
nomenalistic atomism in which atoms are the thoughts and sensations mov-
ing through the stream of consciousness, endlessly combining and recombin-
ing as pragmata. This primacy of pragmata is not just to be found in Sextus 
and later Pyrrhonism, but is also clearly indicated by Pyrrho’s immediate 
disciple, Timon, presumably reflecting Pyrrho himself: “But the apparent is 
omnipotent wherever it goes” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925, 9.105, p. 517). 
Atomism can be illustrated by the model of the alphabet, which was used 
by Sextus, and which, since it is traceable back to Democritus (Berryman, 
2016), was no doubt available to Pyrrho as well. In the alphabet model, indi-
vidual letters have no meaning in themselves, but only gain meaning when 
they are combined together into words. Insofar as phenomena are similarly 
recognized as elements, they too are observed to have no meaning in them-
selves, but only gaining meaning when combined with other phenomena to 
make pragmata. Like the letters of the alphabet, our phenomenal elements 
do not normally appear in isolation, but rather in combination. A phenomenal 
element is like a pixel on a computer screen; it lights up, as it were, only in 
relation to other pixels. If we try to disassociate a phenomenal element from 
any other phenomenal element, it disappears, becoming imperceptible. 
We can nonetheless perceive phenomenal elements, albeit only in combi-
nation with other phenomenal elements. We cannot isolate a phenomenal el-
ement in itself; we can only approximate it by taking it as it appears in its 
simplest and most reliable pragma (where it remains in conjunction with at 
least one other element). We can then use that approximation as a placeholder 
for the element itself. Similarly, any visual mark we make for a letter of the 
alphabet, or any sound we make for that same letter, is also an approximation, 
subject to variations of context. There is no pure and absolute written or spo-
ken letter, as is evident from the plethora of fonts from which we draw to 
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indicate any individual visible letter, as well as from the plethora of sounds 
from which we similarly draw to indicate any individual audible letter. 
No other Greek school advanced a phenomenalistic atomism; this, I sug-
gest, is what distinguishes Pyrrhonism from its predecessors (and contempo-
raries). The Democriteans were atomists without being phenomenalists, and 
the Cyrenaics were phenomenalists without being atomists. All the other 
Greek schools remained bound by an implicit—if not explicit—dogmatic 
metaphysics which distinguished between appearances (thoughts and sensa-
tions) and the imagined realities which were presumed to inform those ap-
pearances, whether or not they could be observed. The Pyrrhonists stood this 
dogmatic metaphysics on its head, taking appearances as inescapable facts 
while suspending judgement on any possible reality underlying those appear-
ances. 
This, I suggest, is the insight that Pyrrho could have found in his sustained 
encounters with the gymnosophists in India. It is perhaps a distinguishing 
feature of some Indian schools (including Buddhists) to begin with the flow 
of experience in consciousness as opposed to another starting point, such as 
the motion of objects in space. No contemporary Greek school took the flow 
of experience as a point of departure. It would have been natural for the 
young Pyrrho to have translated this approach, if he encountered it among 
the gymnosophists, into the atomistic thinking that he likely brought with him 
to India. And among the gymnosophists, only Buddhists could have pre-
sented him with a non-dogmatic phenomenalism that was congenial to atom-
ism. It was the Buddhists who most likely could have presented him with an 
opportunity to recast dependent origination into atomistic terms: hence what 
I have called the Greek reinvention of Buddhism. Pyrrho’s atomism, like the 
Buddha’s, is phenomenalistic, not dogmatic. The elements of the Pyrrho-
nian–Buddhist phenomenalistic atomism are the immediate thoughts and 
sensations we directly experience, and it is the combination of these thoughts 
and sensations which produce the pragmata, or facts, of our experience. 
A reviewer of my earlier work, M. Jason Reddoch, captures the point I 
have been trying to make, both then and now: “The key issue,” he writes, “is 
that Pyrrhonism differs from the traditional perspective of Western philoso-
phy in that it does not assume that the physical world requires some intellec-
tual organizing power in order to explain it” (Reddoch, 2010, p. 425; my 
emphasis). Pyrrho found this insight, I suggest, not among Democriteans or 
Cyrenaics or anywhere else in Greece, but among the gymnosophists in In-
dia. Moreover, he would not have found it in most of the philosophical 
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schools of India either, which were almost all variously dogmatic. The one 
place where he could have found it, where the idea of an “intellectual organ-
izing power” to explain the world is clearly absent, is in the Buddhist princi-
ple of dependent origination. This is distinguished from all other understand-
ings of experience by its explicit denial of any claim of understanding the 
phenomena of experience except in their own terms, as being dependently 
(not independently) arisen. 
6. 
The whole point of dependent origination is the recognition that the phenom-
enal elements of our experience are not to be explained by reference to enti-
ties or forces existing separately and independently of those elements. The 
word for these elements, or phenomenal atoms, in Buddhism is dharmas: a 
notoriously elusive term. The commentaries on the Pāli Canon, we are told 
on good authority, “ascribe at least ten different contextual meanings to the 
word [dharma] as it occurs in the Canon” (Bodhi, 2005, p. 54). Normative 
Buddhism exemplifies this uncertainty with its well-known lists of 75 dhar-
mas developed by the Sarvāstivādins and 82 dharmas developed by the Ther-
avāda, among others (Ronkin, 2018). These dharmas are variously under-
stood as contributing to, diminishing, or overcoming the saṃsāric process 
generated out of their mutual dependency. What normative Buddhism seems 
to have done to come up with scores of dharmas is to consider sensations and 
thoughts in a number of different relations or roles with one another (whether 
they are inflows or outflows, internal or external, past, present, or future, 
etc.). Most of the 75 (or 82, etc.) dharmas are elements of thought, not sen-
sation. However, in all these variations, dharmas always remain the immedi-
ate objects of perception present to consciousness, either sensations or 
thoughts.6 
Theodore Stcherbatsky’s Buddhist scholarship is a century old, but his 
summary account of Buddhist dharmas as phenomenalistic elements is worth 
recalling: 
The elements of existence [in Buddhism] are momentary appearances, mo-
mentary flashings into the phenomenal world out of an unknown source. Just 
as they are disconnected, so to say, in breadth, not being linked together by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 For a recent review of early Buddhist uses of the term dharma, see Gethin (2004, pp. 513–
542). 
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any pervading substance, just so they are disconnected in depth or in duration 
since they last only one single moment (kṣaṇa). They disappear as soon as they 
appear, in order to be followed the next moment by another momentary exist-
ence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (dharma), two mo-
ments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point 
in time-space. […] The idea that two moments make two different elements 
remains. Consequently, the elements do not change, but disappear, the world 
becomes a cinema. Disappearance is the very essence of existence; what does 
not disappear does not exist. A cause for the Buddhist was not a real cause but 
a preceding moment, which likewise arose out of nothing in order to disappear 
into nothing. (Stcherbatsky, 1923/2001, pp. 37–38) 
Stcherbatsky argued for the significance of dharmas in early Buddhism as 
qualities—as sensations and thoughts—more vigorously than most later 
scholars. It is these dharmas, he insisted, these qualities without substances, 
that constitute the uninterpreted and involuntary flow of experience. Rupert 
Gethin offers support for Stcherbatsky’s approach when he concludes that 
dhammas [dharmas] are the basic qualities, both mental and physical, that in 
some sense constitute experience or reality in its entirety. What I think is un-
deniable is that, whether or not one accepts this as something the Buddha him-
self taught, this sense and basic understanding of dhamma is firmly established 
and imbedded in the Nikāyas. Indeed I think it is not unreasonable to suggest 
that it is the prevalent usage of the word dhamma in the Nikāyas. (Gethin, 
2004, p. 521) 
Another recent Buddhist scholar, Robin Brons, in a lucid comparison of 
Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism, nicely delineates the role of elementary dhar-
mas (appearances) in the parallelism he draws between the Buddhist conven-
tional and ultimate truth and the Pyrrhonian distinction between what is evi-
dent and what is not. Brons notes that  
according to Madhyamaka, the ultimate truth (what is found by rigorous in-
vestigation) is śūnyatā. Nothing can withstand such analysis, and thus there 
are no ultimate truths. Inherent existence (svabhāva) and how things are by 
nature simply cannot be found. Mādhyamikas do, however, assent to the con-
ventional truth, which parallels Sextus’ notion of appearances: “[the conven-
tional truth] corresponds to appearances, so it must not be analysed” […]. 
Hence Sextus’ involuntary assent to the appearances can be seen as assent to 
the conventional, and assent to the non-evident can be seen as assent to the 
ultimate. Since no ultimately true things are to be found, the latter assent is 
misguided. It is a fundamental error to take the conventional truth to be inher-
ently existent. (Brons, 2018, pp. 334–335)7 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 For a less conclusive comparison of Madhyamaka and Pyrrhonism, see Garfield (1990, pp. 
285–307) and Dreyfus and Garfield (2011, pp. 115–130). 
 The Evident and the Non-Evident: Buddhism through the Lens of Pyrrhonism 123 
 
The Buddhist classifications of various groups of dharmas—including the 
skandhas and others—can be understood, following Brons, to correspond to 
various instances of what the Pyrrhonians called pragmata, or facts. Just as 
the elementary dharmic qualities inform the broader dharmas and the karmic 
flow itself, so do appearances—our involuntary, immediate sensations and 
thoughts—inform the facts of human experience. 
The recognition that Democritean atomism could be shorn of its dogma-
tism and repurposed to accommodate Buddhist phenomenalism was, I sug-
gest, Pyrrho’s defining achievement. In his day, the detailed superstructure 
later established in the Pāli Canon, the Abhidharma, and other Buddhist com-
mentaries was almost certainly not as fully articulated as it later became. In 
those early circumstances, it may have been less important which classifica-
tions of dharmas, or pragmata, were the most correct, or the most helpful. 
What may have mattered more was the basic insight of the richness and com-
plexity of the flow of all phenomena—however variously displayed as 
skandhas/pragmata—understood as the product of their mutual dependence 
and as constituting the actual nature of our experience. The appearing and 
disappearing world of phenomenal atomism is the world of things evident; 
the absence which seems to accompany all phenomena is perhaps where con-
sciousness is hidden, in that which is stubbornly non-evident. 
Early Buddhism, as perhaps reflected in Pyrrhonism, may have been a 
simpler, more direct, more accessible practice of liberation from beliefs than 
later Buddhism. The beliefs and attachments that both Buddhists and Pyrrho-
nists exhort us to suspend, we might note, include not only the desires we can 
recognize as problematic, but also those widely acclaimed as virtuous. A life 
of pleasure, greed, or narcissism is something we can understand as harmful 
and self-defeating, but marriage, patriotism, and justice are perhaps not so 
easily dismissed, though they are equally dogmatic beliefs. 
It might be noted as well that the ataraxia the Pyrrhonists discovered 
through their phenomenalistic atomism (revealed by the suspension of judge-
ment) is arguably very different from what other Greek philosophers meant 
by their use of ataraxia and related terms such as euthymia and athambia. 
Pyrrho is never described as cheerful, like Democritus, nor as a laughing 
philosopher, like Anaxarchus, nor as a man focused on pleasure and pain, 
like Epicurus—from which contrast Epicurus claimed to derive his own ver-
sion of ataraxia. Our impression of Pyrrho is rather that of a serene, remark-
ably self-contained man, indifferent to pleasure and pain, not a figure out to 
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lead people or make a name for himself as most of the others were. The Bud-
dha’s initial impulse after enlightenment was a similar sense of reticence. His 
first notion was not to teach his insight, and Pyrrho, perhaps out of the same 
impulse, was content to live quietly in a repose and tranquillity born out of a 
steady concentration on pragmata and to let others make of his example what 
they would. 
7. 
Having come full circle, let me close by suggesting some parallels between 
the features of Pyrrhonism that I have just outlined and some common fea-
tures of Buddhism, using Pyrrhonism as a lens to focus the vague cloud of 
early Buddhism. Putting aside the later differences among Buddhist schools, 
it turns out that some of the more common features of Buddhism as we know 
it—what Beckwith calls “normative” Buddhism (Beckwith, 2015, p. 8 et pas-
sim)—can be expressed in Pyrrhonian language. These features are encapsu-
lated in a series of general Buddhist terms, such as dependent origination, 
attachment, eternalism and annihilationism, the Middle Path, and so on. 
There is no space in this short exposition to explore the nuances of Buddhist 
terminology. I will rely instead on the approximate popular understandings 
that they currently enjoy. 
I suggest a series of parallels. First: Pyrrhonian talk about mutually defin-
ing, fluctuating evident and non-evident appearances is matched by Buddhist 
talk about the dependent origination of our impermanent phenomenal states. 
Second, the Pyrrhonian rejection of dogmatic beliefs—beliefs about things 
inherently non-evident—is matched by the Buddhist rejection of clinging, or 
attachment to such things. Third, the Pyrrhonist rejection of positive and neg-
ative dogmatisms is matched by the Buddhist rejection of eternalism and an-
nihilationism. Fourth, the open, evidence-based inquiry advanced by the Pyr-
rhonists is matched by the Buddhist Middle Path; both share a practical, phe-
nomena-based empiricism. Fifth, the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement 
regarding dogmatic belief is matched by the “unanswered questions” of the 
Buddhists. Sixth, the Pyrrhonian rejection of the interpretation of facts is 
matched by the Buddhist assertion of the “emptiness” of experience. And 
seventh, the imperturbability, or ataraxia, of the Pyrrhonists is matched by 
the Buddhist enlightenment or liberation. 
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Let me take these parallels in order. First, consider appearances, both pre-
sent and absent. Pyrrhonian appearances are entirely conditioned by one an-
other, and not, as far as we can tell, by anything outside of them. Thoughts 
and sensations are variously and continuously being recombined into differ-
ent sets, facts, or pragmata—the ever-changing but recurring and often reli-
able arrangements of appearances. No appearance in itself is good or bad, 
beautiful or ugly, and so on; what it turns out to be depends entirely on the 
context in which it appears. 
Dependent origination similarly holds that nothing in our experience is 
permanent or independently existing. Buddhists speak of appearances some-
what differently from Pyrrhonists, as we have seen, but in both cases, appear-
ances are transient and mutually defining. The Buddhists’ fluctuating 
skandhas and the Pyrrhonists’ presences and absences of pragmata both have 
an intermediate existence: neither permanent and independent on the one 
hand, nor illusory and non-existent on the other. 
Both Buddhists and Pyrrhonists understand appearances to be the ele-
ments or atoms which constitute our experience. Both understand these ele-
ments to be wholly dependent on one another and experienced by us as bun-
dles of involuntarily evident thoughts and sensations. Dependent origination 
is the sum of the experiences we necessarily suffer, according to the Bud-
dhists, and the Pyrrhonists also posit our suffering them. Here, we might keep 
in mind the root meaning of suffering as involuntary experience, as neces-
sarily enduring something, whether pleasurable or painful, as being tied to it. 
This is perhaps what the Buddha meant all along by suffering, or dukkha. 
Second, consider our beliefs. The essence of dogmatism, according to the 
Pyrrhonists, is belief, and beliefs are claims about what is (or seems to be) 
inherently non-evident (and so empirically unverifiable). We do not have to 
believe anything about our appearances. However, we cannot help but know 
them, and we can only affirm what we do not know by believing in it. 
Our most important beliefs are not claims about what is temporarily or 
practically non-evident; in those cases, as we have seen, what counts to re-
solve such claims must be evident, whether practically possible or not. Our 
most important beliefs, by contrast, are about things inherently non-evident, 
which, it seems, cannot be resolved. 
The Buddhist equivalent of belief is attachment, or clinging, which, I sug-
gest, is indistinguishable from belief. To believe something is to be attached 
to it. In both traditions, the linguistic mechanism of attachment is a sign of 
some kind, such as a name—or what the Buddhists call nāma-rūpa, or name-
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and-form. It might also be a performative act—such as a wedding vow, or a 
declaration of war—a sign which is believed to create an intangible reality 
with tangible consequences. There are many forms of attachment, but they 
all seem to presuppose a language of belief in the existence of things inher-
ently non-evident. Beliefs, or attachments, for Pyrrhonists and Buddhists 
alike, are intentional human activities; they are the conscious creation of fic-
tional entities deemed to be permanent. 
Third, consider the Pyrrhonist rejection of positive and negative dogma-
tisms compared with the Buddhist rejection of eternalism on the one hand 
and annihilationism on the other. Eternalists, for Buddhists, correspond to 
the Pyrrhonists’ positive dogmatists, those who postulate some kind of per-
manent, independent entity or concept, such as God, the Soul, or Substance, 
not to mention Race, History, Nature, Gender, or almost anything said to un-
derlie all or part of our experience. Similarly, the Buddhists’ annihilationists 
correspond to the negative dogmatists, total sceptics, or nihilists spurned by 
the Pyrrhonists. To these ancient annihilationists, we might add today’s rel-
ativists or deconstructionists, insofar as no interpretation of experience can 
be any better or worse than any other. 
Fourth, the Buddhist “middle path” accepts appearances in their mutual 
dependency; that is, as neither existing absolutely (as permanent, independ-
ent essences) nor failing to exist at all (as pure illusions). Similarly, the Pyr-
rhonists’ acceptance of continued inquiry—necessitated by ever-changing 
experience—is their version of the middle path between positive and nega-
tive dogmatisms, where appearances have an intermediate, contingent, con-
textual status, existing neither absolutely nor not at all. Both Pyrrhonism and 
Buddhism, I suggest, make appearances, not concepts or ideas, the criterion 
of experience. Both of them are compatible with and even promote phenom-
ena-based scientific inquiry. 
Fifth, the Pyrrhonists talk of the suspension of judgement: a conclusion 
they draw from the incompatible interpretations of what is inherently non-
evident. This is paralleled by the Buddha’s famously “unanswered questions” 
regarding the nature of the world, the nature of the self, existence after death, 
and other non-evident things. Both Pyrrhonists and Buddhists find it impos-
sible to arrive at a determination of things inherently non-evident. Like the 
Pyrrhonists, the Buddha refused to speculate on such matters; he confined 
himself to what is evident, to appearances on the one hand and their absence 
on the other. Both Pyrrhonists and Buddhists maintain that interpretations 
postulate permanent, fictional entities which, if we embrace them, interrupt 
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and block the natural flow of experience, leaving us trapped, snagged by 
some form of attachment, or bondage. 
Sixth, consider the Pyrrhonists’ refusal to interpret appearances. To take 
appearances at face value is to make them their own criterion. Once we do 
this, there is nothing apart from appearances by which they can be judged; 
there is no available essence or form somehow within or behind them by 
which they can be explained and made permanent. The Buddhists advance a 
similar view of appearances when they insist that appearances are “empty.” 
The emptiness of our experience, of our phenomenal life, is the absence of 
any hidden content which can organize and explain our immediate thoughts 
and sensations. Our direct experience is simply what it is, as it comes and 
goes. If appearances are their own criterion, if they are dependently origi-
nated yet practically reliable, then the fictional entities we can imagine are 
unnecessary in order to understand those appearances. The fictions are a dis-
traction at best and a virtual prison at worst. Our appearances should rather 
be left “empty” of interpretation if they are to be appreciated for what they 
are. 
As a seventh and final point of comparison, let me suggest that the Pyr-
rhonist ataraxia, or imperturbability, that follows the suspension of judge-
ment can be understood as the equivalent of the liberation or enlightenment 
proclaimed to be the result of Buddhist practices. The peace we gain is liber-
ation from the anxiety of belief, from its uncertainty and its vulnerability to 
endless controversy. Once we deconstruct our beliefs and distinguish inter-
pretations from appearances, we can see the dependent origination of appear-
ances as the involuntary experiences that they are, free of interpretation; we 
can also see the indeterminate nature of the inherently non-evident, including 
any self we may have, and the futility of trying to explain (or deny) the un-
explainable. 
In sum, Pyrrhonists and Buddhists both live “by what is apparent,” as 
Sextus puts it, and “in accordance with everyday observances”: what the 
Buddhists call right conduct and the Pyrrhonists call piety. To do this is to 
follow evident experience without belief or interpretation, to accept what that 
experience (or its absence) offers without qualification, and to act accord-
ingly. 
Right conduct, or piety, includes the recognition and respect—call it com-
passion—due to all these real-life experiences and practices, even those of 
believers. According to both Pyrrhonists and Buddhists, it is only by ulti-
mately trusting what is evident and cannot be evaded that the errors of belief 
can be recognized, and thereby avoided, and peace of mind be made possible. 
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Scripture and Scepticism in Vasubandhu’s Exegetical 
Method* 
Oren Hanner 
In this chapter, I wish to explore philosophical responses to scepticism con-
cerning Buddhist scriptural knowledge. My main focus will be on forms of 
scepticism that appear within scriptural exegesis, and I will limit the scope 
of the discussion to responses formulated by the Indian Buddhist thinker 
Vasubandhu. To this end, I will ask the following question: Is there a place, 
according to Vasubandhu, for scepticism in scriptural interpretation made by 
the religious tradition itself, and if so, what role does this scepticism play in 
the exegetical act? Accordingly, the particular form of scepticism on which 
I will aim to shed light is religious scepticism—in this context, any expres-
sion of doubt that challenges or disputes the credibility of scriptural 
knowledge claims.  
This sense of scepticism is closely related to the approach taken by early 
modern thinkers such as René Descartes and Baruch Spinoza, who ques-
tioned the epistemological validity of religious scriptures in search of a firm 
criterion of knowledge. Descartes famously finds it logically unsatisfactory 
that “we must believe that there is a God, because we are so taught in the 
Holy Scriptures, and, on the other hand, that we must believe the Holy Scrip-
tures because they come from God” (Descartes, 1641/1993, p. 34) and seeks 
a rational means of establishing God’s existence, while Spinoza postulates 
that “the universal rule […] in interpreting Scripture is to accept nothing as 
an authoritative Scriptural statement which we do not perceive very clearly 
when we examine it in the light of its history” (Spinoza, 1670/2004, p. 101). 
Vasubandhu also recognizes that philosophical difficulties of various 
kinds arise when one subjects Buddhist scriptures to critical interrogation 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
* The research for this chapter was generously supported by the Maimonides Centre for Ad-
vanced Studies, the University of Hamburg. I wish to thank Bob Miller (Lozang Zopa) for his 
valuable comments on passages translated from Tibetan. 
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and that such difficulties can lead to doubt. He allows for scepticism of this 
kind, and at times even encourages it. However, given that he was writing in 
a milieu that revered the Buddha’s words, he also seeks to preserve the au-
thority of Buddhist scriptures. As a way of coping with this twofold demand, 
I will suggest, Vasubandhu’s exegetical method converts religious scepti-
cism into epistemological scepticism, a form of scepticism which does not 
deny that scriptures may convey truths about reality, but which doubts that 
we can accurately access these truths. In other words, Vasubandhu shifts the 
focus of doubt from the texts to the fallibility of human understanding.  
In this framework, scepticism about scriptural knowledge claims can tar-
get two closely related but distinct objects: scriptural doctrines on the one 
hand, and the reader’s understanding of them on the other. Scepticism of the 
former kind (religious scepticism) is depicted as misguided and as being 
rooted in cognitive or affective error. Scepticism of the latter type (epistemo-
logical scepticism) naturally has only an indirect bearing on the words of the 
scriptures, as it concerns the way in which they are interpreted and appre-
hended. In this way, Vasubandhu allows for scepticism about scriptural tes-
timony while vindicating the scriptures from any intrinsic error. 
This exegetical strategy aptly serves a tradition which valorizes its scrip-
tures and at the same time purports to assess their credibility by submitting 
them to rational inquiry. It goes hand in hand with other, more familiar her-
meneutical tools that Buddhist exegetics employed in order to resolve con-
tradictions between different textual sources and to determine the intention 
of particular texts. What is important here is the distinction between explicit 
meaning (Skt. nītārtha) and implicit meaning (neyārtha), which rationalizes 
the hermeneutics of various Buddhist commentary traditions, including the 
Abhidharma, the Theravāda, the Madhyamaka, and the Yogācāra (Lamotte, 
1949/1988, pp. 16–21; Thurman, 1978, pp. 25–34). The category of explicit 
meaning denotes propositions that are to be accepted as literally expressed, 
while the category of implicit meaning denotes propositions that require fur-
ther interpretation. Other strategies, such as the four special intentions (ab-
hiprāya) and the four hidden ornaments (alaṃkāra), are used for a similar 
purpose (Lopez, 1988, p. 7). The main assumption justifying these strategies 
is that in addressing himself to disciples of different spiritual capacities, the 
Buddha modified his teachings to suit their particular needs. Nevertheless, in 
spite of the contradictions that ensue from this pedagogical method and de-
spite the interpretation they require, all of the Buddha’s teachings are under-
stood to provide a true description of reality. Vasubandhu’s treatment of 
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scepticism regarding scriptural testimony should be understood in the light 
of these hermeneutical assumptions. 
I will discuss the place of scepticism in scriptural exegesis from three per-
spectives. The first centres on methodological or meta-philosophical remarks 
that Vasubandhu made in some of his works. These remarks clarify the epis-
temological status of scriptures and the way in which one ought to approach 
them. I will then concentrate on the theory of exegesis and examine instances 
of scepticism in Vasubandhu’s exegetical method in the Vyākhyāyukti (here-
after VY),1 a work which lays out a set of principles for the adequate con-
struction of commentarial treatises. Finally, I will turn to the ways in which 
these ideas are applied in Vasubandhu’s commentary work. As scriptural in-
terpretation takes place in various intellectual settings, I will first consider 
the pedagogical context, in which a teacher elucidates the meaning of scrip-
tures in order (among other things) to resolve sceptical objections raised by 
an audience of disciples. Then, I will consider the context of philosophical 
debate, in which scriptures are adduced in support of the proponent’s philo-
sophical stance or in order to weaken that of an opponent. In this second 
context, I will show that the disagreements that ensue from Vasubandhu’s 
transition to epistemological scepticism in polemical exegesis brings him up 
against the Pyrrhonian problematic, understood according to the dialectical 
interpretation (Lammenranta, 2008, 2012; Wieland, 2013). According to this 
interpretation, the problem that leads Pyrrhonian thinkers to adopt scepticism 
is their inability to resolve disagreements about the nature of reality without 
begging the question; that is, without making the partial judgement that their 
own doxastic appearances are true while those of others are not. It is this 
inability to escape our fundamental presuppositions, rather than the equal 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 The translations of the VY below are based on the critical edition published in Lee (2001). 
References refer to the Derge edition of the Tibetan Canon (Zhu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen, 
1985, Vol. 136. #4069), followed by the page number in Lee’s critical edition. All translations 
are mine unless otherwise stated. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the contested 
issue of Vasubandhu’s identity. The study will depart from the assumption that is mostly ac-
cepted in contemporary literature that the same author composed the VY and the other works 
examined below. On the question of authorship with respect to the VY, see Skilling (2000, pp. 
297–299) and Verhagen (2005, p. 560 nn. 6 and 7). 




Meta-Theory: Between Devotion and Doubt 
Vasubandhu’s reflections on the epistemological validity of scriptures are 
expressed in a number of meta-philosophical remarks. Some of these re-
marks exhibit sceptical and critical attitudes towards Buddhist scriptures, 
while others lean towards a devotional outlook, reaffirming the authority of 
scriptures and the knowledge they convey. One may wonder whether these 
different approaches can be reconciled. In other words, is Vasubandhu’s po-
sition coherent, and if so, in what way precisely? According to my reading, 
devotion, doubt, and criticism blend harmoniously into a coherent hermeneu-
tical view if devotion is seen as the appropriate attitude towards scriptures 
and doubt as the appropriate attitude towards human understanding of scrip-
tures. 
In a well-known passage of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), 2 
Vasubandhu laments the misunderstanding of Buddhist scriptures that has 
taken root among the dialecticians of his time. This misunderstanding, he 
adds, has come about because the Buddha and other realized beings are not 
present in the world anymore—a situation which means that readers with 
poor judgement misunderstand the true meaning of the Buddha’s teachings. 
He sums up his presentation of Abhidharma thought in the following words: 
The True Dharma of the Teacher is twofold, consisting of scriptures (āgama) 
and attainment (adhigama).  
In that case, scriptures are the discourses (sūtra), moral code (vinaya), and 
metaphysics (abhidharma); attainment is the [factors] conducive to awakening 
(bodhipakṣyā)—this is the twofold True Dharma. […]  
For the most part, the metaphysics I have described is established in the man-
ner of the Vaibhāṣika school of Kashmir. That which is understood inappro-
priately here is my fault; the reliable means of knowledge (pramāṇa) for the 
manner of the True Dharma are the Silent Ones [i.e., the buddhas].  
As a general rule, this metaphysics I have made known is established in the 
manner of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kashmir. In this respect, what I have misunder-
stood is my mistake. The buddhas and the sons of the buddhas, however, are 
the reliable means of knowledge for the manner of the True Dharma.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 References to the AKBh in Sanskrit are to Pradhan (1975). References to the AKBh in Tibetan 
are to Zhu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen (1985, Vols. 140 & 141, #4090). The verses are indi-
cated in italics. 
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When the Teacher, the eye of the world, has closed his eyes, and beings who 
see with their eyes have mostly perished, these teachings are thrown into dis-
order by poor, careless dialecticians, who have not had experience of reality.3 
This passage contains the principles which rationalize the hermeneutical 
strategy that Vasubandhu follows in dealing with doubts about scriptural tes-
timony. Richard Hayes suggests that Vasubandhu reconciles two potentially 
incompatible views in this passage:  
On the one hand, [Vasubandhu] has denied that the scriptures as we now un-
derstand them are fully authoritative; that is to say, we cannot place full con-
fidence in the scriptural tradition anymore, because the scriptures require in-
terpretation and hardly anyone still exists who is competent to provide the 
requisite interpretation. But, on the other hand, by placing the blame for the 
current nonauthority of scriptures on the imperfections of teachers like him-
self, Vasubandhu salvages the view that the Buddha himself was a source of 
knowledge. (Hayes, 1984, p. 654, emphasis in original) 
The Buddha’s words are therefore reliable, but human understanding may 
fail to penetrate their true meaning. Moreover, Vasubandhu admits—perhaps 
as a mere expression of modesty, perhaps out of a genuine awareness of his 
epistemological limitations—that he himself may be guilty of misreading the 
scriptures. While he denounces those who misunderstand the teachings, it is 
noteworthy that he does not question the teachings themselves or the epis-
temic authority of the scriptures. If there is something we should be sceptical 
about, it is our reception of the scriptures, not the texts themselves. Further-
more, the sort of scepticism expressed here is not a general claim about our 
inability to arrive at true knowledge. It encompasses only our capacity to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 AKBh ad 8.39c–41, pp. 459–460: saddharmo dvividhaḥ śāstur āgamādhigamātmakaḥ | ta-
trāgamaḥ sūtravinayābhidharmā adhigamo bodhipakṣyā ity eṣa dvividhaḥ saddharmaḥ 
|[…] kāśmīravaibhāṣikanīti siddhaḥ prāyo mayā ’yaṃ kathito ’bhidharmaḥ | yaddurgṛhītaṃ tad 
ihāsmadāgaḥ saddharmanītau munayaḥ pramāṇam || 8.40 || prāyeṇa hi kāśmīravaibhāṣikāṇāṃ 
nītyādisiddha eṣo ’smābhir abhidharma ākhyātaḥ | yad atrāsmābhir durgṛhītaṃ so ’smākam 
aparādhaḥ | saddharmanītau tu punar buddhā eva pramāṇaṃ buddhaputrāś ca | nimīlite śāstari 
lokacakṣuṣi kṣayaṃ gate sākṣijane ca bhūyasā | adṛṣṭatattvair niravagrahaiḥ kṛtaṃ kutārkikaiḥ 
śāsanam etad ākulam || 8.41 ||. Khu 266a1–5: ston pa'i dam chos rnam gnyis te || lung dang rtogs 
pa'i bdag nyid do || de la lung ni mdo sde dang chos mngon pa dang 'dul ba'o || rtogs pa ni byang 
chub kyi phyogs te | de lta na dam pa'i chos ni rnam pa de gnyis yin la | […] bdag gis mngon 
pa'i chos 'di phal cher ni || kha che bye brag smra pa'i tsul grub bshad || ngan par zin gang de 
'dir bdag gis nyes || dam chos tsul gyi tsad ma thub rnams yin || bdag gis chos mngon pa 'di ni 
phal cher kha che bye brag tu smra ba dag gi tsul du grub par bshad pa yin no || 'di la bdag gis 
nyes par zin pa gang yin pa de ni bdag gi nyes pa yin te | dam pa'i chos kyi tsul dag gi tsang ma 
ni sangs rgyas dang | sangs rgyas kyi sras rnams kho na yin no || ston pa 'jig rten mig ni zum 
gyur cing || mngon sum skye bo phal cher zad pa na || de nyid ma mthong rang dgar gyur pa yi || 
ngan rtogs rnams kyis bstan pa 'di dag dkrugs. 
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clearly discern the meaning of scriptural knowledge, and moreover suggests 
that by following appropriate logical and cognitive procedures, we may be 
able to read them properly. The dialectical setting examined below indeed 
seems to suggest that Vasubandhu held such a reliabilist attitude towards 
scriptural exegesis. 
In another meta-theoretical remark that considers doubts about Buddhist 
teachings, Vasubandhu clarifies the role of scepticism in a pedagogical set-
ting. At the beginning of the fifth chapter of the VY, which concludes the 
work and retrospectively clarifies its purpose, he explains the reasons why 
objections should be raised and why scriptures ought to be scrutinized. One 
reason is primarily rhetorical: when a commentator expounds the scriptures 
and raises objections, the audience develops curiosity and becomes more at-
tentive, expecting the replies that follow.4 Beyond this rhetorical effect, ob-
jections to the doctrines transmitted in scriptures have a pedagogical and the-
ological function. They lead to a greater understanding of the teachings, from 
which devotion arises. In Vasubandhu’s words: 
If it is asked: What is the purpose of an objection if one has [raised] objections 
and scrutinized [the matter]? [It is] because the replies are easier to understand 
after an objection. If one has previously heard of the greatness of the sūtras, 
the listener will act respectfully towards what he hears and remembers. There-
fore, first express the purpose [for the teachings].5 
According to this passage, then, sceptical objections do not undermine or re-
fute scriptural knowledge claims. What Vasubandhu suggests instead is that 
doubts and objections are only provisional. Eventually, they are resolved in 
harmony with the scriptures, instilling faith in the heart of the listener or 
reader. The intended goal of this form of scepticism is thus to create convic-
tion and deeper understanding, which are assumed to be available to the 
teacher and disciples. Rather than clear-cut scepticism, this attitude can be 
defined as “devoted criticism” (Nance, 2012, pp. 120–121): criticism whose 
purpose is restoring faith through a rational inquiry into the scriptures. From 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 “Furthermore, the Dharma teacher should first set forth the sūtras and then [raise] objections 
and scrutinize [the matter] because [this] arouses a craving for the replies in the audience.” VY 
114a7, p. 250: gzhan yang chos smra ba pos thog ma kho nar mdo sde bkod nas brgal zhing 
brtag par bya ste | 'khor lan rnams la sred pa bskyed pa'i phyir ro || 
5 VY 114b1–2, p. 250: brgal zhing brtag pa byas na yang brgal ba ci'i phyir smos she na | brgal 
ba'i mjug thogs su lan rnams bde bar khong du chud par bya ba'i phyir ro || sngar | mdo sde'i 
che ba nyid thos na| |mnyan pa dang ni gzung ba la| |nyan pa po ni gus byed 'gyur| | de phyir thog 
mar dgos pa brjod| 
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this point of view, the critical scrutiny of scriptural testimony is a means of 
acquiring a pure understanding of the Buddha’s words in a devotional man-
ner. Accordingly, the final book of the VY stresses the importance of devot-
edly listening (gus par mnyan pa) to the teachings. 
There is another exposition in the VY which displays this approach, in 
which Vasubandhu enumerates five benefits that come about from devotedly 
listening to the Buddha’s teachings. These are: (1) hearing the unheard, (2) 
purifying that which has already been heard, (3) dispelling doubts, (4) bring-
ing about right view, (4) realizing by means of wisdom profound word and 
meaning.6 Hence, two of the main consequences of listening to the teachings 
are that those teachings that have already been heard by the listener become 
purified and clarified and that doubts in his mind are dispelled.7 All this sug-
gests that for Vasubandhu, one of the main motivations for questioning scrip-
tural testimony in the exegetical project is generating faith, enhancing the 
understanding of the teachings, and establishing their authoritativeness. As 
scriptures are principally authoritative, scepticism about scriptures in the 
pedagogical context is seen as being rooted in the audience’s misapprehen-
sion (whether actual or rhetorically induced by the teacher), which teaching 
attempts to correct. 
Finally, another meta-theoretical comment on the question of scepticism 
and scriptures appears in a polemical context. A central theme of the VY is 
the authenticity and authority of Mahāyāna scriptures (Cabezón, 1992, pp. 
224–225). As was often the case with later strata of the Buddhist textual cor-
pus composed after the formation of the early canon, proponents of the 
Mahāyāna scriptures had to protect their claims of authenticity from criticism 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 VY 116b4–5, p. 257: ma thos pa thos par 'gyur ba dang | thos pa yongs su byang bar 'gyur ba 
dang | som nyi spong ba dang | lta ba drang por byed pa dang | shes rab kyis don dang | tshig 
zab mo rtogs par 'gyur ba'o || 
7 “If it is asked how one comes to purify what one has heard, [then] hearing what is expressed 
here or in other texts and leads to Buddhahood, or that which has been defiled, is clarified and 
purified by listening. In this way, one has purified that which has been heard. If it is asked how 
uncertainty (som nyi) is dispelled, [then] certainty (nges pa) with respect to that with which 
doubt (the tshom) arises when thinking of it is achieved by listening to the Dharma.” VY 117a2–
4, p. 258: ji ltar na thos pa yongs su byang bar 'gyur zhe na | sangs rgyas 'byung ba gzhan dag 
las sam | 'dir thos pa brjod dam | dri ma can du gyur pa gang yin pa de mnyan pas gsal bar byed 
cing dri ma med par byed do || de ltar na thos pa yongs su byang bar 'gyur ro || ji ltar na som nyi 
spong bar 'gyur zhe na | de sems pa na the tshom 'byung ba gang yin pa de | chos mnyan pas 
nges pa 'thob bo || 
138  Hanner 
 
 
from non-Mahāyānist sectarians (Davidson, 1990, pp. 305–312). Accord-
ingly, in the VY, Vasubandhu seeks to rebut arguments which aim to under-
mine the Mahāyāna doctrines by casting doubt on the authenticity of their 
authoritative textual sources. The purpose of Vasubandhu’s arguments, in 
other words, is to defend the status of Mahāyāna scriptures as the words of 
the Buddha against claims that they are apocryphal. One statement in partic-
ular indicates that this motivation lies behind Vasubandhu’s exegetical en-
deavour. At the end of his discussion about objections, Vasubandhu con-
cludes that “therefore, the claim that the Mahāyāna is the word of the Buddha 
is not contradictory. For that reason, the claim that the vaipulya [sūtras of the 
Mahāyāna] are the Mahāyāna is without contradiction.”8  
The charge that a given scripture is apocryphal is perhaps the most severe 
sceptical accusation, as it undermines that scripture’s value altogether. In the 
VY, Vasubandhu addresses various objections that dispute the authenticity of 
the Mahāyāna scriptures based on the structure of the Buddhist canon, the 
doctrinal content of the Mahāyāna sūtras, and inter-canonical criteria (Cabe-
zón, 1992, pp. 225). Scepticism in philosophical debates, however, employs 
other, less extreme measures. For example, philosophical rivals may question 
the accuracy or veracity of particular teachings or the way in which the scrip-
tures are commonly understood. Sceptical objections in polemics pose a 
threat which must be warded off apologetically. The advocate of the scripture 
aims to defend its reliability by refuting arguments designed to undermine it, 
as Vasubandhu indeed does in the VY and elsewhere. The role of exegesis in 
these moderate cases is firstly to demonstrate that scriptural statements are 
authentic and accurate, or alternatively to show that they have been misinter-
preted and ought to be read in another way. Additionally, its role is to clarify 
those scriptural statements in keeping with the philosophical thesis that the 
author is seeking to establish.  
A distinction must be drawn between Buddhist and non-Buddhist scrip-
tures. According to the VY, a Buddhist exegete comments on the words of the 
Buddha. Moreover, as non-Buddhist scriptures often lay out philosophical 
views that are dismissed by Buddhists, these scriptures are normally rejected 
from the outset. Therefore, the method of scriptural interpretation outlined 
above naturally does not pertain to works of non-Buddhist authors. With 
Buddhist scriptures, the case is different. Vasubandhu once more seeks to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 VY 114a, p. 249: de bas na theg pa chen po sangs rgyas kyi gsung yin no zhes bya ba de ni mi 
’gal lo || de’i phyir shin tu rgyas pa’i sde theg pa chen po yin no zhes bya ba ’gal ba med do || 
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accommodate a wide range of sources and to associate any sceptical objec-
tion to scriptures with misjudgement on the part of the sceptic. Misjudge-
ments of this kind occur in different ways: one might follow non-literal ut-
terances literally, or vice versa; fixate on the words rather than on their mean-
ing; fail to acknowledge widely recognized sūtras; not recognize the inter-
pretive context provided by multiple scriptural sources; or stumble into other 
hermeneutical fallacies (Cabezón, 1992, pp. 225–233; Gold, 2014, pp. 116–
118). 
Thus, Vasubandhu’s meta-philosophical remarks indicate that scepticism 
concerning the credibility of scriptural testimony can be directed either at the 
scriptures themselves or at the ways in which they are understood by readers. 
Buddhist scriptures are essentially unerring. For this reason, questioning the 
doctrines they teach, exhibiting doubt, and raising critical objections all sig-
nify a state of misapprehension. Given that human understanding may be 
flawed, it is justified and even philosophically healthy to maintain a sceptical 
attitude towards scriptural knowledge claims as we understand them. 
Theory: Doubts and Objections in the Vyākhyāyukti 
What happens, however, when someone does directly call the content of 
scriptures into question? Vasubandhu addresses this issue in the VY. The 
commentarial project, as presented in this work, aims to elucidate different 
aspects of the primary scripture. Some of the methods used have little to do 
with the epistemological status of the scriptures. For example, the explana-
tion of obscure phrases (tshig don; padārtha) seeks to clarify unfamiliar ex-
pressions. The purpose of the text (dgos pa; prayojana) provides an exposé 
of sorts of the work discussed. In themselves, these two methods neither cast 
doubt nor validate the truthfulness of scriptural testimony. Other aspects of 
the commentarial enterprise are more closely concerned with manifestations 
of scepticism. Vasubandhu does not seem to uphold a single concept of scep-
ticism equivalent to those theorized in Western thought, but he does employ 
a few key terms which carry similar meanings. Two particularly relevant 
concepts that appear frequently in the VY are doubt (the tshom; vicikitsā), 
which is also referred to as uncertainty (som nyi; saṃśaya), and objection 
(brgal ba; codya), which is conceptually interchangeable with inquiry (brtag 
pa; parīkṣā). Another concept which bears on the topic is reasoning (rigs pa; 
yukti or nyāya).  
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In the VY, the two terms “doubt” and “uncertainty” appear side by side, 
although the former is used much more frequently. Vasubandhu does not de-
fine them or elaborate on the function of doubt. Nevertheless, it is evident 
from his use of the terms that doubt is not considered to be a positive attitude 
for the study of scriptures; it is rather an unwholesome state of mind to be 
abandoned. First, doubt arises from ignorance (ma rig pa; avidyā)9 and is one 
of the properties of thorough obscuration (kun tu rmongs pa; sammoha).10 
According to one sūtra cited by Vasubandhu, it is also one of three states of 
mind, alongside non-knowledge (mi shes pa; ajñāna) and wrong views (log 
par shes pa; mithyā-dṛṣṭi), that are associated with having a childish nature, 
being deluded, and being deficient in wisdom.11 Vasubandhu substantiates 
this statement, glossing the term “childish” as being associated with igno-
rance, doubt, and wrong views.12 Likewise, not being able to cut off all doubt 
with respect to the Buddha is one of four faults that Vasubandhu enumer-
ates.13 Doubt is hence a mindset to be counteracted: one of the five benefits 
of listening to the Dharma is that uncertainty is dispelled, and one of the five 
qualities of listening to the True Dharma is that those who have doubt, or are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
9 “Because doubt is brought about by ignorance.” VY 78b4, p. 148: the tshom ni ma rig pas rab 
tu phyi ba [here I follow D: rab tu phye ba] nyid kyi phyir ste | 
10 “In this regard, because thorough obscuration is accompanied by ignorance, doubt, and 
wrong views.” VY 31b1, p. 8: de la kun tu rmongs pa rnams ni mi shes pa dang the tshom dang 
log par shes pa dang ldan pa'i phyir ro || 
11 “From the Sūtrakhaṇḍa: ‘Having a childish nature, having a deluded nature, having the nature 
of deficient wisdom.’ As for that, it should be understood as possessing ignorance, doubt, and 
wrong views, in this order.” VY 51a4–5, pp. 65–66: byis pa'i rang bzhin can | rmongs pa'i rang 
bzhin can | shes rab 'chal pa'i rang bzhin can zhes bya ba ni mdo sde'i dum bu ste | de ni go 
rims bzhin du mi shes pa dang | the tshom dang | log pa'i shes pa dang ldan pa las rig par bya'o 
|| 
12 “With respect to that, ‘childish’ is indicated and the rest is explained: because of being con-
nected with ignorance, doubt, and wrong views.” VY 51a2, p. 65: de la byis pa zhes bya ba ni 
bstan pa yin la | lhag ma bshad pa yin te | mi shes pa dang | the tshom dang | log pa'i shes pa 
dang ldan pa'i phyir ro || 
13 “In brief, these four types of faults are taught: (1) with regard to the taught Dharma, the fault 
of mistaken meaning; (2) with respect to the practiced Dharma, the fault of not going to nirvāṇa; 
(3) with respect to listeners, the fault of having a scattered mind (blo du ma); (4) with respect 
to the Buddha, not being able to cut off all doubts.” VY 44a3–5, p. 43: mdor na skyon rnam pa 
'di bzhi bstan pa yin te | bstan pa'i chos la don phyin ci log pa nyid kyi skyon dang | sgrub pa'i 
chos la mya ngan las 'das par mi 'gro ba nyid kyi skyon dang | nyan pa po rnams la blo du ma 
dang ldan pa nyid kyi skyon dang | ston pa la the tshom thams cad gcod mi nus pa'i skyon no || 
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consumed by doubt (the tshom zos pa), arrive at certainty.14 By contrast, the 
views of non-Buddhists, which disagree with the Buddha’s teachings, cannot 
serve as an antidote either to ill view with respect to truths or to ignorance 
and doubt.15 
Unlike the Pyrrhonians, who maintain that suspending judgement, or 
questioning truths by producing doubt, can lead to peace of mind, 
Vasubandhu believes that generating a doubtful mood is not the path that 
leads to a life of happiness and well-being. Quite the contrary: it is the re-
moval of doubt which is linked to happiness. Vasubandhu mentions cutting 
off doubt as one of three kinds of bliss (mchog tu dga' ba; prāmodya),16 and 
claims that forsaking doubt satisfies the heart.17 As this treatment of doubt 
indicates, Vasubandhu does not consider this state of mind to be a useful 
approach in the assessment of scriptural knowledge claims, or indeed any 
kind of knowledge at all. Doubt cannot fulfil this function precisely because 
in cognitive terms, it stands in contrast to knowledge and reasoning. Doubt 
is here associated with uncertainty, the inability to arrive at a clear decision 
concerning truths—not in a positive, liberating sense, but rather in a sense of 
confusion that results in unhappiness. Scriptures which hand down the Bud-
dha’s teachings are therefore superior to the state of doubt, and of the two, 
they are the only source of reliable knowledge. 
The case is different, however, with objections or inquiry. These are in-
corporated as an indispensable element of teaching the Dharma and are listed 
as one of the five aspects of scriptural commentary. In the VY, the term “ob-
jections” almost invariably appears adjacent to “replies” (lan), thus creating 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
14 “There are five good qualities of listening to the True Dharma: (1) what is not understood is 
made understood; (2) what is wrongly apprehended is abandoned; (3) gnawing doubts are set-
tled; (4) certainty becomes the essence; and (5) the noble beings’ eye of wisdom becomes per-
fectly clear.” VY 122a3–4, pp. 274–275: dam pa'i chos mnyan pa la yon tan lnga yod de | rnam 
par mi shes pa rnam par shes par byed pa dang | nyes par bzung ba 'dor ba dang | the tshom zos 
pa nges par byed pa dang | nges par byas pa snying por byed pa dang | 'phags pa'i shes rab kyi 
mig sbyong bar byed pa'o || 
15 “Furthermore, the views of non-Buddhists are not antidotes to ill views with respect to truths, 
doubt, and ignorance.” VY 57b3–4, 85: gzhan yang phyi rol pa rnams kyi lta ba ni bden pa rnams 
la ngan par lta ba dang | the tshom dang | ma rig pa rnams kyi gnyen po ma yin pa dang | 
16 “The three kinds of bliss [are] (1) the bliss of abandoning distraction of the mind; (2) the bliss 
of cutting off doubts; and (3) the bliss of thoroughly grasping the result.” VY 67b7, p. 115: 
mchog tu dga' ba rnam pa gsum ni sems g.yengs pa spong ba'i mchog tu dga' ba dang | the 
tshom gcod pa'i mchog tu dga' ba dang | 'bras bu yongs su 'dzin pa'i mchog tu dga' ba'o|| 
17 “Satisfying the heart, because of cutting off doubts.” VY 119a7, p. 265: snying dga' bar byed 
pa ni the tshom gcod par byed pa'i phyir ro|| 
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the compound “objections and replies” (brgal lan or brgal pa dang lan; 
codyaparihāra). This recurring conjunction implies, once again, that 
Vasubandhu considers that objections are intended to serve as a springboard 
for their own resolution. In the first appearance of the term in the VY, 
Vasubandhu explains that objections and replies are “non-contradiction with 
respect to reasoning (rigs pa; nyāya or yukti) and with respect to coherence 
(snga phyi, literally ‘previous and next’).”18 Reasoning, as defined in the VY, 
consists of the three means of knowledge: direct perception (mngon sum; 
pratyakṣa), inference (rjes su dpag pa; anumāna), and authoritative speech 
(yid ches pa'i gsung; *āptavacana).19 On this conception, reasoning encom-
passes not only logical inference and unmediated experience, but also other 
Buddhist scriptures subsumed under authoritative speech. Any objection 
which points at a contradiction between the primary scripture in question and 
one of those three aspects of reasoning is considered as an objection from 
reasoning.20 The term “coherence” is left undefined, though various instances 
of objections belonging to this class clarify its meaning. Later in the work, 
Vasubandhu elaborates on the subject and recognizes three types of objec-
tion. In addition to the first two, which are classified as objections concerned 
with meaning (don la brgal ba), he lists the category of objections concerning 
words (sgra la brgal ba).21 Arguments in this category are directed at irreg-
ularities in the grammatical structure of the text. 
For each of the three types of objections, Vasubandhu provides a set of 
examples.22 One example of an objection concerned with words given here 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 VY 31a1, p. 7: brgal ba dang lan brjod pa las ni rigs pa dang snga phyi mi 'gal ba'o || 
19 On the three means of knowledge in the VY, see Verhagen (2008, pp. 244–247). On reasoning 
in Indian Buddhism more broadly, see Nance (2007). 
20 “In brief, here, ‘reasoning’ means the threefold means of knowledge—direct perception, in-
ference, and authoritative speech. It should be known that an objection which contradicts any 
of these is an objection which contradicts reasoning.” VY 87b3–4, p. 173: mdor na rigs pa ni 
'dir tshad ma rnam pa gsum po mngon sum dang rjes su dpag pa dang yid ches pa'i gsung ngo 
|| de dag las gang yang rung ba zhig dang 'gal bar brgal ba yang rigs pa dang 'gal par brgal ba 
yin par rig par bya'o || 
21 “Objections are of two kinds: objections concerned with words and objections concerned 
with meaning.” VY 85b4–5, p. 167: brgal ba ni rnam pa gnyis te | sgra la brgal pa dang | don la 
brgal ba'o ||; “Objections concerned with meaning are also of two kinds: objections from con-
tradiction with respect to coherence and objections from contradiction with respect to reason.” 
VY 86a5, p. 169: don la brgal ba yang rnam pa gnyis te | snga phyi 'gal bar brgal ba dang | rigs 
pa dang 'gal bar brgal ba'o || 
22 For further discussion and examples of objections in the VY see Nance (2012, pp. 118–120) 
and Cabezón (1992, pp. 225–233). 
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is based on a paragraph in which the present tense is used in order to refer to 
an action in the past—“Where are you coming from?”—when in fact the per-
son had already arrived. According to this objection, the present tense cannot 
be used for the past in such a way.23 An example of an objection with respect 
to reasoning arises in response to a paragraph whose subject matter is the 
result of giving. This paragraph states the maxim according to which giving 
leads to great wealth, which rests on one principle of the theory of karman. 
A sceptic, however, raises the objection that this assertion contradicts reason, 
since a logical inference shows that even those who are miserly achieve 
wealth, while those who give may also suffer poverty. 24  Finally, one of 
Vasubandhu’s examples of an objection concerning coherence deals with two 
passages from Buddhist scriptures. According to the first passage, human 
beings perform meritorious and non-meritorious actions, by virtue of which 
they are reborn. The second passage, however, suggests that while actions 
and their retribution exist, those agents who perform the actions do not exist. 
The sceptic interlocutor claims that such an intrinsic nature—of being exist-
ent and non-existent at the same time—is logically incoherent.25 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
23 “For example: ‘Although Venerable Śāriputra dwelled [in the past], [the Buddha asked:] Śāri-
putra, where are you coming from now? [Śāriputra replied:] Your Honour, I’m now coming 
from the shade of a dense grove.’—In this application, using the past tense like the present is 
not reasonable.” VY 85b5–6, pp. 167–168: 'di lta ste | tshe dang ldan pa śā ri'i bu bzhugs zin 
kyang | śā ri'i bu khyod da gzod dang gang nas 'ong 'ong | btsun pa da gzod thibs po'i tshal nas 
gdugs la mchis pa las mchi mchi'o zhes bya ba'i sbyor ba 'di ni da ltar byung ba bzhin du 'das 
pa'i dus la bya ba rigs pa ma yin no || 
24 “Likewise [another example], ‘Fully cultivating and training in the root of merit which arises 
from giving—if it is done many times, one attains great wealth.’—This is contrary to inference: 
opulence occurs to the miserly ones and poverty occurs to the ones who give; because even the 
miserly may be rich and because even those who give may be poor.” VY 87b–88a, pp. 174–175: 
de bzhin du sbyin pa las byung ba’i bsod nams bya ba’i gzhi kun tu bsten cing bsgoms te lan 
mang du byas na longs spyod chen po nyid 'grub par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba yang rjes su dpag pa 
dang 'gal ba yin te | ser sna can la phyug pa dang | gtong ba la dbul po yang snang ste | ser sna 
can yang phyug po nyid yin pa'i phyir dang | gtong ba yang dbul po nyid yin pa'i phyir ro || 
25 “Likewise [another example], according to some, ‘human beings here engage in both that 
which is meritorious and non-meritorious, they appropriate it, and furthermore, because of that, 
they carry [that karman] and are reborn.’ However, according to some, ‘both action exists and 
the fruition of action exists, but there is no agent.’ Such an intrinsic nature is an objection with 
respect to coherence.” VY 86b3–4, p. 170: de bzhin du kha cig las mi rnams kyis ni 'di na bsod 
nams dang | sdig pa gang yin gnyis ka byed pa ste | de'i bdag gir bya ba yin zhing des | de yang 
khyer te 'gro bar byed pa yin zhes gsungs pa dang | kha cig las las kyang yod rnam par smin pa 
yang yod la byed pa po ni mi dmigs so zhes gsungs pa de lta bu'i rang bzhin ni snga phyi 'gal 
bar brgal ba yin no || 
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As indicated earlier, although objections dispute the authority of the scrip-
tures and the validity of their knowledge claims, Vasubandhu’s attitude to-
wards them is consistently positive. Objections bring benefit in the rhetorical, 
pedagogical, and theological effects they have on those learning the scrip-
tures. Their final purpose and result is the interiorization of the Buddha’s 
teachings. What is the difference, then, between doubt and objections which 
renders the former unacceptable but the latter a desirable form of inquiry? 
The difference, it seems to me, lies in the relation of the two to reasoning. 
Doubt is portrayed as a prejudiced and rationally unjustifiable form of scep-
ticism. Hence, it cannot be altered through reasoning (although it can be dis-
pelled by listening to the Dharma). Objections, on the other hand, are 
grounded in logical claims and rational thinking and constitute a form of 
scepticism which can be rationally defended or responded to. Both types of 
sceptical attitude mentioned in the VY call attention to the cognitive vulnera-
bility of human understanding, without claiming any fault on the part of 
scriptures. Doubt is a flaw in the listener’s judgement, devoid of any capacity 
to assess knowledge claims. Objections serve to validate the knowledge 
claims presented by Buddhist scripture because they are ultimately over-
come, demonstrating that this form of scepticism rests on a misunderstanding 
that must eventually be corrected. Therefore, according to the VY, scepticism 
is warranted when one assesses scriptural claims, but any doubt is eventually 
misguided, one way or another. 
Pedagogical Applications: Sceptical Arguments in the Dharmadhar-
matāvibhāgavṛtti 
On the theoretical and meta-theoretical levels, then, scepticism directed at 
scriptures is deemed an expression of misunderstanding. This is also the case 
on the level of application. One work that amply illustrates how the strategy 
is used in the pedagogical context is Vasubandhu’s Dharmadharma-
tāvibhāgavṛtti (Commentary on “Distinguishing Between Phenomena and 
Their Essence,” hereafter DhDhVV). 26  The primary text on which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
26 Originally composed in Sanskrit, the DhDhVV is extant in Tibetan only (except for several 
Sanskrit fragments). The translations below are based on the critical edition published in 
Nozawa (1955). References are to the Derge edition of the Tibetan Canon (Zhu-chen Tshul-
khrims-rin-chen, 1985, Vol. 124, #4028), followed by page numbers in Nozawa’s critical edi-
tion. The verses are indicated in italics.  
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Vasubandhu is commenting in this work is one of the works attributed to 
Maitreya.27 Both the primary text and the commentary give voice to doctrines 
articulated in the Mahāyāna tradition of Buddhism. They delineate the theory 
of emptiness the way it has been developed by the Madhyamaka school, yet 
describe it as having a close affinity to practice and the transformation of 
consciousness, a hallmark of the Yogācāra school (Anacker, 1992). Maitreya 
makes a dichotomous distinction between dharmas (phenomena) and dhar-
matā (the true essence of phenomena). Dharmas are the manifold entities 
conceived by ordinary minds. They are accompanied by mental confusion, 
since they are appearances of what ultimately does not exist, and therefore 
do not accord with the ultimate nature of reality. By contrast, dharmatā sig-
nifies the true, unified reality which the myriad appearances conceal. This 
ultimately existing reality is undifferentiated, without distinctions between 
perceiving subjects and perceived objects, devoid of entities to be designated 
and devoid of designations.  
The discrepancy between that which appears but does not exist and that 
which exists but does not appear is the source of the illusion which leads to 
mental afflictions and suffering. Accordingly, the soteriological goal of 
Mahāyāna Buddhist practice, as explained in the DhDhV, is liberation from 
this illusion, achieved by developing non-conceptual wisdom and by trans-
forming the “basis” (āśraya); namely, the storehouse consciousness (ālaya-
vijñāna).28 In his commentary, Vasubandhu clarifies these principles, while 
considering various objections directed at Maitreya’s work. As in the VY, 
Vasubandhu utilizes these objections to clarify Maitreya’s teachings further 
and to advance his exegesis. 
In the DhDhVV, Vasubandhu consistently rebuts sceptical criticism of 
Maitreya’s work. The distribution of roles usually follows the one described 
in the VY: a hypothetical listener raises various objections to the doctrines, 
and Vasubandhu assumes the role of the commentator and resolves them. 
Thus, it is never the case that the listener’s misgivings motivate a rejection 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
27 See Dharmachakra Translation Committee (2013, pp. x–xi) for a hagiography of Maitreya. 
Modern scholars are divided on Maitreya’s identity. Some see him as a historical figure, an 
advocate of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism and one of its founders. Others suggest that 
Maitreya is a pseudonym for the important Yogācāra scholar Asaṅga. On the authorship of the 
texts ascribed to Maitreya, including the DDV, see Mathes (1996, pp. 11–17). 
28 For an elaborate explanation of the doctrines presented in Maitreya’s work and Vasubandhu’s 
commentary, see Brunnhölzl (2012, pp. 13–153), Mathes (1996, pp. 23–28), Robertson (2008, 
pp. 482–491), and Tucci (1930, pp. 18–35). 
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of the primary text as unreliable or mistaken. In its critical scrutiny, the 
DhDhVV employs some of the key ideas conceptualized in the VY, such as 
objections, reasoning, and especially contradiction with respect to reasoning. 
The philosophical discussion, however, does not involve doubt and uncer-
tainty, objections to words, or contradiction with respect to coherence. Many 
of the critical questions directed at Maitreya’s doctrine concern the nature of 
the two categories of dharma and dharmatā. The listener interrogates their 
extension, their relation to each other, their ontological status, and so on.  
One objection Vasubandhu addresses over the course of this exchange 
concerns the defining characteristics of dharmas. The listener poses the fol-
lowing question: would it not be more reasonable to maintain that dharmas 
lack one of their two properties—either their non-existence or their appear-
ance?29 Vasubandhu examines the two possibilities and presents an argument 
that dismisses them one at a time, with the underlying premise that both prop-
erties are required in order for the misperception of reality to be possible: 
[Maitreya] says: If one of the two, non-existence and appearance, did not exist, 
then confusion and non-confusion, and affliction and purification, would not 
be feasible (mi ’thad).  
If non-existence existed, but not appearance, then there would not be confu-
sion [caused] by that non-existence, because there [can] be no confusion with 
respect to non-existence being non-existent. If confusion did not exist, then 
non-confusion would also not exist, because non-confusion has [confusion] as 
its antecedent. Therefore, affliction would not exist, because that has confu-
sion as its cause. If that did not exist, purification would also not exist, because 
purification has affliction as its antecedent. Therefore, if that [purification] did 
not exist, since liberation would be effortless, that would contradict direct per-
ception (mngon sum). 
On the other hand, if appearance existed, but not non-existence, in that way 
too, since non-existence would not exist, there would not be confusion, since 
if appearance were established according to its nature, confusion [would] not 
[exist]. If confusion did not exist, the rest would also not exist, in the same 
way as [explained] above. Therefore, since human action would be meaning-
less, this would contradict reasoning (rigs pa).30 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
29 “It is asked: again, why is it unacceptable that [dharmas] lack one of the two, non-existence 
and appearance?” DhDhVV 29a4, p. 23: yang ci'i don gyis med pa dang| snang ba dag las gang 
rung zhig med par mi 'dod ce na | 
30 DhDhVV 29a4–29b1, pp. 23–24: gsungs pa| med pa dang snang ba dag las gang rung zhig 
med na ni 'khrul pa dang| ma 'khrul pa dang| kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba 
mi 'thad do| gal te med pa kho nar gyur te snang bar ma gyur na ni de med pas 'khrul par mi 
'gyur te| med pa ni med pa nyid du ma 'khrul pa'i phyir ro || 'khrul pa med na ni ma 'khrul pa 
yang med par 'gyur te | ma 'khrul pa ni de sngon du 'gro ba can yin pa'i phyir ro || des na kun 
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This passage from the DhDhVV presents two arguments from contradiction 
with reasoning (direct perception being subsumed under reasoning) and em-
ploys them in order to resolve the objection and validate Maitreya’s doctrine. 
Stylistically, the DhDhVV embodies Vasubandhu’s sceptical strategy by in-
terweaving many of the commentarial responses to the objections with the 
primary text (a stylistic device used in other Buddhist commentaries as well). 
In other words, replies to the doubts directed at the primary text rely on 
claims from the primary text itself. This has a rhetorical effect: the primary 
text is portrayed as if it had anticipated the sceptical criticism to which the 
commentary responds. Furthermore, this argumentative style has a philo-
sophical significance. Since the scripture “anticipates” the criticism and the 
commentarial response, it is accorded logical precedence over the commen-
tary and the objections.  
An objection addressed in this way concerns the reduction of all reality 
into the two categories of dharma and dharmatā. Before he clarifies the de-
fining characteristics of these categories, Maitreya proclaims that the two 
ought to be distinguished according to their defining characteristics. The hy-
pothetical listener in the commentary then critically interrogates the philo-
sophical distinction:  
[As for the meaning of the quote] “to distinguish these two due to their defin-
ing characteristics”—first, is it that only phenomena and the true nature are 
distinguished, but another [category] is not? Or else is it that [everything] 
amounts to nothing more than these two?31  
In other words, the question is whether there are other ontological categories 
whose recognition is unnecessary for liberation or whether the two categories 
completely encompass everything that exists. Responding to this question, 
Vasubandhu “invokes” Maitreya (emphasized), who provides the core of the 
reply: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
nas nyon mongs pa yang med par 'gyur ba yin te| de ni 'khrul pa'i rgyu can yin pa'i phyir ro| |de 
med na rnam par byang bar yang mi 'gyur te| rnam par byang ba ni kun nas nyon mongs pa 
sngon du 'gro ba can yin pa'i phyir ro || de'i phyir de med na 'bad pa med par grol bar 'gyur 
bas na mngon sum dang 'gal lo || 'on te snang ba kho nar 'gyur gyi med par ma gyur na | de lta 
na yang med pa med pas 'khrul par mi 'gyur te | snang ba de'i bdag nyid du yongs su grub na 
ma 'khrul pa'i phyir ro || 'khrul pa med na snga ma bzhin lhag mar yang mi 'gyur ro || de'i phyir 
skyes bu'i byed pa don med par 'gyur bas rigs pa dang 'gal lo || 
31 DhDhVV 27b5–6, p. 20: smras pa | de dag mtshan nyid sgo nas ni rnam par dbye || zhes bya 
ba ci re zhig chos dang chos nyid de dag nyid rnam par dbye'i gzhan ni ma yin nam | 'on te 'di 
dag tsam du zad pa yin zhe na | 
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To answer, it is not the case that the distinction between the two is made after 
setting them aside from many [categories]. 
- How then? 
- That which the Buddha presented—the aggregates (phung po; skandha), 
the elements (khams; dhātu), the sense spheres (skye mched; āyatana), 
and so on—in short, all this is two. 
- Why [is it so]? 
- Because [the categories of] dharma and dharmatā comprise [every-
thing].32 
Vasubandhu then clarifies: “If the aggregates, the elements, the sense fields, 
and so on are abridged, they become two kinds; that is, phenomena and the 
true nature.”33 
A similar passage employs this device and begins with Maitreya’s char-
acterization of phenomena and their true nature. Dharmas, Maitreya says, 
appear but do not exist, while dharmatā exists but does not appear. Accord-
ing to the primary scripture, this is the source of the confusion, delusion, and 
false imagination (yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa; abhūtaparikalpa) 
afflicting sentient beings. Regarding this claim, the listener inquires how 
something which does not exist can nevertheless appear.34 Vasubandhu ex-
plains in response: 
[Maitreya] says that [it appears] in the way that illusory elephants and so on 
appear. For instance, just as an elephant produced by a magician and so on, or 
the spell for restraining magical weapons and so on, do not exist as they ap-
pear, although there is an appearance, in the same way, false imagination, too, 
appears but does not exist.35 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
32 DhDhVV 27b6–7, p. 20: brjod pa mang po rnams las bkol nas gnyis su rnam par dbye ba byed 
pa ni ma yin no || 'o na ci zhe na| bcom ldan 'das kyis phung po dang | khams dang | skye mched 
la sogs pa rnam par bzhag pa gang yin pa de mdor bsdus pas | 'di thams cad ni gnyis te | ci'i 
phyir zhe na | chos dang chos nyid kyis bsdus pa'i phyir ro || 
33 DhDhVV 27b7–28a1, p. 20: phung po dang | khams dang skye mched la sogs pa de ni | bsdu 
na rnam pa gnyis su 'gyur te | 'di lta ste | chos dang chos nyid do || 
34 DhDhVV 29a1, p. 23: med pa snang ba yang ji lta bu zhe na | 
35 DhDhVV 29a1–3, p. 23: gsungs pa | sgyu ma'i glang po che la sogs pa snang ba bzhin no || 
dper na sgyu mar byas pa'i glang po che la sogs pa dang| nor dang 'bru la sogs pa ni ji ltar 
snang ba de ltar med la| snang ba yang yin pa la de bzhin du yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu 
rtog pa yang med bzhin du snang ba yin no| |gzhan yang yod pa yang mi snang ba'i phyir ro| 
|'khrul pa zhes rjes su 'jug go zhes bya ba ni ba dag med pa rnam pa gnyis yod pa mi snang ba'i 
phyir yang 'khrul pa yin no| | 
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In other words, the appearance of phenomena which do not actually exist is 
no different from other mundane illusions, which appear to us even though 
they do not really exist.  
Finally, another objection centres on the ontological relation between the 
two categories. Vasubandhu raises the hypothetical question of whether 
dharma and dharmatā are the same or different from each other36 and re-
sponds, once again, by relying on Maitreya’s original claims:  
[Maitreya] says: These two are neither the same nor different, because exist-
ence and non-existence [are with] difference and without difference.37 
Vasubandhu then elaborates on the reply that he extracted from the primary 
scripture with an argument from contradiction with reasoning: 
It is unacceptable (mi ’dod) that the two mentioned above, dharmas and dhar-
matā, are one and [it is unacceptable that they are] different.  
- Why is that? 
- Because existence and non-existence are distinct and not distinct. First, 
it is unreasonable (thad pa ma yin) that dharmas and dharmatā are one. 
- Why [is it so]? 
- Because existence and non-existence are distinct. Since dharmatā exists 
and dharmas do not exist, how can [things] which are distinct in exist-
ence and non-existence be one? They are also not different. 
- Why [is it so]? 
- Because existence and non-existence are not distinct.  
- How are they not distinct? 
- Because dharmatā is thoroughly distinguished by the mere non-exist-
ence of dharmas, due to the non-distinction [between the two] in the per-
ceived object [that they constitute]. It is demonstrated that dharmas and 
dharmatā are neither the same nor different.38 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
36 “One may wonder: as for this, assuming that it [the characterization of phenomena and the 
true nature] is so, is it asserted that [the ontological relation between] phenomena and the true 
nature is a case of being one, or a case of being different?” DhDhVV 29b2, p. 24: de ni de lta 
yin na ci chos dang chos nyid dag gcig nyid du khas blang bar byas pa'am | 'on te tha dad pa 
nyid du snyam na | 
37 DhDhVV 29b2–3, p. 24: gsungs pa | gnyis po dag ni gcig nyid ma yin zhing so so nyid ma yin 
te | yod pa dang med pa dag khyad par dang khyad par med pa'i phyir ro || 
38 DhDhVV 29b3–6, pp. 24–25: gnyis po dag ces bya ba chos dang chos nyid dag ni gcig pa nyid 
dang tha dad pa nyid du mi 'dod do || de ci'i phyir zhe na | yod pa dang med pa dag khyad par 
yod pa dang khyad par med pa'i phyir ro || re zhig chos dang chos nyid gcig pa nyid du ni 'thad 
pa ma yin te | de ci'i phyir zhe na | yod pa dang med pa dag khyad par yod pa'i phyir ro || chos 
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The claim is that it does not stand to reason that dharmas and dharmatā are 
the same, since they differ in their ontological status (the latter exists while 
the former do not); however, they are also not different, since the two con-
stitute different facets of one object of perception (the existence of dharmatā 
is founded on the non-existence of dharmas). To put it another way, their 
epistemological extension is identical, and in this regard, they are mutually 
dependent. As these examples show, for Vasubandhu, objections directed at 
scriptural testimony in the pedagogical context involve some misunderstand-
ing. When such objections are vocalized, they are immediately addressed and 
a deeper understanding of the scriptures and doctrines evolves. Hence, when 
the credibility of scriptures is at stake, it is human understanding that ought 
to be questioned. 
Argumentative Applications: Contested Scriptures in the Abhidhar-
makośabhāṣya 
Whereas the pedagogical setting is generally tolerant towards expressions of 
doubt about scriptural testimony, from the outset, the polemical setting fo-
cuses on doubts directed at scriptural understanding. Such is the case in the 
AKBh, one of Vasubandhu’s major polemical works. In this text, the exeget-
ical component permeates the discussion and manifests itself on various lev-
els. First, the prose portion, which constitutes the majority of the work, com-
prises an overarching commentary (bhāṣya; bshad pa) on the verse section. 
Second, within the prose commentary, Vasubandhu engages in a hermeneu-
tical analysis of numerous sūtra fragments. Often, it is expressions of doubt 
towards the interpretation of scriptural testimony that trigger exegesis. Given 
the breadth and wide-ranging nature of the AKBh, I will only concentrate 
here on several representative sūtra fragments that give rise to disagreements 
or philosophical objections and show how Vasubandhu deals with them. 
Some fragments stir exegetical polemics. Many others, however, are adduced 
by Vasubandhu or his philosophical opponents without being called into 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
nyid ni yod pa yin la chos ni med pa yin pas yod pa dang med pa khyad par can dag ji ltar gcig 
nyid du ‘gyur | tha dad pa nyid kyang ma yin no || ci'i phyir zhe na | yod pa dang med pa dag 
khyad par med pa'i phyir ro || ji ltar khyad par med ce na | chos nyid ni chos med pa tsam gyis 
rab tu phye ba yin pa'i phyir te | gzung ba la sogs pa'i khyad par med pa'i phyir ro || chos dang 
chos nyid dag gcig ma yin pa dang | so so ma yin pa nyid bshad zin to || 
 Scripture and Scepticism in Vasubandhu’s Exegetical Method  151 
 
question. Additionally, at least in one place, the authority of a sūtra is dis-
puted altogether, with the effect that the debate reaches an impasse. In this 
case, and contrary to his approach in the VY, Vausbandhu does not respond 
apologetically, but terminates the debate with a hopeless shrug and a scepti-
cal remark reminiscent of the one discussed above:  
Now, if they do not recite these sūtras, what can we do in this case? The Bud-
dha has gone to parinirvāṇa, the teachings are without a leader, they are being 
shattered into many parts, and are even separated from word and meaning at 
will. However, for those who do [accept] this scripture [as] a means of 
knowledge (pramāṇa; tshad ma), the scripture also establishes [the teaching 
of] the intermediate state.39 
This response, just like the meta-philosophical comment above concerning 
the widespread misinterpretation of scriptures, can be seen as an acknowl-
edgement of our inability to fully resolve exegetical disagreements when ab-
solute certainty about the meaning of scriptures is precluded. In this, 
Vasubandhu exhibits an intuition similar to that of the classical sceptics. For 
the latter thinkers, particularly adherents of Pyrrhonism, disagreements 
served as an important sceptical weapon, and—as some interpreters of Pyr-
rhonism argue—constituted the core justification for suspending belief (Fo-
gelin, 1994; Lammenranta, 2008, 2012; Machuca, 2011, 2015). In the five 
modes of Agrippa documented by Sextus Empiricus in the Outlines of Pyr-
rhonism, disagreement is one form of argumentation leading to the suspen-
sion of belief, alongside relativity, infinite regress, circularity, and arbitrary 
hypothesis. This set of sceptical devices challenges epistemic justification to 
this day. 
According to the dialectical interpretation of the Pyrrhonian problem, the 
suspension of judgement is based on our inability to resolve disagreements 
among different doxastic appearances without begging the question at issue; 
in other words, without partially judging that our own doxastic appearances 
are true while those of others are not, thereby assuming what we are supposed 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
39 AKBh ad 3.12, pp. 122–123: athaitāny api sūtrāṇi tair nāmnāyante | kim idānīṃ kurmo yac 
chāstā ca parinirvṛtaḥ śāsanaṃ cedam anāyakaṃ bahudhā bhinnaṃ bhidyate cādyāpi yathec-
chaṃ granthataś cārthataś ca | yeṣāṃ tu tāvad ayam āgamaḥ pramāṇaṃ teṣām āgamato ’pi 
siddho ’ntarābhavaḥ. Ku 118a5–6: 'on te de dag ni mdo de dag kyang mi 'don to zhe na| ston 
pa gang yin pa ni yongs su mya ngan las 'das| bstan pa 'di'i 'dren pa ni med| rnam pa mang po 
ni tha dad kyi steng du da dung yang tshig dang don la dga' dgur byed na go |da ci zhig byar 
yod de re zhig gang dag la lung 'di tshad ma yin pa de dag la ni lung las kyang srid pa bar ma 
grub bo| | 
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to prove (Lammenranta, 2008, p. 16). When we take a stance in disagree-
ments, it is not the case that we consider all competing views to be equally 
persuasive. Rather, each side in the disagreement takes the other party’s ar-
gument to be unsound and finds one position more compelling than the other. 
The five modes of Agrippa are designed to show truth-seekers that justifying 
this belief in a satisfactory way without begging the question (i.e., on impar-
tial grounds) is a logically impossible task. Someone who attempts to do so 
will eventually run into one of three difficulties: infinite regress, in which her 
belief is justified by a further belief that needs to be justified in turn; circu-
larity, in which her belief is supported by another belief which is justified by 
the first one; or arbitrary hypothesis, in which her belief rests on a belief that 
is arbitrarily postulated, without being further justified. 
In the exegetical framework of the AKBh, then, non-Buddhist scriptures 
are cast aside, sweeping disagreements about the authority of Buddhist scrip-
tures are tolerated, and the meaning of certain Buddhist scriptures is left un-
disputed. Therefore, debates that necessitate elaboration involve those Bud-
dhist scriptures whose canonicity is granted by the disputing sides, but whose 
meaning is understood in contrary ways. These debates instantiate the Pyr-
rhonian problematic as understood according to the dialectical reading, and 
in what follows, I wish to explore Vasubandhu’s treatment of this issue. 
Objections against the interpretation of sūtra passages are raised by 
Vasubandhu and his opponents alike. Thus, for example, sūtras are critically 
scrutinized in a debate between Vasubandhu and a follower of the Pudgala-
vāda school on the question of whether the Buddha taught the existence of 
persons.40 Vasubandhu seeks to demonstrate that persons do not ultimately 
exist, but are merely conventional designations for ever-changing streams of 
aggregates. In support of this position, he cites a stanza which, to his mind, 
establishes that the name “Buddha” stands for a stream of aggregates (yā hy 
asau buddhākhyā saṃtatis; sangs rgyas zhes bya ba'i rgyud gang yin pa). The 
Pudgalavādins object to this reading of the quoted passage, questioning 
Vasubandhu’s understanding of it (katham idaṃ gamyate; 'di ji ltar khong du 
chud ce na). Immediately thereafter, they introduce a sūtra fragment of their 
own, which they believe corroborates their view that a person is an entity that 
is distinct from the aggregates. In this passage, the Buddha is said to explain 
that a person is the bearer (bhārahāra; khur khyer ba) of the burden (bhāra; 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
40 AKBh 9, pp. 467–468, Khu 87a7–87b7. 
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khur); namely, aggregates. Vasubandhu disputes their understanding, sug-
gesting that the Buddha’s use of the term “person” in that particular sense 
does not contradict his own theory of persons. Vasubandhu and his interloc-
utors, then, question each other’s interpretation of scriptures. These expres-
sions of doubt—including Vasubandhu’s readings, when rebutted by his op-
ponents—target not the scriptures and the truths they convey, but the oppo-
nent’s understanding of them. What follows from this scholastic choice, it 
seems, is that errors, when they occur, are the lot of human (mis)understand-
ing and not that of scriptures. 
The polemical context invites the exegete himself to question scriptures 
presented by his interlocutor. In these cases, it is noteworthy that from the 
outset, Vasubandhu’s scepticism is directed at the interlocutor’s understand-
ing of the scripture, with the tacit assumption that scriptures transmit true 
knowledge. In several places, Vasubandhu specifically calls attention to the 
cognitive biases involved in his philosophical opponents’ misreading of 
scriptures. For example, they fail to understand the meaning of the Buddha’s 
teaching, being fixated on the literal meaning of the words. This is the case 
in a discussion about the four characteristics of conditioned dharmas (arising, 
duration, passing away, and impermanence); Vasubandhu’s Sarvāstivāda in-
terlocutor holds that each of the characteristics is a dharma in itself. To 
demonstrate that this position was proclaimed by the Buddha, the 
Sarvāstivādin cites a sūtra which states that the characteristics can be dis-
cerned.41 Vasubandhu dismisses this evidence as a misunderstanding rooted 
in over-literal reading.42 
Similarly, in the course of a debate about the nature of moral downfall, 
the Sarvāstivādin argues that monks who have committed one downfall do 
not lose their moral restraint altogether. Vasubandhu disagrees with this and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
41 “In this case, it is said in the sūtra: ‘The arising of the conditioned factor is known, the passing 
away [is known] too, abiding and transformation [are known] too.’” AKBh ad 2.46, p. 76: yat 
tarhi sūtra uktaṃ “saṃskṛtasyotpādo ’pi prajñāyate vyayo ’pi sthityanyathātvam apī”ti. Ku 
81b1: 'on gang mdo sde las| 'dus byas skye bar yang mngon no| |'jig par yang mngon no| |gnas 
pa gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid du yang mngon no zhes gsungs so zhe na| 
42 “The understanding of the words is dear to the Gods, but not the understanding of the mean-
ing. The Blessed One, however, said that the object of confidence [ought to be] the meaning 
[and not the words].” AKBh ad 2.46, p. 76: granthajño devānāṃ priyo na tv arthajñaḥ | arthaś 
ca pratiśaraṇam uktaṃ bhagavatā. tshig śes pa ni lha rnams dga’ ba yin gyi don śes pa ni ma 
yin no || bcom ldan ’das kyis ni don la brten par gsuṅs so. Ku 81b1–2: tshig shes pa ni lha rnams 
dga' ba yin gyi don shes pa ni ma yin no| |bcom ldan 'das kyis ni don la brten par 
gsungs so| | 
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references a sūtra passage which testifies to the contrary view; namely, that 
a monk who commits a downfall ceases to be a monastic.43 The Sarvāstivādin 
objects to the ascribed meaning and interprets the passage to fit with his po-
sition. At this point, Vasubandhu criticizes his interlocutor for committing 
another hermeneutical fault: reinterpreting an explicit statement which ought 
to be understood literally. 44  Here, the Sarvāstivādin reads the Buddha’s 
teaching as implicit and elucidates it on a parallel, allegorical level, thereby 
misconstruing its original meaning.  
However, the AKBh recognizes an even more fundamental issue, which 
casts gloom over the exegetical enterprise and seems to provoke unsettling 
scepticism at a deeper level. This issue concerns the very criterion of 
knowledge; in this case, the standards for determining the circumstances un-
der which scriptures ought to be interpreted instead of taken literally. It con-
cerns, in other words, the hermeneutical dichotomy of explicit and implicit 
meaning. At stake is our capacity to apply this method properly, and conse-
quently the possibility of reaching a well-founded understanding of scrip-
tures. This issue comes up in a debate about the nature of dependent origina-
tion. Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaibhāṣika’s understanding of this doctrine, 
which he sees as being removed from the words and meaning of the sūtra. 
Specifically, he is disturbed by their inclination towards reifying the various 
states in the process of dependent arising. To this end, he cites a sūtra in 
which ignorance—the first link in the chain of dependent origination—is de-
fined as “non-knowledge related to the past” (yat tat pūrvānte ’jñānam; sngon 
gyi mtha' mi shes pa gang yin pa), meaning that ignorance is not deemed to 
be a distinct entity (dharma), but is only a term which designates an already 
known entity: the dharma of non-knowledge (ajñāna; mi shes pa). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
43 “Well then, it was said by the Blessed One: he is not a monk, not a mendicant, not a son of 
the Śākya, he falls from the status of a monk.” AKBh ad 4.39, p. 223: yat tarhi bhagavatoktam 
“abhikṣur bhavaty aśramaṇo ’śākyaputrīyo dhvasyate bhikṣubhāvāt |” Ku 189a4: 'o na bcom 
ldan 'das kyis dge slong ma yin dge sbyong ma yin| shākya'i bu ma yin| dge sbyong gi dngos po 
las nyams par 'gyur te| 
44  “[Vasubandhu:] This is done over-hastily. [Sarvāstivādin:] Why then over-hastily? 
[Vasubandhu: Because] that which is [conveyed] explicitly by the Blessed One is [here] con-
veyed in a different manner.” AKBh ad 4.39, p. 223: idam abhisāhasaṃ vartate | kim 
atrābhisāhasam | yat bhagavatā nītārthaṃ punar anyathā nīyate | Ku 189a5–6: 'di ni ha cang 
thug thub ches par 'gyur ro| |'di la thug thub ci zhig bya zhe na| bcom ldan 'das kyis nges pa'i 
don gang yin pa gzhan du 'dren pa'o| | 
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Vasubandhu further claims that the aforementioned sūtra is of explicit mean-
ing.45 The Vaibhāṣika claims in response that the sūtra defines ignorance as 
a dharma in an implicit manner. 
Vasubandhu’s assumption, which animates the whole debate, is that ex-
positions (nirdeśa; bstan pa) such as the one given for ignorance indicate that 
the sūtras containing them are necessarily of explicit meaning. At this point, 
the Vaibhāṣika questions not only the classification of the sūtra according to 
the explicit/implicit dichotomy, but also Vasubandhu’s aforementioned cri-
terion for determining that a sūtra is explicit. The Vaibhāṣika claims that the 
fact that it employs an exposition does not indicate in and of itself that the 
sūtra is explicit. At times, the Buddha defines concepts by enumerating their 
most essential aspects—an exposition which requires further explication.46 
For example, Vasubandhu’s interlocuter mentions a commentary in which 
the internal earth element (pṛthivī-dhātu; sa'i khams) is defined by a list of 
material body parts (the hair on the head, the hair on the body, etc.). In this 
line of argument, one can detect a movement towards undermining the foun-
dations of Vasubandhu’s hermeneutical system, an agreement about the 
standards of explicit and implicit meaning.47 
Vasubandhu makes an attempt to address this attack on his paradigm by 
demonstrating that his interlocutor has failed to understand the exposition 
itself and has consequently perceived this exposition as incomplete, even 
though it proves to be complete when understood correctly (and this, in turn, 
shows that the sūtra is explicit, as Vasubandhu argued before).48 In this case, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
45 “But because that which is of explicit meaning is not of implicit meaning, this is not the 
meaning of this sūtra.” AKBh ad 3.28, p. 136: yac ca nītārthaṃ na tat punar neyaṃ bhavatīti 
naiṣa sūtrārthaḥ. Ku 128a7: nges pa'i don gang yin pa de ni drang ba'i don ma yin pas 'di ni 
mdo'i don ma yin no| | 
46 “Not every [sūtra] by way of an exposition is of explicit meaning. Expositions are also given 
according to the most important aspects [which then require elucidation].” AKBh ad 3.28, p. 
136: na vai sarvaṃ nirdeśato nītārthaṃ bhavati | yathāpradhānaṃ cāpi nirdeśāḥ kriyante. Ku 
128a7: bstan pa'i sgo nas thams cad nges pa'i don kho na yang ma yin gyi| gtso bo ji lta bar 
bstan par yang mdzad de. 
47 This indirectly reveals the circular nature of this hermeneutical tool, as noted in Tzohar (2017, 
p. 266). 
48 “In this case, it is not hair and so forth which are defined by the earth element, because of 
which their definition is [allegedly] incomplete [and requires further elucidation], but rather in 
this case, it is the earth element which is defined by hair, and so forth. And because, moreover, 
the earth element has not been included in the hair and so forth, its exposition is complete [and 
does not require further elucidation; that is, it indicates a sūtra of explicit meaning].” AKBh ad 
3.28, p. 136: na hi tatra keśādayaḥ pṛthivīdhātunā nirdiśyante | yata eṣām aparipūrṇo nirdeśaḥ 
156  Hanner 
 
 
then, the misunderstanding ascribed to the sceptic afflicts three orders of in-
terpretation: the meaning of the scripture (“ignorance is a dharma”); the ap-
plication of hermeneutical tools (interpreting a literal scripture as if it were 
implicit); and the meta-procedure for determining how hermeneutical tools 
are to be applied (failing to accept the elements which distinguish an implicit 
scripture from an explicit one). Vasubandhu and his Vaibhāṣika interlocutor 
find themselves in a vicious circle in which each of them seeks to validate 
his criterion of truth by appealing to the epistemic source, while the epistemic 
validity of the source of knowledge is measured by the criterion of truth. 
Their disagreement ends, as a Pyrrhonian would undoubtedly anticipate, with 
one of the five modes of Agrippa; namely, circular reasoning. 
Vasubandhu, however, does not draw the normative conclusion that the 
sceptic draws—that one should suspend judgement with respect to scriptural 
knowledge claims. He does not terminate his exegetical debates with doubt, 
nor does he prescribe this as a desirable dialectical state. In light of his char-
acterization of doubt in the VY, it seems safe to say that Vasubandhu differs 
from the sceptic in this regard because he does not believe that the suspension 
of judgement is the way to attain tranquillity, still less higher spiritual in-
sights. For him, radical doubt does not defeat the authority of Buddhist teach-
ings. Unlike the sceptic, Vasubandhu seems to hold a form of external coher-
entism or reliabilism whereby the true meaning of scriptures can be revealed 
when the correct exegetical procedure is followed. Even though only Bud-
dhas have direct experience of the truths transmitted in scriptures, by relying 
on a proper method of scriptural interpretation, unawakened beings can ap-
proach the profundity of the Buddha’s knowledge. 
Conclusion 
As a philosopher and exegete, Vasubandhu is far from being an adherent of 
an all-embracing sceptical worldview. Knowledge of reality with the aid of 
scriptures is possible, at least to a substantial degree. Nevertheless, in his 
exegetical system, scepticism in the sense adopted here is an essential aspect 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
syād api tu keśādibhir eva pṛthivīdhātuḥ tatra nirdeśyate | na ca keśādīn abhyatītyāpy asti 
pṛthivīdhātur iti saṃpūrṇa evāsya nirdeśaḥ. Ku 128b1–2: 'di ni dpe ma yin te| de las ni gang gis 
na de dag ma rdzogs par bstan par 'gyur ba sa'i khams kyi skra la sogs pa ston pa ni ma yin gyi 
'on kyang de las ni skra la sogs pa dag kho nas sa'i khams ston pa yin te| skra la sogs pa ma 
gtogs pa yang sa'i khams med pas 'di rdzogs par bstan pa kho na yin no. 
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of scriptural commentary. This is true for both the teacher who sheds light 
on the message of sūtras before his disciples and the philosopher who en-
gages in dialectical argumentation based on scriptural sources. To preserve 
the authority of the Buddha’s words, Vasubandhu channels all sceptical in-
clinations towards a separate object: our understanding of Buddhist teach-
ings, or misunderstanding thereof. This is the standard object of doubt in 
these philosophical debates, as demonstrated in different places in the AKBh. 
It also stands at the heart of Vasubandhu’s explanation of disagreements re-
garding the authority of scriptures and their content. As far as scriptural 
learning is concerned, both the teacher and his disciples may raise sceptical 
objections regarding the credibility of the teachings. In such cases, sceptical 
expressions are either conceived as unwarranted due to their prejudiced 
standpoint and should be rectified by means of further learning, or they are 
seen as a means of grounding and interiorizing knowledge claims stated by 
the scriptures. 
In this understanding of doubt and authority, we detect a complex view of 
the relation between scripture and reasoning as sources of knowledge. In 
Buddhist thought, and in the Indian philosophical tradition more broadly, 
scriptures and reasoning are considered to be two important factors in the 
acquisition of liberating knowledge. Traditionally, Indian epistemology 
maintains that inference is more reliable than scriptural testimony and that in 
the event of contradiction between them, the former should triumph. 
Vasubandhu’s treatment of scepticism, however, provides an additional per-
spective. True, reasoning is the tool which enables us to determine the true 
meaning of scriptures; but at the same time, reasoning may err. Scriptures, 
on the other hand, are intrinsically a source of true knowledge, whether they 
are correctly understood or not. 
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Commentaries by Khenpo Shenga and Ju Mipham. Boston, MA: Snow Lion Pub-
lications, ix–xiii. 
Fogelin, Robert J. (1994). Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gold, Jonathan (2014). Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu’s Unifying Buddhist Phi-
losophy. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Hayes, Richard P. (1984). “The Question of Doctrinalism in the Buddhist Epistemol-
ogists.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 52/4, 645–670. 
Lammenranta, Markus (2008). “The Pyrrhonian Problematic.” The Oxford Handbook 
of Skepticism, edited by John Greco. New York: Oxford University Press, 9–33. 
Lammenranta, Markus (2012). “The Role of Disagreement in Pyrrhonian and Carte-
sian Skepticism.” Disagreement and Skepticism, edited by Diego E. Machuca. 
New York: Routledge, 46–65 (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy 
46). 
Lamotte, Étienne (1988). “Assessment of Textual Interpretation in Buddhism.” Bud-
dhist Hermeneutics, edited by Donald S. Lopez, Jr. Honolulu: University of Ha-
waiʻi Press, 11–28 (Studies in East Asian Buddhism 6). (Original work published 
1949.) 
Lopez, Donald S., Jr. (1988). “Introduction.” Buddhist Hermeneutics, edited by Don-
ald S. Lopez, Jr. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1–10 (Studies in East 
Asian Buddhism 6). (Original work published 1949.) 
Machuca, Diego E. (2011). “The Pyrrhonian Argument from Possible Disagreement.” 
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93/2, 148–161. 
Machuca, Diego E. (2015). “Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagree-
ment.”  
Journal of Philosophical Research 40, 23–39. 
Mathes, Klaus-Dieter (1996). Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von ihrem wahren 
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One): The Root Text and Its Scriptural Source. Beijing: China Tibetology Publish-
ing House (Han Zang fo xue yan jiu cong shu 4). 
Skilling, Peter (2000). “Vasubandhu and the Vyākhyāyukti Literature.” Journal of the 
International Association of Buddhist Studies 23/2, 297–350. 
Thurman, Robert A. F. (1978). “Buddhist Hermeneutics.” Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 46/1, 19–39. 
Tucci, Giuseppe. (1930). On Some of the Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya[nātha] 
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Sceptical Buddhism as Provenance and Project* 
James Mark Shields 
Scepticism is accordingly a form of belief. Dogma cannot be abandoned; it can only 
be revised in view of some more elementary dogma which it has not yet occurred to 
the sceptic to doubt; and he may be right in every point of his criticism, except in 
fancying that his criticism is radical and that he is altogether a sceptic. 
– George Santayana, Skepticism and Animal Faith, 1923 
 
The past century and a half has seen various attempts in both Asia and the 
West to reform or re-conceptualize Buddhism by adding a simple, often 
provocative, qualifier. This paper examines some of the links between 
“secular,” “critical,” “sceptical,” and “radical” Buddhism in order to 
ascertain possibilities in thinking Buddhism anew as a 21st-century “project” 
with philosophical, ethical, and political resonance. In particular, I am 
motivated by the question of whether “sceptical” Buddhism can coexist with 
Buddhist praxis, conceived as an engaged response to the suffering of 
sentient beings in a globalized and neoliberal industrial capitalist world 
order. Let me state from the start that my attempt to make sense of these 
terms and to draw connections between them is very much in nuce; that is, a 
work in progress that might serve as a kind of meta-analysis of the research 
I have undertaken over the past decade and continue to pursue in my various 
projects. As a result, this chapter is also autobiographical in the sense that it 
is rooted in my own ways of thinking, including my biases, about the ideas, 
movements, and persons I have chosen to study.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
* This chapter is a revised and extended version of a paper delivered at the Workshop on Bud-
dhism and Scepticism: Historical, Philosophical, and Comparative Perspectives, University of 
Hamburg, November 14–16, 2017. 





Many introductions to philosophical scepticism in the West begin by 
commenting on the deep and significant relation between scepticism and 
epistemology. Since the classical period, but perhaps even more so after René 
Descartes (1596–1650), Western theories of knowledge have developed in 
response to (either in defense of or in opposition to) various forms of 
scepticism (see, e.g., the entry on “skepticism” in the Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy). Often, this amounts to a particular philosophical programme 
engaging in a limited scepticism about particular sources of or avenues for 
knowledge (e.g., empiricists about a priori knowledge). And of course, 
religions also develop on the basis of (perhaps more) limited forms of 
scepticism: towards prevailing ritual practices, institutions, dogmas, cultural 
values, and so on. In this sense, all of the world’s major religious traditions 
emerged as “reform” movements, breaking away from or seeking out new 
permutations within existing religious and social practices. But there are also 
important distinctions to be made between simple doubt, the impulse for 
religious reform, and philosophical scepticism as generally understood. Most 
importantly, as Wittgenstein has shown, the former two instances imply a 
ground of belief about the way things really are; that is, doubt in the ordinary 
sense requires the possibility of its removal (“A doubt without an end is not 
even a doubt” 1 ). Another way to say this is that ordinary doubt or 
incredulity—and, I would add, the “doubt” that normally undergirds the 
impulse to religious reform—is part and parcel of holding things to be true; 
that is, having at least a minimal commitment to metaphysics, ontology, 
and/or cosmology.  
Philosophical scepticism is decidedly more thoroughgoing in its critique 
of all forms of knowledge, rather than an exchange of true certainty for 
falsehood or delusion. Indeed, philosophical scepticism would seem to be a 
stance that is incompatible with metaphysical belief—or at least, one that 
must be held in significant tension with even a minimal commitment to 
metaphysics. Pyrrho of Elis (c. 365–275 BCE) is often considered the 
founder of philosophical scepticism in the West, though his works are mainly 
known through the writings of Sextus Empiricus, who lived some four 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 Wittgenstein (1972/1969, §625).  
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centuries later. Pyrrhonian sceptics “withhold assent to every non-evident 
proposition” (Klein, 2015)—though to be clear, this also includes the meta-
proposition that we cannot have knowledge of any sort. Here, we begin to see 
both an opening, but also, perhaps, a lacuna in this form of thoroughgoing 
scepticism: sceptics of the Pyrrhonian variety are resolute anti-dogmatists, 
but (and by virtue of such) they are not in fact committed to the positive 
rejection of epistemology. Rather, they are, in a sense, setting aside the 
question, or perhaps changing the subject away from epistemology. We will 
return to this below. 
The tradition of scepticism in the West has largely not followed Pyrrho 
and Sextus, however. Rather, Descartes’s writings engage and expand upon 
what the Pyrrhonians derided as Academic scepticism (dating back to 
Carneades [214–129 BCE]), which, for all its insistence on “radical doubt,” 
ultimately relies on a process of argument and reasoning to reach conclusions 
such as the famous cogito. Interestingly—as we will see below—one of the 
claims of the Japanese Critical Buddhists was that Descartes was, in several 
respects, a model or paradigm for contemporary Buddhism, because of his 
insistence on radical (methodological) doubt and his commitment to a kind 
of intellectual integrity and personal autonomy of belief. Sextus outlines the 
distinction between the Pyrrhonian and Academic sceptics in terms of a 
subtle but significant difference in their understanding of “belief”—here used 
in the context of “assent to propositions.” Whereas the Academics believe 
with “strong impulse or inclination,” Pyrrhonian “belief” is a form of non-
resistance: “simply to follow without any strong impulse or inclination” 
(Sextus Empiricus, 1933, 1.230). This last description sounds remarkably 
akin to the way certain forms of Asian philosophical and religious traditions 
are interpreted in the modern West, not least Daoism and Buddhism, though 
it is an interpretation that has been challenged in the past century by Asian 
Buddhists who claim that such “topical” or “ataraxic” Buddhism relinquishes 
its foundational commitment to ethics; namely, to liberating all beings from 
the round of suffering. In what follows, I will trace a brief history of such 
challenges, beginning with the most recent one offered by Stephen Batchelor.  
Batchelor’s Secular Buddhism 
For the past several decades, the British Buddhist activist and scholar 
Stephen Batchelor has pushed the edges of the Dharma by proposing a 
demythologized approach to Buddhism—a view that, on one hand, has clear 
roots in the “modern” or “modernist” forms of Buddhism that have flourished 
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in Europe and the United States since the 1920s (if not a few decades before 
in Japan), but which also presents itself as a radically “contemporary” form 
of practice, best suited for Buddhists of the early 21st century. One of 
Batchelor’s early works, Buddhism without Beliefs (1998), was instrumental 
in shaping my own interests in Buddhism in relation to Western philosophy 
and ethics. In 2015, Batchelor published a book that summarizes his thinking 
over this two-decade span. Invoking both the work of the post-theist 
Christian theologian Don Cupitt and the meta-cultural analysis of Charles 
Taylor, the book is entitled After Buddhism: Rethinking the Dharma for a 
Secular Age.2  
In introducing the concept of “secular Buddhism,” Batchelor insists that 
he does not  
envision a Buddhism that seeks to discard all traces of religiosity, that seeks 
to arrive at a dharma that is little more than a set of self-help techniques that 
enable us to operate more calmly and effectively as agents or clients, or both, 
of capitalist consumerism. (Batchelor, 2015, p. 17)  
Indeed, he argues,  
we could make the case that the practice of mindfulness, taken out of its 
original context, reinforces the solipsistic isolation of the self by immunizing 
practitioners against the unsettling emotions, impulses, anxieties, and doubts 
that assail our fragile egos. (Batchelor, 2015, p. 17)  
While this revolt against excessive inwardness may seem to point Batchelor 
towards a more “engaged” position, he shifts rather towards an aesthetic or 
even pantheistic perspective:  
Instead of imagining a dharma that erects even firmer barriers around the 
alienated self, let us imagine one that works toward a re-enchantment of the 
world. Doing so will require the cultivation of a sensibility to what might be 
called the “everyday sublime.” (Batchelor, 2015, p. 17) 
We will return to this idea of Buddhism as a cultivation of sensibility later on. 
For now, I would like to highlight Batchelor’s attempt to carve out a “middle 
way” (to invoke a classical Buddhist trope) between the kind of religiosity 
that is rooted in dogmatic faith and the sort of unreflective atheism—
“materialism”?—that denies not only the possibility of God and the realm of 
transcendence, but with it all that is not logical or subject to empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 Cupitt’s best-known work, After God (1997), describes the gradual but inevitable demise of 
“theistic” religions in favour of naturalism. Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) provides a detailed 
and evocative reinterpretation of “secularism” as a (largely) positive post-Enlightenment trend 
towards a plurality of spiritual options. 
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verification, including, importantly, the feeling of humility and awe in the 
face of nature. “Secular” is clearly not simply a synonym for “non-religious.” 
Betraying his modernist assumptions, Batchelor seeks an essence (and 
justification) for secular Buddhism in the early texts, arguing for the presence 
of an unmistakably “skeptical voice” in the Pāli Canon, one that 
refuses to be drawn into affirming or negating an opinion, into making 
ontological assertions, or into asserting anything as ultimately true or real. The 
sage chooses to suspend judgment rather than get involved in disputes […]. 
The point is to gain practical knowledge that leads to changes in behavior that 
affect the quality of your life: theoretical knowledge, in contrast, may have 
little, if any, impact on how you live in the world from day to day. (Batchelor, 
2015, p. 22)  
Beyond the appeal to an “ideality of origins,” here we see Batchelor make an 
explicit connection between secular Buddhism and what we might call a 
“realist” or even “pragmatist” approach to knowledge.3 He goes on to cite 
Trevor Ling’s observation that “what we now know as Buddhism started life 
as an embryonic civilization or culture that mutated into an organized 
religion”—seeing this as an insight on which to construct a modern, secular 
Buddhism (Batchelor, 2015, p. 28). Later in the book, it becomes clear that 
what Batchelor means to suggest here is that Buddhism was (and can be) a 
comprehensive way of being in the world, unrestricted by the limits of 
“religion” as conceived in the contexts of (Western) modernity, as well as by 
more traditional criteria of family, status, and so on (Batchelor, 2015, p. 48). 
So this is, one might say, a vision of post-Enlightenment humanist 
universalism combined with a Romantic rejection of the lines between 
religion and the secular realms. Here, “secular” comes into clearer focus as 
a kind of “this-worldly” attention to the ordinary world, including both nature 
and social existence. 
One of Batchelor’s most insightful suggestions—and one that draws his 
work into conversation with the Critical Buddhist movement, addressed 
below—is his discussion of the “critical” aspect of Buddhist teachings, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 “Gotama is concerned with how a person can flourish within the totality of his or her senso-
rium, which he calls ‘the all.’ As a pragmatist, he has no interest in claiming that ‘nothing exists 
outside of experience’ or insisting that ‘God does not exist.’ These are metaphysical claims, 
just as indefensible as the metaphysical claims of his opponents. To adopt an atheist position 
would lay him open to exactly the same charges he makes against those he criticizes. Instead of 
making a statement about the existence or otherwise of a transcendent consciousness or Divin-
ity, Gotama says that claims to know what is unknowable and see what is unseeable are non-
sensical and entirely irrelevant to the task at hand of practicing the dharma” (Batchelor, 2015, 
p. 179). 
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he introduces by suggesting that what makes following the Buddhadharma 
so difficult for most people is that it “goes against the stream” (Pāli 
paṭisotagāmi) (Batchelor, 2015, p. 45). For Batchelor,  
to enter the stream of the eightfold path means to go against the stream of one’s 
reactivity, be that of one’s instinctual drives, social conditioning, or 
psychological inclinations. By choosing to think, speak, and act otherwise than 
as prompted by those habits requires considerable resolve and commitment. 
(Batchelor, 2015, p. 45) 
Nirvana then becomes an “opening of a space” for true freedom, as one 
moves beyond inclinations, conditioning, and “reactivity” (Batchelor, 2015, 
p. 60).4 Notice here how Batchelor frames his argument along lines that are 
readily familiar, not only to traditional orthodox religionists (i.e., religious 
transformation as a breaking out of conventional modes and habits into a 
“new life”), but also to secular liberals of the Kantian persuasion: freedom 
and salvation are premised on breaking away from our “natural” state; having 
the courage and aspiration to transcend the limitations of our “ordinary” (i.e., 
“unenlightened”) ways of being. Batchelor goes on to render this process in 
more resolutely anti-Darwinian terms:  
Mythically, this force is described as the “army of Mara,” which is composed 
of “sensual desire; discontent; hunger and thirst; craving; sloth and torpor; 
fear; doubt; hypocrisy and obstinacy; gain, renown, honour and ill-gotten 
fame; and the extolling of oneself and disparaging of others.” Today we would 
understand these forces as part of the legacy of biological evolution, the 
embedded instincts and drives that enabled our ancestors to succeed in the 
competition for scarce resources and survive. (Batchelor, 2015, p. 63) 
At first glance, this sounds plausible, but by associating all of these negative 
traits with “the legacy of biological evolution,” Batchelor may here be 
replacing one set of “myths” with another. Yes, human beings need to eat, 
and surely there are evolutionary aspects to common responses (e.g., fight or 
flight) when faced with threatening situations. But sloth? Hypocrisy? 
Honour? The desire for fame? Selfishness? To assume that these are 
somehow “instinctual”—even as a foundation for criticism—seems to me to 
give up the game to the discourse of contemporary neo-liberal “realism” and 
associated neo-Freudian psychology, buttressed by Hobbesian assumptions 
about human nature and lingering Christian–Idealist suspicions about all 
things carnal. What if the “three fires” of greed, hatred, and delusion (or 
“confusion”) are partly or wholly a product of social and economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 By “reactivity,” Batchelor means taṇhā (Skt. tṛṣṇā), usually translated as “desire” or “crav-
ing” (p. 74). 
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(ideological) conditioning? Would that make a difference to Batchelor’s 
Gospel of Secular Buddhism?5 While Batchelor elsewhere alludes to the 
inescapable nature of social conditioning (Batchelor, 2015, pp. 293–294), 
towards the end of the book, he reiterates his conviction that contemporary 
secular Buddhism can and must resist our evolutionary heritage:  
From the perspective of modern biology, greed and hatred are a legacy of our 
evolutionary past. They are physical drives rooted in our limbic system, which 
still possess such potency because of the exceptional survival advantages the 
drives conferred on humans as a species. (Batchelor, 2015, p. 208) 
There is much of value here, but there are also, I suggest, problems with 
Batchelor’s project. Perhaps there are inevitable tensions between a 
“sceptical” and a “secular” Buddhism—while Batchelor employs both terms, 
he relies more heavily on the latter as a descriptor of his project for Buddhist 
reform (even though, as noted above, his understanding of the “secular” is 
nuanced in an interesting and fruitful way). Can a truly “sceptical” Buddhism 
keep to the ethical—some would argue political—imperative of the Buddhist 
path; namely, the commitment to the liberation of all beings from suffering? 
Near the end of the book, Batchelor hints at a broader, more explicitly 
political vision of Buddhist practice when he stipulates that dukkha is not 
simply an outflow of the greed and hatred that emerge from our “habitual 
reactivity,” but rather “whatever impedes human flourishing […] [such as] a 
patriarchal culture, a despotic government, an oppressive religion, grinding 
poverty: these can prevent our flourishing just as effectively as our own greed 
and hatred” (Batchelor, 2015, p. 310). This brings him closer to the 
arguments of Critical Buddhism, to which I shall now turn. 
Critical Buddhism: “Buddhism is Criticism” 
Like Stephen Batchelor, Matsumoto Shirō 松本史郎 and Hakamaya Noriaki 
袴谷憲明 , the primary figures behind the late 20th-century Japanese 
scholarly movement known as Critical Buddhism (hihan bukkyō 批判仏教), 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
5 To flesh out my critique a little more, it seems odd to me that Batchelor explains reactions 
such as restlessness, boredom, guilt, self-doubt, vanity, inadequacy, anxiety, conceit, paranoia, 
expectation, and wishful thinking as “simply what happens when an organism interacts with its 
environment.” I beg to differ—most if not all of these ways of responding to a situation are 
affected if not determined by one’s upbringing, education, culture, religion, hegemonic ideolo-
gies, and so on. It seems a stretch to conclude, as Batchelor does, that they simply “are what 
arises” (Batchelor, 2015, p. 75).  
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recognized serious problems with the way Buddhism has been both 
understood and practised in the modern period, if not before.6 They argued 
that: a) the early Buddhist tradition was established on premises that can be 
considered rational, sceptical, and broadly humanistic in their ethical force; 
b) over time, due to various factors, these “critical” aspects had withered if 
not disappeared in most branches of the Asian Buddhist tradition, but 
particularly the Chan and Zen traditions of East Asia; c) as a result, 
contemporary Asian Buddhism—and particularly Japanese Buddhism—was 
in need of a “critical” reformation, which might be brought about through a 
combination of textual scholarship and comparative analysis, utilizing 
critical resources from Western thought traditions such as the work of René 
Descartes—that most unlikely of Buddhists. More specifically, the Critical 
Buddhists founded their arguments on a clear distinction between ways of 
thinking and valuing they called critical and those they referred to as topical, 
contrasting terms associated with the methodological analysis of Descartes 
on the one hand and his presumed foil and foe, the Italian thinker 
Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), on the other.  
So, if Buddhism must be critical, then what, exactly, does it mean to be 
critical, or to practice—and embody—criticism? For Hakamaya, being 
critical implies, first and foremost, the ability and willingness (perhaps, to 
invoke Kant again, courage) to make clear distinctions. He argues that it is 
in fact only critical thinking that can combat worldly discrimination (in the 
socio-political sense), which results precisely from a lack of logical/ethical 
discrimination, often in the name of some greater unity or harmony (e.g., 
racism, ethno-chauvinism, religious exclusivism, nationalism). Topicalism, 
a Latinate term back-translated by Matsumoto into Sanskrit as dhātu-vāda—
implying something like the “way of locus,” or simply, essentialism—stands 
as the bête noire of Critical Buddhism. Defined by Matsumoto as “a 
substantialist monism in which the Buddha-nature is the sole foundational 
reality out of which apparent reality is produced” (Matsumoto, 1997, p. 171) 
and by Jamie Hubbard as “an aesthetic mysticism unconcerned with critical 
differentiation between truth and falsity and not in need of rational 
demonstration” (Hubbard, 1997, p. vii), topicalism is a way of thinking about 
Buddhism, scholarship, religion, and, one might add, life more generally 
which is based on the notion of “a singular, real locus (dhātu) that gives rise 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 See Shields (2011).  
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to a plurality of phenomena […] a ‘generative monism’ or a ‘transcendental 
realism’” (Matsumoto, 1997, p. 171). 
It is important to note here that Critical Buddhism is not understood by 
Hakamaya and Matsumoto as merely Cartesian rationalism or Enlightenment 
humanism in Buddhist guise, but is rather as being ostensibly founded on 
certain inviolable Buddhist doctrines or principles against which everything 
else—even other doctrines and forms of belief held sacrosanct in some 
Buddhist quarters—must be judged. Thus, while heavily indebted to 
rationalist (and, to some extent, pragmatist) philosophical methods, 
criticalism is founded on (Buddhist) faith, where faith is not to be understood 
as “the unity of the object of belief and believer,” but rather as believing in—
holding true and abiding by—certain key doctrines such as pratītya-
samutpāda (dependent origination), while using one’s intellect and language 
to judge and elaborate the meaning and practical application of these 
principles in relation to nature and contemporary social forms. Thus, as with 
Descartes, there is a limited form of scepticism at work, but one that is always 
secondary to the primary, ethical telos of Buddhist practice. 
Along these lines, the proper question to ask from the perspective of 
Critical Buddhism is not “What is Buddhism?” but rather “What is the 
purpose of Buddhism?” Hakamaya, in his attack on so-called topical 
thinking, criticizes the notion that satori or awakening is the goal of 
Buddhism; rather, he argues, the goal is dharma-pravicaya—“the clear 
discrimination of phenomena” (Hakamaya, 1997, p. 74). But even this is not 
really the end or telos of Critical Buddhism; it is rather the mode or method 
of it. The goal of Critical Buddhism is instead “the realization of ‘wisdom’ 
(bodhi) for the practice of ‘great compassion’ (mahākaruṇā)” (Yamaguchi 
Zuiho, quoted in Hubbard, 1997, p. xvi). Here, we shift from a primarily 
ontological or objective inquiry to a more explicitly constructive, ethical, 
soteriological, or perhaps even theological one. Again, as with the Cartesian 
project of radical doubt, here scepticism must give way to a measure of 
certainty, in order to give teeth to criticism as a firm basis for ethics. 
Radical Buddhism 
While intrigued by the forthright tone of the Critical Buddhists Matsumoto 
Shirō and Hakamaya Noriaki, and by their insistence that Buddhism was, or 
rather should be, founded on premises that are rational, sceptical, and broadly 
humanistic, in my 2011 book Critical Buddhism, I was critical of what I saw 
as the often uncritical liberalism of the Critical Buddhist perspective. This 
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concern led me to my next project on precedents for thinking about and 
practising Buddhism in conversation with more explicitly political—
progressive, even radical—forms of thought in the Japanese tradition.7 In 
Against Harmony: Progressive and Radical Buddhism in Modern Japan, I 
provided an intellectual genealogy and analysis of progressive and radical 
Buddhism in Japan since the Meiji Restoration of 1868, with particular focus 
on the first three decades of the 20th century, during which Japan saw the 
growth of nationalism and imperialism, both in discourse and practice.8  
Despite the variations in the “New Buddhist” movements arising in Japan 
in the mid to late Meiji period (1868–1912), there was a general consensus 
that a) Buddhist institutions had lost their way and needed to be replaced or 
supplemented by a vigorous “lay Buddhism”; b) Buddhism was and had to 
re-establish itself as “this-worldly” (genseshugi 現世主義 ); 9  and c) 
Buddhism was and should be engaged with social, economic, and political 
issues—particularly when social, economic, and political systems were the 
primary cause of much modern “suffering.” That said, like their Critical 
Buddhist descendants, most of these New Buddhists remained politically 
within the realm of progressive liberalism or social democracy; that is, they 
were convinced that modern democratic principles and structures were a 
necessary if not sufficient foundation for the New Buddhism they sought to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 Batchelor, after noting that “the shift to a more secular approach to Buddhism is not new,” 
provides three specific examples of similar attempts emerging out of modernity: the Vipassana 
movement, with roots in Burma, Chögyam Trungpa’s Shambala Buddhism, and Soka Gakkai 
International. He criticizes all three of these “secularized Buddhist movements” for not being 
“radical” enough: “Although there may be a reduced public display of overt religiosity in their 
centers and a deliberate effort by teachers to present the dharma in terms of its psychological 
and social benefits, little effort has been made to critically examine the underlying worldview 
of Buddhism, in which are still embedded the cosmology and metaphysics of ancient India”—
for example, “doctrines of karma, rebirth, heavens, hells, and supernormal powers” (Batchelor, 
2015, p. 19). Here, Batchelor shows himself woefully oblivious to critical—even radical—
precedents to his secular Buddhism in places such as China and (especially) Japan, some of 
which went far beyond his rather tame, dare I say “bourgeois” (if “progressive”), project. 
8 See Shields (2017). 
9 Batchelor on Buddhism and “this-worldliness”: “Dharma practice takes place within this do-
main (visaya), which is the realm of human experience, a world intimately tied to the body and 
the senses. ‘It is just in this fathom-high mortal frame endowed with perception and mind,’ says 
Gotama, ‘that I make known the world’ […]. Loka, for him, does not refer to the world out 
there that I observe and hear about as a detached spectator but is shorthand for whatever goes 
on. The world is whatever ‘collapses,’ ‘falls apart,’ or simply ‘passes.’ […] It refers as much to 
thoughts and feelings that rise up and pass away as to events occurring outside the body” 
(Batchelor, 2015, p. 179). 
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establish. And yet, contacts with secular anarchists and Christian socialists 
led some of these New Buddhists into more radical terrain, leading to the 
emergence of groups such as the Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism 
(Shinkō Bukkyō Seinen Dōmei 新興仏教青年同盟), a Marxist–Buddhist 
organization that flourished in the early 1930s before being forcibly 
suppressed in 1936.  
One of the more striking elements of New Buddhism was a general lack 
of concern with metaphysics, cosmology, and even doctrine. Although many 
of those involved were scholars or scholar-priests—mainly associated with 
the Jōdo Shin 浄土真 (True Pure Land) and Nichiren 日蓮 sects—they did 
not spend much time justifying or arguing for their New Buddhism on 
philosophical, textual, or doctrinal grounds. Partly, this comes from the 
commitment to “this-worldliness,” which supported a pragmatic, and, I 
suggest, “phenomenological” understanding of Buddhist truth. But it also 
emerges from an encounter with pantheist/immanentist and materialist 
thought traditions, culminating in the work of Marx and Russian anarchists 
such as Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) and Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921). I 
have written about the problems and possibilities of Buddhist materialism 
elsewhere, but will simply point out here that scepticism and materialism 
have obvious points of contact; not least the radical critique of claims to 
transcendence, whether religious or philosophical. In the West, this goes all 
the way back to Epicurus (341–270 BCE), but also can be seen in the Cārvāka 
school of ancient India.10  
Here, let me cite Matthew Stewart’s summary of Epicurus’s thought, 
which, I believe, transposes perfectly—however surprisingly—onto the 
work of the Japanese New Buddhists:  
Happiness in this life […] is everything. The highest form of happiness is 
freedom from pain in the body and tranquility of mind. The surest path to 
happiness is a life of ordinary virtue. The greatest sources of needless 
unhappiness are the misunderstandings that give rise to unquenchable desires 
and baseless fears. The worst of our misunderstandings involve the fear of 
inscrutable deities and the fear of death. Religion exploits these fears for the 
benefit of priests and kings. Calm attention to the true nature of things allows 
us to cast aside harmful fears and superstitions and thereby to achieve 
happiness. Science—by which is meant the quiet pursuit of the understanding 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 The term “Lokāyata” denotes a form of philosophical materialism that appears as a foil in 
early Buddhist texts, though scholars maintain that the Lokāyata or Cārvāka school did not 
emerge until the sixth and seventh centuries CE. The best-known figure associated with 
Cārvāka thought is the legendary Bṛhaspati, who appears to have taught a mix of scepticism 
and materialism.  
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that brings happiness—is the only form of piety worth the name. (Stewart, 
2014, p. 87)  
Indeed, the guiding principle of the Epicurean tradition can be found in 
Lucretius’s assertion that “nothing is ever produced supernaturally out of 
nothing” (Lucretius, 1951, I. 82–83), and that nothing, in turn, is ever 
completely destroyed. As with classical Buddhism in all its forms, in the 
Epicurean universe, “there is change—indeed, things never cease coming to 
be and perishing—but all change is transformation” (Stewart, 2014, p. 88). 
Thus, the foundation for this Epicurean, materialist form of scepticism is an 
acceptance of the “truth” of ceaseless change, as well as a commitment to 
“science” understood as a recognition and use of principles of naturalistic 
causality. But where is the political element to this? Indeed, Epicureans—as 
with their rivals, the Stoics, and sceptics of the Pyrrhonian sort—are often 
considered to be apolitical. Here, though, I suggest that the rejection of 
“politics” one finds in these classical Western schools is similar to their 
rejections of “religion”; that is, it is fundamentally a criticism of unreflective, 
dogmatic forms of political and religious belief and practices. In particular, 
when it comes to politics as normally understood, the sceptic would have 
serious doubts, as she should, about the effectiveness of both “the institution 
of government and the use of coercion as a social tool” (Fagin, 1997, p. 41). 
It may be that we are confronted here with a different conception of 
“politics,” one that aligns with some of the ideas of the contemporary 
progressive thinker Murray Bookchin, who argues that politics has its origins 
in local communities rather than the large administrative bodies and top-
down hierarchies we associate with the modern (or ancient) “state.”11  
Let us return to the issue of pragmatism. For Epicurus and Lucretius, as 
for Pyrrho and other classical sceptics,  
philosophy was first and foremost a practice. It was only by applying such ideas 
in one’s life that their value was realized. The aim was not intellectual 
knowledge but a radical transformation of one’s entire outlook on oneself and 
the world. (Batchelor,2015, p. 254)  
This, of course, is also at the very core of the religious impulse. And yet, for 
Pyrrho, at least, since things are 
equally in-different, un-measurable and un-decidable […] neither our 
sensations nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods. Therefore, we should 
not put the slightest trust in them, but be without judgement, without 
preference, and unwavering, saying about each thing that it no more is than is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
11 See, for example, Bookchin (2015, p. 11). 
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not, or both is and is not, or neither is or is not. The result for those who adopt 
this attitude […] will first be speechlessness (aphatos), then untroubledness 
(ataraxia). (Batchelor, 2015, p. 254)  
Though Batchelor tries to draw links between Pyrrhonian scepticism and the 
Buddha (even suggesting a direct influence via Anaxarchus, a mentor of 
Alexander the Great) (Batchelor, 2015, p. 330), the New (and especially 
radical) Buddhists edge more closely towards direct engagement with the 
causes of suffering than “untroubledness”—taking seriously, once again, the 
developments of 19th-century radical thought as it emerged from materialist 
and other traditions. The concern here is that “untroubledness” may be rooted 
in a too-ready acceptance of “conventional” modes of awareness and 
understanding—a conforming to “common sense” that is in fact delusory 
and/or ideologically constructed.  
Buddhist Phenomenology 
Here, Jay Garfield’s work elaborating the “phenomenological” aspects of 
Mahāyāna—and particularly Madhyamaka thought—is of use. This is how 
Garfield sums up Buddhist pragmatic conventionalism:  
Phenomena thus depend upon conceptual imputation—a dependence with 
social, cognitive and sensory dimensions. This may be one of the most radical 
attacks on one aspect of the Myth of the Given to have ever been advanced in 
world philosophy. It is not simply an argument that reality—whatever it may 
be—is not given to us as it is; rather, it is the claim that we can make no sense 
whatsoever of the very notion of reality that is presupposed by any form of 
that myth. The dependence, however, is not absolute, and does not yield an 
idealism; it is rather causal, involving an interplay between the subjective and 
objective aspects of the reality we enact. (Garfield, 2015, p. 35)  
At this point, Garfield asks: Is this still metaphysics, or is it phenomenology; 
that is, investigating the world as we know it rather than the world as it is? He 
suggests that the Madhyamakan stance points to a phenomenological 
perspective that sets aside ontology, and thus metaphysics, entirely. Though 
this seems to align with certain features of the principle Western sceptical 
traditions (both Pyrrhonian and Academic), which resisted to varying 
degrees making statements about the world as it is, it differs from these in 
the following ways:  
In providing an account of the world, the ontology of which is determined by 
imputation, Buddhist philosophers, partly for soteriological reasons, partly for 
metaphysical reasons, are emphasizing that the entities and properties with 
which we interact are those that have significance for us, those about which 
we care, that stand out from and are framed by backgrounds, or that constitute 
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the backgrounds that give significance to that which stands out […] Buddhist 
philosophy […] is aimed at solving a particular problem, that of the 
omnipresence of suffering […]. The choice of the lebenswelt as the site of 
metaphysics is thus not a retreat from reality, but a focus on the reality that 
matters to us. Its metaphysics is the metaphysics that can make a difference. 
(Garfield, 2015, p. 39)  
In short, “phenomenology is central to Buddhist thought, because in the end, 
Buddhism is about the transformation of the way we experience the world” 
(Garfield, 2015, p. 179). Again, it is hard to miss a strong resonance here 
with the line of Western thought that runs from Epicurus and Lucretius 
through Bruno, Spinoza, and Marx. The lebenswelt in this phenomenological 
turn is “a world in which conventions can be constituted”; it is a world that 
is inescapably social—and even political—all the way down.12  
From a Buddhist perspective, the trick, of course, is to distinguish—or, as 
the Critical Buddhists would have it, “discriminate”—between those 
conventions that cause suffering and those that relieve it. One of the potential 
dangers of Buddhism—noted in particular by the Critical Buddhists, but also 
by New Buddhists of an earlier era—is the tendency to promote “harmony” 
with the status quo: economic, cultural, political, cosmological, or even 
metaphysical. This is where the sceptical aspect of phenomenology comes 
into focus.  
Arguing against Mark Siderits that the Mādhyamika are not, in fact, “anti-
realists” but rather that they extend anti-realism to such a degree that it 
explodes the very premise on which it (and by extension, “realism”) rests, 
Garfield concludes that  
like his rough contemporary Sextus Empiricus, Nāgārjuna navigates between 
the extremes of the realism/anti-realism dichotomy by suspending the debate 
at issue; and by doing so he rejects the very presuppositions of the debate—
that to be real is to be ultimately real, to have svabhāva. […] To be real on this 
understanding is hence not to possess, but to lack, ultimate reality. (Garfield, 
2015, p. 65)13 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 “For this reason, from a Mahāyāna perspective, not only are our salient social practices and 
linguistic meanings conventionally constituted, but so too is our ontology” (Garfield, 2015, p. 
39). 
13 Thus, as Garfield points out, whereas the Abhidharma might see the Madhyamaka as nihilis-
tic in its denial of svabhāva to everything, from the Madhyamaka point of view, it is the Abhi-
dharma that is nihilistic in the way it seems to deny or undercut the “reality” of the conventional 
world (in the way, perhaps, of some forms of scientific reductionism). Indeed, the Madhyamaka 
sees itself as offering a middle path between such nihilism and the more ordinary “common 
sense” reification. 
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Although phenomenology directly points to lived experience—and thus 
aligns with a naturalistic and even materialistic perspective—it also allows 
for a sustained critique of the “natural attitude,” characterized by “a kind of 
unreflecting ‘positing’ of the world as something existing ‘out there’ more 
or less independently of us” (Evan Thompson, cited in Garfield, 2015, p. 
175). Thus, like Buddhism at its best, phenomenology is rooted in a sceptical, 
and deeply critical, approach to the world and self. But also, like Buddhism 
at its best, the phenomenological method ideally goes beyond mere 
“introspection”—since introspection may be just as deluded as external 
observation via the senses (Garfield, 2015, pp. 177–178).  
Conclusion 
While there is clearly more work to be done, in this chapter, I have raised 
some intriguing possibilities that emerge from bringing Buddhist thought 
into conversation not only with classical Western scepticism, but also with 
modern and contemporary forms of progressive and radical philosophy—
particularly those emerging out of the materialist, Epicurean, Marxist, and 
anarchist streams. Epicurus, like Spinoza and Marx, for that matter, is much 
better described as a proponent of radical immanence than as a “materialist.” 
By this, I mean that they preferred to move away from metaphysics 
altogether rather than to oppose one set of ontological assumptions (idealism) 
with another (which is what “materialism” ostensibly does). At the same 
time, the “immanentist” line of thought eschews the sort of “weak nihilism” 
that might emerge from a scepticism that refuses to “take sides” on an issue. 
In a move that at least superficially resembles that of the existentialists, the 
very lack of a firm ontological ground is a call to greater responsibility—a 
push towards rather than away from the “meaningless” world. While 
Pyrrhonian scepticism may seem correlative with classical Buddhism, as 
well as the “secular” Buddhism promoted by modernists such as Batchelor, 
it is actually the residual scepticism of the Epicurean tradition that provides 
a better match with at least a progressively inclined contemporary Buddhism. 
This sort of scepticism requires a measure of “faith” in specific moral (and 
even political) claims about the value of human flourishing, the inevitability 
of change—but also the possibility of transformation—while also remaining 
mindful of the deleterious affects of much of what passes for “common 
sense” realism. As Wittgenstein would have it, “if I want the door to turn, the 
hinges must stay put” (Wittgenstein, 1969/1972, §343). 
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